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Ch a P t e r 1
Introducing the Remittances- 
to- Development Agenda
Migration, Remittances, and Development — 
Three Vignettes
This book explains how migrant remittances became a develop-
ment tool around the turn of the new millennium. This was the 
active accomplishment of policy entrepreneurs and experts intent 
on transforming the way that people around the world viewed 
and acted upon remittances. The following three vignettes offer 
an initial glimpse at the actors, historical events, and fundamental 
contradictions at the heart of this story.
KeePing the monies floWing in times of Crisis
The global financial crisis unleashed in 2008 threatened, among 
many other things, to erode the high volume of remittances 
that international migrants send back home to the global South, 
monies that had come to be  seen— as we will see throughout the 
course of this  book— not just as a lifeline for poor families but 
also as a promising source of development finance. The aggre-
gate amounts of money migrants sent across borders declined 
in 2008 as a result of the financial calamity, but the declines 
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did not last long. By 2009 global financial flows had stabilized 
and would start to grow again in the coming years. How did 
this happen? Were migrants somehow immune to the effects 
of the financial crisis, the crippling unemployment, economic 
uncertainty, and financial ruin it brought to so many ordinary 
people the world over? Maybe not. Robert Meins, a remittances 
expert from the Inter- American Development Bank, one of the 
most important international financial institutions working at 
the intersection of migration and development, suggested in an 
industry newsletter that a whole different dynamic was at work. 
He explained that:
The defining characteristic of remittances is that they are seen as a 
family obligation. Senders are more likely to cut back on their own 
consumption than to reduce the amount of money they send to 
their families. Unlike speculative flows or foreign investment, 
therefore, profit motives do not drive remittance levels. As a result, 
changing economic or political risks and natural disasters will not 
negatively impact the decision to send.  .  .  . [Emerging evidence 
suggests] that immigrants are working longer hours to compensate 
for lower wages, switching sectors after job loss, responding to 
labor demand and/or local immigration enforcement by moving 
from one state to another, and even tapping into their savings to 
maintain remittance levels. (Migrant Remittances, 2008: 8– 9)
For experts in the international institutions intent on draw-
ing out the developmental potential of remittances, this was 
good news. Migrants exhibited the requisite adaptability and 
willingness to keep the monies flowing. There would be no sig-
nificant long- term effects of the financial crisis on worldwide 
remittance flows. Whether migrants  themselves— who engaged 
in these multiple forms of self- exploitation and experienced 
firsthand the pain and disruption necessary to keep sending 
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 monies  home— celebrated this reality as much as the remit-
tances experts did is a completely different question.
the heroiC migrant and the end of migration
One of the central promises of change that former Mexican pres-
ident Vicente Fox made in the run- up to his victorious elec-
tion in 2000 was that he would govern on behalf of 118 million 
 Mexicans— a number that included the 100 million people resid-
ing within the territorial confines of the Mexican nation- state as 
well as the 18 million mexicanos en el exterior, the imagined commu-
nity of Mexican migrants and their descendants living abroad. In 
recognition of their economic contributions to Mexico and their 
continued commitment to the nation, Fox often referred to those 
mexicanos en el exterior as heroes. In this, President Fox was part 
of an expanding chorus of leaders from major migrant- sending 
states, from Ireland to the Philippines, who have celebrated the 
heroic contributions of migrants to their homelands over recent 
decades. For Fox, this heroic imagery took perhaps its grandest 
form on December 3, 2000, just three days into the presidency. 
That day Fox held his first public event and opened the official 
presidential residence, Los Pinos, for a meeting with migrant 
leaders. In his official address, the newly inaugurated president 
waxed eloquent about the spirit and tenacity of the migrant, 
about the set of characteristics that migrants shared with a curi-
ous amalgam of historical figures:1
It is in each humble, poor, successful, and triumphant migrant 
where we realize the capacity that we carry within us all, that 
potential that I would almost say is unlimited but which we our-
selves sometimes can’t see, that we only discover when we are 
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facing a challenge and when we begin to struggle to overcome 
those obstacles and to reach our goals. That is when the true 
spirit of man comes out, a spirit that we all carry within us.
Just to cite a few of the great figures of humanity: that capacity 
that Gorbachev had, or Juan Pablo II, or Martin Luther King, or 
Gandhi, or Mandela, or Walesa, who on their own, because they 
decided to fight for something big, because they decided to reach 
for the  unreachable— they transformed humanity, they trans-
formed borders, they transformed and they changed chilling and 
painful realities. That spirit, that capacity is in the soul of each 
migrant.
That is why it was indispensable for us that our first visit here, in 
Los Pinos, the first formal act, was held with you, because we want 
to infect ourselves with that spirit, we want to follow your example 
and we want for all of Mexico, the 100 million Mexican men and 
women that are living here in our beloved country struggling day 
in and day out, that wake up each morning to get to work, for all of 
us to do it with the energy, con los pantalones, con las faldas with which 
you all have struggled and have met with success.
 (Fox Quesada, 2000b)
And yet, despite this laudatory characterization of migrants, 
in literally his next breath, Fox spoke of his dream of a nonmi-
gratory future: “We see in the future a dream, and that dream is 
that every youngster, every adolescent, every child of ours can 
stay at their family’s side, that they can stay here in Mexico, that 
they can grow, can realize their dreams and their own transcen-
dence here in their homeland.” This duality, this schizophrenic 
portrayal of heroic migrants as the utmost representation of 
what humanity has to offer while at the same time represent-
ing mobility across borders as a social ill to be done away with 
in the future, continued to be a main theme throughout Fox’s 
administration and that of his successor, Felipe Calderón. It 
would not be a stretch to say that this contradictory framing 
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has seeped to the very core of Mexican state- policy discourse 
on migration.
the limits of migrant inClUsion
In March 2002 the governments of the United States and  Mexico 
formally announced a new “Partnership for  Prosperity.” Although 
U.S.- Mexican relations had cooled following the events of 
 September 11, 2001, as the administration of George W. Bush pri-
oritized its War on Terror over the further integration of North 
America, the partnership sought to combine the forces of the 
public and private sectors to foment regional development and 
expand economic opportunities for individuals across Mexico and 
the United  States— including the inhabitants of the traditional 
migrant- sending regions of Mexico whose limited economic pos-
sibilities could lead to further outmigration.
Government officials in the local offices of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Mexican Consulate in 
Chicago took this initiative and ran with it. Beginning in May 
2003 they jointly formed the New Alliance Task Force (NATF) 
and worked with local banks, credit unions, and community- 
based organizations to encourage financial inclusion by expand-
ing the financial- education opportunities and banking services 
available to Mexican immigrants in and around the city. This 
innovative transnational collaboration bore real fruits. In no 
time the government officials had dozens of financial institu-
tions involved in the initiative. It served as a valuable conduit 
to share information about the legality of providing financial 
services to the  undocumented. Its working groups also helped 
to create innovative new financial products for this commu-
nity, such as the ITIN mortgage, which relies on an  individual 
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 Taxpayer Identification  Number supplied by the IRS rather 
than the Social Security  Number— ubiquitous but unavailable 
to undocumented migrants. But this successful partnership 
would not last. Anti- immigrant pressure groups challenged the 
FDIC’s participation in a program providing assistance to “ille-
gal” immigrants. Thus began the slow and silent death of the 
NATF. It would seem that this program to include migrants and 
their monies in the formal financial system escaped the limits of 
what was possible in a period marked in so many other ways by 
the tendency to exclude the undocumented from the institutions 
of mainstream America.
 • • •
These brief vignettes offer a window into the efforts of var-
ious actors who worked to reframe our understanding of the 
importance of migration, migrants, and their monies for the 
global economy and, in the process, turned remittances into a 
development tool. They also illustrate the growing confluence 
of the transnational engagement policies of migrant- sending 
states like Mexico and the market- centric development pol-
icies of international financial institutions. And finally, they 
help us see how policies designed to include migrants and 
their monies within financial markets fit uneasily in a polit-
ical environment marked in so many other ways by efforts to 
exclude  migrants— particularly the  undocumented— from 
social, cultural, political, and economic institutions. These 
are the major themes explored throughout this book.
introdUCtion
At the beginning of the new millennium a new tool for devel-
opment suddenly appeared on the global stage: remittances. 
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These are the monies that transnational migrants, usually poor, 
“unskilled” labor migrants from the global South,  transfer to 
friends and families back home. Often sent in amounts of lit-
tle more than a few hundred dollars at a time, the  aggregate 
amount of remittances flowing to the so- called developing 
countries in 2013 was estimated to be somewhere on the order 
of 414 billion U.S. dollars (Ratha et al., 2013). This staggering 
amount of money has led political leaders and policymak-
ers around the world to begin imagining remittances as “an 
important resource for the development of poor countries” 
(Iglesias, 2005: x).
To be sure, migration scholars have long debated how their 
object of study and the remittances generated through the pro-
cess of labor migration either contribute to or impede devel-
opment in migrant- sending regions. Significant debates played 
out in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, between optimistic and 
pessimistic scholars about the relation between remittances, 
consumption, productive economic activity, and develop-
ment in Mexico and other major migrant- sending countries 
(Alarcón, 2002; Binford, 2003). But something exceptional was 
happening at the turn of the millennium, as national govern-
ments, international development organizations, and groups 
in civil society ratcheted up the enthusiasm about remittances 
and their great potential to kick- start development processes 
in the migrant- sending regions of the global South. As remit-
tances gained visibility in recent years, the existence of ear-
lier scholarly debates was all but ignored, and the potential 
developmental impacts of remittances were presented as an 
entirely new discovery.2 (See Terry, 2005.)
Claims about the impact and importance of this new object 
of development seemed only to gain steam as the decade of the 
2000s unfolded. Across the world, official statistics documented 
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extraordinary growth in migrants’ remittance transfers. Scholars 
and policymakers pointed out how the determinants and essen-
tial characteristics of remittances, founded as they are in familial 
relations and obligations, made them a valuable source of devel-
opment finance for a variety of reasons. Not least of these reasons 
was the apparently “countercyclical” nature of remittance flows, 
which meant that they would tend to rise when needed most, fol-
lowing natural disasters or economic downturns (Ratha, 2003). 
The euphoria around remittances and development reached 
such staggering heights that by mid- decade even some analysts 
close to the World Bank were forced to ask whether remittances 
had become “the new development mantra” (Kapur, 2005). Cer-
tainly, the infatuation with remittances waned somewhat in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis initiated in 2008, but not 
completely. The flows may have momentarily dropped, in some 
cases precipitously, as declining economic activity meant fewer 
migrants ventured to the global North, but policymakers around 
the world continued to pursue opportunities to exploit remit-
tance flows for the purposes of “development.” 3
The primary concern of this book is to explain how these 
private resources, these paltry sums of money from some of the 
world’s least affluent people, came to be so widely seen as a pub-
lic resource, as a promising source of development in the new 
millennium. To do this, I untangle and examine the discursive 
and political practices of a variety of actors from across multiple 
 geopolitical scales, whose intellectual work and on- the- ground 
efforts helped to generate a consensus around the view that remit-
tances constituted a promising development tool and around a 
preferred set of market- based policy solutions that promise to 
spur development by incorporating migrants and their monies 
into global financial markets. This consensus forms what I term 
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the “remittances- to- development agenda” or R- 2- D agenda. 
Given that the U.S.- Mexico “remittance corridor” (Hernández- 
Coss, 2005) has been a leading canvas on which this policy con-
struction has been sketched, significant attention is given to the 
making and implementation of this agenda in North America.
The market- based policy solutions at the core of the R- 2- D 
agenda are not the only alternatives available to policymakers 
intent on exploiting cross- border migration and the resources 
it generates for developmental purposes in migrant- sending 
regions and countries. Another much- celebrated policy option 
relies less on the abstract forces of the market and more on the 
collective agency of migrants themselves to promote develop-
ment back home. Mexico pioneered public policy seeking to 
capitalize on migrants’ collective agency (and resources) with 
its Tres por Uno matching- grant program, designed to chan-
nel funding toward community- development and public- 
infrastructure programs in migrant- sending villages and 
towns. (See Goldring, 2002; Merz, 2005; Fernández de Castro, 
García Zamora, and Vila Freyer, 2006; Michael Peter Smith 
and Bakker, 2008; Iskander, 2010.) The success of the Tres por 
Uno program came not simply from its policy design but, per-
haps more important, from its ability to foster lasting relation-
ships between migrant leaders and state officials. This would 
facilitate an “interpretive” policymaking process with state 
officials and migrant leaders working together to co- produce 
the matching- grant program (Iskander, 2010).
Similar dynamics of state officials’ “acting with” migrants 
(Iskander, 2013: 169) underlie other historical successes in remit-
tances and development policy, such as the Moroccan gov-
ernment’s successful initiative in the 1970s to bring migrants’ 
remittance transfers into the formal banking system and to use 
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these monies to fund major national development projects. The 
success of “Operation Moroccan Workers Abroad,” as that pro-
gram was known, relied on an extensive “strategy of accom-
paniment,” through which government officials developed trust 
with migrants, came to understand the barriers impeding their 
use of the formal banking system, and helped migrants to over-
come those barriers (Iskander, 2013).4
These types of policies certainly face their own difficulties 
in solidifying the nexus between migration and development. 
The Tres por Uno program, for instance, has sometimes been 
criticized for prioritizing projects that respond to the desires 
of absent  migrants— funding the construction of rodeo rings 
or the beautification of town plazas, for  example— more than 
to the lived realities and needs of current residents. It would 
not be difficult, however, to imagine modifications to such 
public- private partnerships that would make their develop-
ment aspirations more strategic and bring migrant remittances 
and public resources together for more focused infrastructure 
projects designed to foment community and economic devel-
opment in the areas where it is needed most.
But this type of public- private partnership, based in a mutual 
respect for the collective agency of migrants and for government, 
has not been popular with the purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda. 
In this age of market fundamentalism, any policy option call-
ing for extensive and high- profile government actions to lead the 
drive toward development is seemingly off the table. The pol-
icy entrepreneurs5 driving this agenda have promoted instead 
market- based policies that would rely on the agency not of orga-
nized migrants or enlightened government officials but of finan-
cial institutions seeking clients and profits in a competitive 
market to achieve the elusive connection between migration and 
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development.6 Despite the market- fundamentalist rhetoric, the 
design and application of such market- based  solutions— ironically 
 enough— would itself require significant governmental work. As 
we will see below, such governmental work included knowledge 
work to reimagine the importance of migration and the remit-
tances it generates for development in the global South; policy 
design and diffusion work drawing up and spreading various policies 
that promised to incorporate migrants and their monies within 
financial markets and institutions as a means of promoting (finan-
cial) development; and the work of subject formation, both teaching 
officials in banks and credit unions about the benefits to be had 
from offering financial services to migrants and remittance recip-
ients and providing migrants, their friends, and families with the 
financial education and literacy they would need to act as good 
financial subjects.
Analyzing these various forms of governmental work, 
Migrating into Financial Markets illustrates how the propo-
nents of the R- 2- D agenda have helped to spread the image of 
migrants’ remittances as a promising if underutilized tool for 
development. It also shows their success in laying out a pre-
ferred set of market- based policies that have largely displaced 
alternative policy approaches. Such achievements, however, 
do not mean that the agenda and its associated policy pro-
gram have been an unqualified success. As we will see over the 
course of the book, the effects of all the governmental work 
animating the agenda have been uneven. Even if the agen-
da’s proponents may have been successful at getting the world 
to view remittances as an enticing pool of untapped capital 
that could be leveraged by financial markets and institutions, 
the market- based solutions that they advocate have not (yet?) 
reached their promise.
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ContextUalizing the  
remittanCes- to- develoPment agenda
In order to provide a broader contextualization for the emer-
gence of these policies and practices, the remainder of this intro-
duction discusses two prominent features of the contemporary 
global political- economic terrain that help to situate the recent 
(re)discovery of remittances by development policymakers and 
practitioners. These broader contextual features are: (1) the state- 
led transnationalism (Goldring, 2002) of migrant- sending states 
looking to exploit transnational migration as a development strat-
egy; and (2) the continuing dominance of market fundamental-
ism (see Somers and Block, 2005; Block, 2007; Block and Somers, 
2014) in the arena of international- development policy and prac-
tice. As these two dynamics increasingly came together by the 
early 2000s they helped cement the R- 2- D agenda’s consensus 
around the importance of remittances, their strategic value as a 
tool for development, and the types of market- based policies and 
institutional changes necessary to turn their potential develop-
mental impacts into reality.
migration, state- led  
transnationalism, and develoPment
Since 1995, the government of the Philippines has celebrated a 
“Migrant Heroes Week” every June. In an expression of just how 
profoundly the heroic migrant has changed official represen-
tations of the territoriality of the Filipino nation, a government 
official speaking at an event opening the festivities in the year 
2000 proclaimed, “Philippine territory goes beyond what we once 
knew. It extends now to Australia, to the United States, and [so 
forth]. What used to be Bayang Filipino [Filipino Nation] is now 
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Mundong Filipino [Filipino World]” (quoted in Rodriguez, 2010: 
78). A similar discourse on heroic migrants and the extraterritorial 
extension of national boundaries can be observed across a num-
ber of other migrant- sending countries as well. Consider the case 
of Ireland. When the country’s president- elect, Mary Robinson, 
took office in 1990 she painted a portrait of Ireland and its citizens 
stretching all across the globe. In her inaugural address, Robinson 
stated, “there is a vast community of Irish emigrants extending . . . 
throughout the continents of North America, Australia, and of 
Europe itself. There are over 70 million people living on this 
globe who claim Irish descent. I will be proud to represent them” 
(quoted in Levitt, 2001: 195). These rhetorical gestures, and the 
policy interventions migrant- sending states undertake to imple-
ment these visions of an unbounded national community, raise an 
important question about whether and how contemporary trans-
national migration has come to undermine the nation- state’s pre-
sumed triple correspondence between sovereignty, territory, and 
political community.
This question has been the object of a vibrant academic debate 
over recent decades among students of migrant transnationalism.7 
Although scholars may argue over the causes and consequences 
of these recent policy innovations, there is little disagreement 
that something significant is under way when migrant- sending 
states become engaged in extraterritorial political activities 
designed to cultivate and maintain ties with their migrants liv-
ing abroad. While these efforts may not serve to completely 
delink the nation- state, with all its powers and capabilities, 
from its territorial moorings, they do appear to extend extra-
territorially the (trans)national development project, the bound-
aries of national identity and community membership, and 
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. What is driving 
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migrant- sending states to pursue such extraterritorial projects? 
What types of policies give life to these projects? And how have 
they dovetailed into the R- 2- D agenda?
The extraterritorial policy initiatives of migrant- sending 
states, aimed at fomenting and reproducing transnational live-
lihoods among migrants, have been analyzed by a number of 
authors using varied conceptual language to describe the poli-
cies, from “state- led transnationalism” (Goldring, 2002) to “global 
nations” (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003) and “diaspora engage-
ment” (Gamlen, 2008). These conceptual distinctions notwith-
standing, analysts generally agree on the content and objectives 
of these policies. The policies are aimed at encouraging migrants 
to both successfully incorporate within destination societies and 
to maintain a variety of intensive and ongoing connections with 
the homeland. This is part of a strategy of sending states to man-
age the “perils and promises of emigration” (Fitzgerald, 2009: 19). 
The exact institutional mix of transnational- engagement poli-
cies varies across sending countries, as Gamlen’s (2008) cross- 
national comparison amply documents, but they usually include 
some combination of policies inducing migrant investment in 
the homeland (Goldring, 2002; Saxenian, 2006; Iskander, 2010), 
granting dual nationality and extraterritorial political rights 
(Itzigsohn, 2000; Martínez Saldaña, 2003; Itzigsohn and Vil-
lacrés, 2008; Michael Peter Smith and Bakker, 2008; Escrivá, 
Bermúdez, and Moraes, 2009), offering expanded government 
services abroad (Délano, 2009), and cultivating continuing iden-
tification with the homeland (González Gutiérrez, 1999; for a 
general discussion of these policies, see Levitt and de la Dehesa 
2003; Østergaard- Nielsen, 2003; and Gamlen 2008).
Explanations for the turn to state- led transnationalism tend 
to center on the political and economic interests of sending 
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states. Political interests can be understood as driving the turn 
toward transnational- engagement policies in a number of dif-
ferent ways. The adoption of state- led transnationalism is often 
an effort to shape the sending state’s emigrants into an effec-
tive ethnic lobby within the polity of the receiving state, a lobby 
that can advocate on behalf of the interests of the sending state 
within the receiving polity (de la Garza and Pachon, 2000; 
Østergaard- Nielsen, 2003). In addition, as these policies have 
become increasingly prevalent in recent decades, there may be 
political pressure from the international arena for sending states 
to mimic the efforts of other states, adopting policies that have 
become an international norm (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). 
Luis Guarnizo and Michael Smith (1998) emphasize the economic 
aspect, arguing that as a result of global economic restructuring, 
migrant- sending states have become dependent upon foreign 
investment, and this leads to a “growing dependence on trans-
migrants’ stable remittances [prompting] sending states to try 
to incorporate their ‘nationals’ into both their national  market 
and their national polity by a variety of measures” (Guarnizo 
and Smith, 1998: 8). The policies adopted by countries around 
the world to link the economic skills and resources that their 
emigrants have acquired abroad to economic development back 
home vary around the world. These include efforts by Mexico 
and other countries to foment migrants’ collective investment 
in community infrastructure projects (Fernández de Castro, 
García Zamora, and Vila Freyer, 2006; Michael Peter Smith and 
Bakker, 2008; Iskander, 2010; Portes and Zhou, 2012); policies by 
China and India to induce highly skilled, wealthy migrants to 
help transform the national economy through their investments, 
skills, and connections (Portes and Zhou, 2012; Eischen, 2013; Yi, 
2013); and even efforts like that of Morocco to channel migrant 
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remittances through state- owned banks to help finance large- 
scale infrastructure projects (Iskander, 2010, 2013).
Understood as driven by the political and economic interests 
of sending states, state- led transnationalism can come across 
as an effort at strategic repositioning, something of a counter-
hegemonic project of peripheral and semiperipheral states to 
improve their positions within the capitalist world- system. Such 
a portrayal implies that these policy  complexes— and the trans-
national practices they encourage among  migrants— may run 
counter to the interests of more dominant receiving states in the 
global North.8
Recent scholarship has endeavored to undermine these and 
similar suggestions that state- led transnationalism policies pro-
moting migrant reincorporation are antithetical to the inter-
ests of the receiving states and civil societies, questioning the 
common assumption that immigrant incorporation and transna-
tional engagement are mutually exclusive political possibilities 
(Oboler, 2006; Portes, Escobar, and Arana, 2008; Michael Peter 
Smith and Bakker, 2008). A continuing engagement with the home-
land does not need to work against incorporation and integration 
into social and political institutions in the receiving country if 
we recognize the possibilities for a “simultaneity” of experience 
and practice across borders (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). Sur-
vey research on Latino migrant organization in the United States 
finds that “migrants and their organizations carry on their every-
day activities along parallel tracks that do not appear to contradict, 
but actually support one another. Transnationalism and political 
incorporation proceed simultaneously, as local happenings inter-
act seamlessly with those in the home countries” (Portes, Esco-
bar, and Arana, 2008: 1085). This supports the findings of other 
case- study research demonstrating the compatibility of homeland 
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and hostland political practices and orientations, as migrants are 
increasingly acting politically on both sides of the U.S.- Mexico 
border, living their lives “in terms of and/also rather than either/or 
possibilities” (Michael Peter Smith and Bakker, 2008: 204).
But what about the economic aspect? Is state- led transnation-
alism antithetical to the economic interests of receiving states and 
civil societies? Apparently not. At least not if we look at the actions 
of receiving states in recent years. As scholars of transnationalism 
have gone about their work of demonstrating the  compatibility 
of transnational engagement and immigrant incorporation, send-
ing states pursuing state- led transnationalism have increasing 
found common cause with officials from receiving  states— as well 
as policy entrepreneurs from within international development 
 institutions— in their efforts to  connect migrants and their mon-
ies to their (trans)national- development projects. At the level of 
state and international elites, the fears and accusations about the 
perils of migrant transnationalism, about the necessary incompat-
ibility of state- led transnationalism with the interests and objec-
tives of the migrant- receiving states of the global North, appear 
to hold little sway. What explains this increasing policy conver-
gence? On the one hand, state leaders from both North and South 
appear convinced that the promotion of development in migrant- 
sending countries and regions will generate more expansive 
economic opportunities and thus eliminate the economic- push 
factors thought to compel outmigration. Shared action by send-
ing and receiving states can be seen as the pursuit of a win- win 
scenario where achieving policy success would mean expanded 
economic opportunity and development in the global South 
along with a reduction of (unauthorized) migration into the global 
North. On the other hand, and perhaps more  important, migra-
tion and development policy have proved fertile terrain for actors 
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across multiple scales of political authority to respond to recur-
ring preoccupations with global poverty, inequality, and injus-
tice with “market- based solutions” that would extend rather than 
reverse neoliberal globalization.
the Washington ConsensUs and beyond:  
the ContinUing signifiCanCe of marKet  
fUndamentalism in develoPment  
PoliCy and PraCtiCe
The neoliberal reforms that swept the world from the mid- 1980s 
forward became known as the “Washington Consensus.” This 
term was used to signify the “set of rigid strictures that man-
dated privatization, deregulation, and liberalization” (Roy, 2010: 
15) for the debt- strapped countries of the global South reliant on 
the assistance of international financial institutions in the after-
math of the 1980s debt crisis. The tenets behind this Washing-
ton Consensus, as Stiglitz (2001) has pointed out, were deeply 
marked by market fundamentalism, a faithlike belief in the 
power of markets to solve all manner of social ills (see Block, 
2007); these policies were derived from the belief that “it is gov-
ernment interventions that are the source of the problem; the 
key to transformation is ‘getting the prices right’ and getting the 
government out of the economy through privatization and liber-
alization” (Stiglitz, 2001: xiv). The impact of this neoliberal tran-
sformation was devastating for most people in the global South, 
as privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and austerity resul-
ted in the simultaneous loss of both jobs and state subsidies on 
basic necessities, with little return on the rosy promises of acce-
lerated economic growth and generalized well- being (Davis, 
2006; McMichael, 2012).
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As a result of these devastating impacts, the strict policy 
mandates of this Washington Consensus came under increas-
ing fire from both grassroots movements and policy insiders by 
the late 1990s. Movements and activists from across the global 
North- South divide were beginning to come together in move-
ment spaces to directly contest the neoliberal project and to 
begin imagining and constructing alternatives. These movement 
spaces included protests designed to disrupt negotiations over 
global trade rules, such as the 1999 protests at the World Trade 
Organization’s ministerial meetings in Seattle, as well as gath-
ering spaces where activists met to share experiences and con-
template alternatives to neoliberal globalization. Examples of the 
latter included the Inter- Continental Encounters for Human-
ity and Against Neoliberalism organized by the Zapatista 
movement in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1996 and across Spain in 1997 
(de Angelis, 1998) and the meetings of the World Social Forum, 
originally held in Brazil beginning in 2001 (Ponniah and Fischer, 
2003; Jackie Smith, 2004; de Sousa Santos, 2008).
In addition to this grassroots opposition, prominent main-
stream voices like those of the former World Bank chief econ-
omist, Joseph Stiglitz, criticized the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and its Washington Consensus for their market 
fundamentalism and for their prohibitions against government 
interventions that might help correct market failures (Stiglitz, 
2002) and ameliorate the pain inflicted on the citizenry. This 
growing criticism led Stiglitz and others within the World Bank 
to begin talking about the emergence of a “post– Washington 
Consensus” (Stiglitz, 1998; see also Roy, 2010: 15– 16) that, they 
hoped, would strip market- fundamentalist beliefs away from 
development policy. Growing recognition of the failure of neo-
liberal policies even forced some of the main architects of the 
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neoliberal policy agenda, such as John Williamson, the origi-
nator of the term “Washington Consensus,” to acknowledge 
that “the results of the past decade [had] been disappointing” 
(Williamson, 2003a: 327) and to begin contemplating alternatives.
The erosion and decline of the Washington Consensus in 
the early years of the new millennium would not, however, lead 
to a retreat from market fundamentalism in global- trade and 
development- policymaking arenas. Far from it. A 2003 publi-
cation penned by John Williamson and other prominent poli-
cymakers and political entrepreneurs working in and on Latin 
America illustrates the dominant direction that policymaking 
took in response to the deep criticisms levied upon the neolib-
eral agenda of the 1990s and shows the staying power of mar-
ket fundamentalism. Summarizing the new consensus among 
these prominent policymakers, Williamson advocated for new 
actions to “complete, correct, and complement” the reforms 
of the 1990s (Williamson, 2003b: 18). The actions prescribed 
to Latin American governments involved fully implementing 
the first round of recommended neoliberal reforms, including 
a full liberalization of labor markets; undertaking a new set 
of “second- generation” institutional reforms; and addressing the 
need to pursue not economic growth at any cost but growth 
with equity (Williamson, 2003b: 18).
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) provide us with valuable 
conceptual language to understand this moment, this extension 
and deepening of neoliberal reforms. They identify the exis-
tence of multiple phases of neoliberalization, which they under-
stand as an active process rather than a reified state. The first of 
these phases was that of “roll- back” neoliberalism, characterized 
by the dismantling of state institutions of social protection and 
economic regulation or, in their words, a “pattern of deregulation 
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and  dismantlement.” A second phase involves “roll- out” neolib-
eralism, which they define as “an emergent phase of active state- 
building and regulatory reform” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384). 
The recent efforts to “complete, correct, and complement” (Wil-
liamson, 2003b) the neoliberal policies of earlier years are clear 
demonstrations of this phase of “roll- out” neoliberalism on the 
global scale.
This doubling- down on neoliberal reforms is strikingly 
reminiscent of what Karl Polanyi (2001) argued so many years 
ago: that advocates of economic liberalism regularly resort to 
the claim that its failures are due to incomplete application, 
to  governments’ unwillingness to swallow the medicine and 
allow for the unfettered operation of the self- regulating  market. 
According to economic liberals, the problems generated by the 
application of their radical philosophy are not due to the dan-
gers inherent in the self- regulating market itself, but instead 
“interference with [the competitive] system and interventions 
with [the self- regulating] market are responsible for all our ills” 
(Polanyi, 2001: 150). Much like the nineteenth- century economic 
liberals analyzed by Polanyi, in the face of the repeated failure 
of market- fundamentalist- inspired policies, today’s economic 
(neo)liberals advocate not a retreat from their policy agenda but 
the further extension and deepening of their preferred policies.
This continuing commitment to market fundamentalism can 
be seen in the development industry’s widespread embrace over 
recent years of “private- sector development,” a strategy of using 
business and entrepreneurship to alleviate  poverty— striving, as 
the common refrain goes, to “make markets work for the poor.” 
As a 2009 report from the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) frames it, there is a growing 
consensus that the standard policies of market liberalization are 
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not enough to adequately address global poverty. If we want to 
address this latter objective, the report argues, “it is now widely 
accepted that specific measures are needed to ensure that the 
poor participate. Growth needs to be made available to all in 
order to address rising inequality, and provide opportunities 
and the capability to participate in markets” (DFID, 2009: 15).
Private- sector development can take on a variety of different 
meanings. In some cases it is invoked as a means of suggesting 
that “private enterprise belongs at the very center of the develop-
ment enterprise” (Brainard and LaFleur, 2006: 2) because the pri-
vate sector is the true “engine of growth,” and it is “broad- based 
growth which generates the jobs and incomes which get people 
out of poverty” (DFID, 2009: 9– 10). For others, the private sec-
tor’s main contribution to development is its capability to expand 
markets and bring needed goods and services to the global poor, 
who represent a low- margin but highly profitable mass of con-
sumers and clients at the “bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 
2004). Another formulation suggests that a main contribution of 
the private sector to development is its ability to transmit the val-
ues and practices of  business— particularly its  efficiency— to the 
global- development arena (Hossain, Mehta, and Wolcott, 2010: 
15– 16). Each of these formulations of private- sector development, 
despite their differences, carries the taint of market fundamen-
talism, centering the power and agency of markets and private 
industry to do good in the world and deemphasizing the histori-
cal and structural causes of global poverty and inequality.
Within this broad constellation, the most prominent for-
mulation of private- sector development and its potential for 
improving the lives of the world’s poor is undoubtedly the field 
of microfinance. The microfinance approach is at the center of 
what Ananya Roy (2010: 45) terms the “Washington Consensus 
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on Poverty,” a new common sense that “promotes a market- 
based approach to poverty.” At the core of this Washington 
Consensus on Poverty is the idea that the democratization of 
finance holds the key to poverty alleviation and progressive 
social transformation; that providing access to credit and capital 
will serve to unleash the inherent entrepreneurial energies of 
the poor and allow them to work their own way out of poverty 
and misery.9
Urban land- titling schemes are another much- celebrated form 
of private- sector development. These seek to regularize land-
ownership among inhabitants of informal housing settlements, 
thus providing the world’s poor with documentation of formal 
 ownership that could be used as collateral, granting them access 
to financing and unlocking their inherent entrepreneurial poten-
tial (de Soto, 2000). One of the major proponents of this strategy 
has been the Peruvian neoliberal economist Hernando de Soto, 
whose popular writings have given the topic a wide audience. 
With support from the World Bank, in the mid- 1990s de Soto’s 
Institute for Liberty and Democracy undertook a large- scale 
land- titling pilot project in Peru that would eventually regularize 
nearly one million irregular plots (Mitchell, 2009: 390). Although 
the pilot project carried out in Peru did not have its intended 
 effects— there was not a significant rise in beneficiary house-
holds’ access to business  credit— this empirical outcome did little 
to undermine support and advocacy for this market- based solu-
tion, as land- titling programs were circulated among policymak-
ers and economics teachers around the world as models of best 
practice (Mitchell, 2009). In the end, the ideological commitment 
to market- based solutions, to rugged- individual entrepreneurial-
ism as the solution to rampant poverty, trumps any empirical test 
of the effectiveness of private- sector development.
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It is in the context of this dominance of market- based solu-
tions in the discourse and practice of global development that we 
must place the emergence of the R- 2- D agenda and its construc-
tion of remittances as a development tool. Doing so generates 
an understanding of contemporary migration and development 
policy that differs substantially from much of the critical schol-
arship that has amassed in recent years. The meticulous schol-
arship of Natasha Iskander, for example, has valuably identified 
the processes through which successful migration and devel-
opment policies were constructed in Mexico and Morocco in 
decades past. As noted above, the key to successful policymak-
ing in these places was an “interpretive” rather than an “ana-
lytic” process: policymakers did not start with a preset policy 
objective but got involved in “interpretive engagement,” work-
ing to develop trust in migrant communities and leaders, to con-
struct relationships with migrant leaders, and to learn from one 
another in ways that would allow them to co- produce successful 
policy (Iskander, 2010, 2013).
This is a compelling description of the processes that gave 
life to successful migration and development policy in the past. 
However, it does not provide much leverage in the present 
context. In the chapters to come I aim to show how the most 
prominent migration and development policies circulating 
throughout the globe in the new  millennium— those emanating 
from the R- 2- D  agenda— are driven by an ideological commitment to 
market fundamentalism, not by an analytic or interpretive pol-
icymaking process. The policy entrepreneurs promoting these 
market- based policies from within global development agencies, 
policy think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations, as well 
as migrant- sending and migrant- receiving states, are involved 
in the continuing “roll- out” of neoliberal globalization, bringing 
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it to previously ignored and excluded domains. Complementing 
other forms of private- sector development, the R- 2- D agenda 
aims to extend the institutions, products, and subjectivities of 
global finance into the transnational social spaces created and 
inhabited by migrants, their families, friends, and loved ones 
through the promotion of a series of market- based solutions that 
promise to leverage the extraordinary sum of “newly discov-
ered” migrant remittances for development.
researCh methods and data ColleCtion
The R- 2- D agenda is a complex object of study that demanded a 
multimethod research approach tracing across multiple sites the 
transnational forces and multiscalar processes involved in its con-
stitution and application. The multiple sites for research included 
the policymaking spaces of international financial institutions, 
U.S. and Mexican state agencies, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions where the R- 2- D and other migration- oriented policy agen-
das are being formulated; and the sites where the R- 2- D agenda 
is being put into practice in North America. During fieldwork 
carried out in 2008 and 2009, I collected documentary, interview, 
and participant- observation data documenting the design of the 
agenda and its implementation in North America in those spaces 
where elite policymaking comes face- to- face with migrant com-
munities on the ground.
Research having begun years after the R- 2- D agenda 
had taken shape, the most important data collected were 
 historical— archival and documentary evidence pertaining to 
the content, consolidation, and diffusion of the R- 2- D agenda. 
I collected and analyzed documents detailing the remittances- 
related policy models and preferences, funding priorities, and 
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practices of diffusion of the international financial institutions 
most responsible for elaborating the R- 2- D agenda, the World 
Bank and the Inter- American Development Bank/Multilateral 
Investment Fund. In order to understand how state- led trans-
nationalism came into convergence with the R- 2- D agenda in 
North America I examined migration- related policy statements 
and political speeches by Mexican federal officials, focusing 
largely on the period after Vicente Fox took the presidency in 
2000. As Mexican state- led transnationalism policies increas-
ingly involved collaboration with U.S. government agencies in 
efforts aimed at the financial inclusion of migrants and their 
monies in North America, I also collected documents and 
materials from the agencies in both governments most actively 
involved in these efforts, including the Federal Reserve Banks, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Instituto de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior, the Banco de Ahorro Nacional y Ser-
vicios Financieros, and the Banco de México.
This historical documentary material was supplemented by 
data acquired through in- depth interviews with some of the 
central actors involved in the construction, consolidation, and 
application of the R- 2- D agenda. Fourteen formal interviews 
were conducted with program officers in international financial 
institutions, officials within agencies of the U.S. and Mexican 
governments, and with officials in the banks and credit unions in 
the United States targeting Mexican migrants as potential cus-
tomers. Half these interviews were conducted in person, while 
the others were conducted by telephone; each was tape- recorded 
and transcribed. These semistructured interviews sought to 
elucidate the dynamics involved in constructing and diffusing 
the R- 2- D agenda and to understand the meaning and value that 
various public officials attributed to the work they carried out.
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Finally, in focusing on the application of the R- 2- D agenda in 
North America I identified various financial- education schemes 
being directed at migrants and remittances recipients, as well 
as promotional efforts directed at banks and credit unions. I 
then sought out strategic sites where I would be able to observe 
this work in action. These sites included the education and 
 recruitment efforts and events carried out by U.S. and Mexican 
government agencies and their allies. Engaging in participant 
observation at these allowed me to informally interview and con-
verse with government officials, bank and credit- union officials, 
and migrants of various stripes. This provided access to the con-
tent of these financial- educational campaigns, their achievements 
thus far, and the obstacles perceived by these various actors to the 
recruitment of migrants into formal financial institutions.
navigating the ChaPters to Come
Migrating into Financial Markets examines the work of construct-
ing, promoting, and implementing the R- 2- D agenda with the 
aim of enhancing our understanding of the concrete governmen-
tal work that has gone into making remittances a development 
tool, or at least attempting to do so. The chapters that follow 
analyze the various forms of governmental  work— knowledge 
work, the work of policy design and diffusion, and that of subject 
 formation— carried out by public officials and policy entrepre-
neurs intent on making the R- 2- D agenda a success. Through 
this work the proponents of the R- 2- D agenda extended market- 
fundamentalist ideas and practices into previously excluded 
or ignored  domains— the transnational social spaces created 
and maintained by migrants and the remittances that traverse 
those spaces. It is hoped that the grounded and contextualized 
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examination I offer in the following pages of this extension and 
deepening of neoliberalization helps to provide a compelling 
accounting of how the “messy actualities” (Larner, 2000: 14) of 
neoliberalization played out in this specific project.
The two chapters composing Part One, “The Remittances- to- 
Development Agenda at the Global Scale,” document and  analyze 
the concrete governmental practices carried out by actors within 
major international financial organizations and development 
agencies that worked to enhance the visibility of remittances as a 
potentially attractive tool for development. Chapter 2 examines 
the work involved in constructing remittances as a financial flow 
particularly well suited for development in the global South. 
This chapter is fundamentally about the power dynamics and 
politics of expertise involved in recent controversies over remit-
tances data, their measurement, compilation, and representa-
tion. The chapter examines the work of a small number of policy 
entrepreneurs within a handful of international financial insti-
tutions, development agencies, and think tanks that went into 
the design and spread of particular measurement and represen-
tational practices. Particular attention is placed on these actors’ 
deployment of the “soft power” available to them as officials in 
reputable international  agencies— manifested through grant 
monies provided to collaborators and public challenges to the 
capacities and reputations of government officials who initially 
resisted the power and legitimacy of their new remittances data, 
measurement techniques, and representational  practices— as 
they sought to standardize remittances data across the Latin 
American region. The chapter also notes the broader successes 
achieved by these policy entrepreneurs and their allies with the 
incorporation of their new remittances measures and instruc-
tions within the latest statistical manual published by the IMF.
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Chapter 3 then turns to an analysis of the conceptual and 
 policy work carried out by actors within the financial institutions 
and development agencies after they successfully made remit-
tance flows visible to governmental officials and the international 
community. This chapter details and unpacks three sets of pol-
icies designed and promoted by purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda 
that promise to link remittance flows to development in the global 
South. These policy constructs suggest that remittances can be 
linked to development by (1) reducing the cost that migrants pay 
for remittance transfers, (2) by using remittances to democratize 
finance, and (3) by constructing new market- based development- 
finance mechanisms from cross- border remittance flows. The 
analysis of the significant governmental work required to make 
these so- called market- based solutions a reality demonstrates the 
wide gulf that exists between the ideology of market fundamen-
talism and the practice of neoliberal globalization. This analy-
sis also illustrates that the agency behind making remittances a 
development tool is not simply the abstract logic of capitalism 
itself, or the faceless power of governmentality, but specific indi-
viduals, institutions, and interventions working to enact concrete 
political- economic transformations through the construction and 
promotion of the R- 2- D agenda.
Part Two, entitled “The Long Road to Financial Democracy 
in North America,” is also made up of two chapters. These chap-
ters shift the analytic focus to the transnational scale, charting 
the evolution of Mexican state- led transnationalism from the 
1980s to the present and identifying its increasing convergence 
with U.S. government policies in furtherance of North American 
economic integration. Chapter 4 develops an analytic distinc-
tion between the emigrant and emigration policies pursued 
by the Mexican government over these three decades, placing 
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particular emphasis on the policies of the period from 2000 
forward. The chapter documents how, following the events of 
September 11, 2001, these emigrant and emigration policies have 
largely converged around an R- 2- D model, where it is hoped that 
the resources generated through contemporary migration may 
be channeled toward development in Mexico that may obvi-
ate the need for continued migration in the future. Chapter 4 
sheds new light on the policy content and dynamics driving 
state- led transnationalism. First, it demonstrates that the con-
temporary state- led transnationalism policies being pursued by 
the Mexican government in the social spaces of North Amer-
ica have taken on a market- centric tint. The policies examined 
are aimed both at extending market logics and mechanisms 
deep into migrant populations and at channeling the resources 
generated through migration into development programs and 
projects. Second, the chapter shows that the form of state- led 
transnationalism being pursued by the Mexican government, 
with its emphasis on expanding the power of markets within 
migrant populations, has been forged in strong collaboration 
with agencies and government officials from the United States.
Chapter 5 then trains attention upon the on- the- ground 
policies and practices carried out by government officials in North 
America, focusing on a particular program that has promoted 
“financial democracy” among migrants and remittance recipi-
ents. The chapter analyzes the work carried out by Mexican and 
U.S. government officials collaborating in the design, implemen-
tation, and promotion of a low- cost remittance- transfer product 
marketed under the brand name “Directo a México.” With this 
product, government agencies aimed to both reduce the costs 
of remittance transfers and expand access to financial services 
for migrants in the United States and remittance recipients in 
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Mexico. The chapter illustrates the significant work required of 
government officials attempting to turn the promise of R- 2- D 
into a reality and examines some of the reasons that help explain 
why these efforts have, until now, met with little success.
The concluding chapter wraps up by summarizing the main 
findings of the previous chapters and drawing out the broader 
implications of this study. It begins with a discussion of the par-
adox of neoliberal policymaking and the significant governmen-
tal work required to construct remittances as a market- based 
development tool. Then it moves on to discuss what the R- 2- D 
agenda tells us about the content, rationale, and challenges of 
transnational engagement policies in the contemporary moment. 
Finally, the book concludes with a discussion about the possibil-
ities for repoliticizing the field of migration and development, 
finding new ways to envision this relationship, and identify-
ing the conditions that may, one day, truly make migration an 
option rather than a necessity.
Let us begin.
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Ch a P t e r 2
Facts, Figures, and the Politics 
of Measurement
The Construction and Diffusion of Remittances 
as a Financial Flow
As late as 1998, it was still possible for a well- informed observer 
to review the extant literature on migrant remittances and con-
clude: “There is little doubt that this topic interests many, that 
it has potential for further study, and that remittances can (and 
do) make important contributions to the development of certain 
countries. Nonetheless, for the most part, remittances have not 
received the sustained attention required, either by the recipi-
ent governments, international financial institutions, local com-
munities, or by the private sector” (Waller Meyers, 1998).
Within a few short years, this situation had completely 
changed. Around the turn of the millennium a global  consensus 
was emerging among international institutions, state agencies, 
civil- society organizations, and private financial- services firms 
around the  valuable contribution that migrants’ remittances 
could make to development in the global South. International 
institutions of various stripes launched major projects linking 
the resources and capacities of migrants to their agencies’ proj-
ect portfolios.1 At the same time, states on both the sending and 
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the receiving end of transnational migration circuits were experi-
menting with their own policies designed to maximize the devel-
opmental impacts of migration. (See Levitt and de la Dehesa, 
2003; Østergaard- Nielsen, 2011.) And commercial financial enti-
ties increasingly began promoting remittance- transfer services 
and focusing on improving access to “underserved” migrants and 
their transnational households.
This chapter focuses on this remarkable resurgence in enthu-
siasm regarding the developmental potential of migration and 
remittances. This growing interest in remittances was the direct 
result of intellectual efforts and political practices undertaken 
by researchers and policy entrepreneurs working within a hand-
ful of international development organizations. The knowledge 
work of the policy experts within these  agencies— as well as their 
political efforts to get others to adopt their new ways of measur-
ing migrants’  remittances— allowed the world to see the poten-
tial connection between cross- border migration, the remittances 
it generates, and development in a new light. While the emphasis 
of earlier debates about migration and development might have 
focused significant attention on the potential for migrants them-
selves to act as agents of change, as individuals and/or collec-
tivities who might themselves put money, knowledge, skills, and 
political resources acquired abroad into transformative practices 
back home, the center of gravity now shifted. With attention now 
squarely, if not exclusively, placed on the possibilities for the 
monies that migrants transfer across international boundaries to 
serve as a “development tool,” global financial institutions and 
markets came to be positioned as privileged agents of change.
Generating this new vision of remittances as a development 
tool and spreading it broadly across the world was a significant 
accomplishment, one that deserves greater scrutiny. This  chapter 
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and the next take on this task by examining the governmental 
work of policy experts who encapsulated and diffused the rep-
resentation of remittances as a financial flow and delineated a 
set of market- based policy solutions that promised to leverage 
migrants’ resources for development purposes.
Examining the growing centrality of remittances in discus-
sions about development, this chapter takes seriously the claim 
that, as one Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) document put it, 
the work carried out by MIF officials and their allies to document 
“the increasing importance of remittances” succeeded in engaging 
“international organizations, national governments, universities, 
foundations, and perhaps most importantly, financial institutions . . . 
[in] the process of ‘discovering remittances’ ” (MIF, 2003: 3). But 
rather than simply take this assertion at face value, I dig deeper, 
asking how the researchers and policy entrepreneurs animating 
the R- 2- D agenda accomplished this task and what it was, exactly, 
that they helped the world to discover about remittances.
In pursuing this task I take a cue from scholars importing 
analytic tools from science and technology studies and the gov-
ernmentality approach into the study of global politics and eco-
nomics.2 (For example, Mitchell, 2002, 2009; Larner and Walters, 
2004.) In what follows I focus attention on the knowledge work 
carried out by the researchers and policy advocates who con-
jured up, elaborated, and diffused the R- 2- D agenda’s represen-
tation of remittances as a financial flow and an underutilized 
resource for development. First, I trace out the technical prac-
tices that allowed remittances to be seen as a financial flow, with 
an underlying set of characteristics calling for further integra-
tion within global financial markets and institutions as a means 
to promote  (financial) development. This section focuses on the 
design of graphical depictions of remittances and on efforts to 
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improve statistical measurements of their flow across interna-
tional borders so as to make these financial flows appear as an 
attractive source of development finance. In the second section I 
move on to analyze the power- laden processes of policy mobil-
ity and transfer that helped spread this representation of remit-
tances as a financial flow from a few centers of discursive and 
calculative production more broadly across the Americas and 
around the world.
CalCUlative PraCtiCes and visUal 
rePresentations of remittanCes  
as a finanCial floW
Policy entrepreneurs’ efforts at raising consciousness about the 
importance of remittances for development were complicated 
by questions about the validity and accuracy of official statis-
tics on these cross- border financial transfers. There was general 
agreement among the early proponents of the R- 2- D agenda 
that, until at least the early 2000s, the official statistics produced 
by national government agencies as part of their balance- of- 
payments reporting to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
grossly underestimated the true magnitude of remittances. As 
one of the leading proponents of the agenda has been fond of 
saying, “the main organization that tracks international financial 
flows, the International Monetary Fund, for years literally rele-
gated billions of dollars of remittances to the ‘errors and omis-
sions’ category of its accounts” (Terry, 2005: 5).
Despite their shared concern about the quality of available 
data, the various officials, agencies, and experts promoting the 
R- 2- D agenda were not in agreement on the best path to remedy 
this situation. The remittance research coming from within the 
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World Bank in the early 2000s continued to use IMF data, but 
rather than rely solely on the category of “workers’ remittances,” 
World Bank researchers constructed a more expansive defini-
tion that summed together three separate categories from the 
balance- of- payments accounting framework. They believed that 
this offered a more accurate measure of remittances volumes 
because it captured flows that were often misclassified by official 
compilers. However, as they readily admitted, this reliance on 
official data meant that transfers sent through informal channels 
were still not included in their improved measures (Ratha, 2003: 
171– 72).
The researchers associated with the MIF’s Remittances Pro-
gram, on the other hand, tried to create a statistical measure that 
would capture the total volume of remittances flows, including 
those sent through both formal and informal channels. To this 
end, they adopted a measurement strategy that, they argued, 
generated a more accurate picture of the magnitude of remit-
tance flows by triangulating different sources of data, including 
the official balance- of- payment statistics, census data, and sur-
veys of remittance senders and recipients. (See Orozco, 2005.)
Even though they disagreed over the most appropriate tech-
niques to measure remittance flows, once the various proponents 
of the R- 2- D agenda came up with their own particular versions 
of “more accurate” statistics and measurement tools, they uti-
lized similar sociotechnical practices to express their measures 
and recast the significance of remittances within development 
discourse. The most common of these practices was to trans-
form their data into tables, charts, graphs, and maps demonstrat-
ing in visual form the growing importance of remittance flows.
A central indicator used to demonstrate the growing sig-
nificance and importance of remittances was, unsurprisingly, 
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annual growth rates. Research published by the World Bank, for 
example, often included tables designed to demonstrate the con-
tinual growth of remittances over recent decades. Figure 2.1 is an 
example of an oft- reproduced type of such a table (World Bank, 
2006: 88; see also, Ratha, 2007: 2; Vargas Lundius et al., 2008: 15; 
Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal, 2009: 10). In this particular table, 
we are provided with a compilation of data on workers’ remit-
tances received between 1990 and 2005 by developing countries 
within various groupings, such as income level or regional loca-
tion. For each of these groupings, statistics are provided about 
the quantity of remittances received for various years between 
1990 and 2005. The chart’s final column offers an interpretation 
aid to those readers who may feel bedazzled by all these cate-
gories, groupings, and quantities, as it draws out the main point 
the table is meant to convey: that the rate of growth for  workers’ 
remittances during the period from 2001 to 2005 was  spectacular, 
Fig. 2.1. World Bank tabulation of remittance flows worldwide between 1990 
and 2005. (Source: World Bank, 2006: 88, table 4.1.)
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ranging from 41 percent in the Middle East and North Africa to 
a whopping 114 percent in East Asia and the Pacific.
The compilation and tabulation of remittances data have 
been complemented by graphs that represent visually the spec-
tacular growth recorded over recent years. This is sometimes 
done for particular countries. In other cases, graphs are used to 
present growth trends at more- encompassing regional or global 
scales. Figure 2.2 shows one of these graphs for the regional 
grouping of Latin America and the Caribbean. In these graph-
ical representations, the rate of growth appears nearly expo-
nential; and this is precisely the intention of their authors. The 
following excerpt from the authors of the report that contains 
the graph in Figure 2.2 illustrates this well. These World Bank 
researchers, apparently writing just before the onset of the 
global financial crisis unleashed in 2007, suggest that the rate 
of growth portrayed in their graph was likely to continue well 
into the future:
This figure does not give any indication of remittances flows level-
ing off or stabilizing. If anything, the figure indicates that there is a 
clear upward tendency underlying the data to the point that a sim-
ulation of the evolution of remittances under the assumption of a 
continuous trend would result in remittances of about US$60 bil-
lion in 2007. While this estimate is likely to be on the high side of 
what one could expect, it nevertheless highlights the fact that a col-
lapse in remittances does not seem very likely over the short run.
 (Acosta, Fajnzylber, and López, 2008: 26; citation omitted)
One graphical technique that merits special treatment here 
is the mapping of remittances data that was carried out by the 
MIF for Latin America beginning in the early 2000s. In collab-
oration with the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment (IFAD), the MIF would extend this coverage worldwide 
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Fig. 2.2. World Bank graph showing high rates of growth in remittances 
to Latin America between 1980 and 2005. (Source: Acosta, Fajnzylber, and 
López, 2008: 26, fig. 2.4.)
beginning in 2007. In Figure 2.3 below we find a copy of the MIF 
map of remittances flows to the Latin American– Caribbean 
(LAC) region in 2008, while Figure 2.4 is a copy of the IFAD 
map with worldwide flows for 2006.
One of the more striking features of these maps is their rudi-
mentary nature. They provide no detail about the actual flow 
of remittances; that is, we see no arrows demonstrating whence 
monies originate nor whither they are destined. In the case of 
the MIF map there is, perhaps, some rationale for this absence, 
since significant proportions of remittance monies for much of the 
region come from one single economy, that of the United States. 
This is particularly true for countries like Mexico and El Salva-
dor, whence the vast majority of emigrants reside in the United 
States. But this pattern of migrant concentration within the United 
States does not hold for the entire region. Some Latin Ameri-
can countries receive significant remittance amounts from other 
parts of the world, including Europe and Japan. Migrants from 
Ecuador, for example, are concentrated fairly evenly between 
the United States and Spain (Jokisch, 2007). This more com-
plex  pattern, where the emigrants of some LAC countries tend 
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Fig. 2.3. IADB/MIF map showing remittances received across the Latin 
America– Caribbean region in 2008. (Source: Inter- American Development 
Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund, 2009: 2.)
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to concentrate in the United States while those of other coun-
tries are more widely spread across the globe, is not always lost on 
MIF researchers (MIF, 2003: 7; 2004: 9). Curiously,  however, this 
 pattern is something that gets noted in the body of MIF reports 
but is never translated onto their maps.3
When we look at worldwide remittance flows, purportedly 
captured on the IFAD remittance maps, there is of course no 
single concentrated site of origin for the majority of remittance 
monies comparable to the United States’ relationship with the 
LAC countries. For this reason, the absence of arrows indicating 
origins, destinations, and directionality on the IFAD maps that 
claim to represent the worldwide flow of remittances may seem 
even more puzzling. But there is a reason for this absence. While 
Fig. 2.4. IFAD map showing remittances received around the world in 2006. 
(Source: International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2006: 3.)
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specific and detailed information about origins and destinations 
may be of value to some interested observers, for the purposes 
of these maps generated by the IFAD and the MIF, rudimen-
tary detail is sufficient. This is because these maps are meant to 
demonstrate, in striking visual form, one simple characteristic 
of remittances flows: their aggregate volume.
In addition to these efforts at documenting and presenting 
graphically the volume and growth rates of remittances, the 
promoters of the R- 2- D agenda have also worked to represent 
remittances as a financial flow comparable to other sources of 
external finance, most notably foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and official development assistance (ODA). When these com-
parisons are made, remittances generally receive a favorable 
accounting vis- à- vis other global financial flows on two counts: 
overall volumes and stability. It is common to read in official 
reports of development institutions, for instance, statements 
like the following from the IFAD’s 2008 report “International 
Migration, Remittances, and Rural Development”: “Worldwide, 
remittances have become the second largest capital inflow to 
developing countries after FDI and before [ODA].  .  .  . In some 
countries, remittances have even surpassed the levels of FDI 
and ODA” (Vargas Lundius et al., 2008: 14).
Beyond this relational comparison in terms of aggregate vol-
umes, remittances are also often compared favorably to other 
financial flows on the basis of their apparent stability and counter-
cyclical nature (Ratha, 2003). The claim about the countercycli-
cal nature of remittance flows has been widely reproduced (IAD, 
2004: 4; Terry, 2005: 9– 10), although the claim is sometimes laid 
out in more tepid language, such as that they “may move counter-
cyclically relative to the economic cycle of the recipient country” 
(World Bank, 2006: 99, my emphasis). Even with this qualification, 
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this has been an extremely important claim, marking a complete 
about- face from policy experts’ earlier portrayals of remittances 
as “notorious for their volatility” (Díaz- Briquets and Pérez- 
López, 1997: 414; see also Hernández and Bibler Coutin, 2006).
The claim about the stability and countercyclical nature 
of remittances flows is often supported by charts and graphs 
demonstrating their relation to other financial flows and repre-
senting their supposedly less violent reactions to business cycles, 
financial crises, and natural disasters. Figure 2.5 is an example 
of a graph aiming to illustrate the stability of remittances. The 
graph shows the slow but steady upward march of remittances at 
the global scale from 1990 through 2008, with little of the fluctua-
tion of other financial flows and a much more measured response 
to the effects of the global financial crisis unleashed in 2007. It 
also demonstrates, as development- industry officials claim, that 
remittances have outstripped ODA for most of this period, even 
if they have not yet outperformed FDI flows and have been 
dwarfed by portfolio- investment flows in some years.
As Figure 2.5 shows, the extraordinary rates of growth in 
remittance volumes registered through the mid- 2000s did even-
tually come to an end, as a consequence of the global finan-
cial crisis. MIF figures documented a decline of 15 percent for 
flows to the LAC region in 2009 (MIF, 2010). At the global scale, 
declines were more measured, with the World Bank estimating 
a worldwide fall in remittances for 2009 of just over 6 percent 
(Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal, 2009; World Bank, 2011: 17).
The technical practices identified and analyzed here have more 
or less successfully constructed an image of migrant remittances as 
a financial flow characterized by high volumes, impressive growth 
rates, and relative stability. Let me highlight two important issues 
with this particular portrayal of remittances as a financial flow. 
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The first thing to note is that, built as it is on relational compari-
sons between remittances and other financial flows, this represen-
tation relies on historical data on the volume, growth, and stability 
of remittances. However, the very institutions and researchers that 
actively constructed this conception of remittances as a financial 
flow were themselves, as noted above, highly skeptical about the 
quality and accuracy of the data used to construct these compari-
sons. In an interview that I conducted with the former manager of 
the MIF, he pointed to these limitations, saying:
You know, I’m amused sometimes, or bemused, I guess, to read all 
of the data that is coming in about how fast remittances have been 
growing over the last ten years, when most of that growth is not 
actually increase; it’s better reporting. They haven’t been increas-
ing 37 percent and 42 percent. I think they were, they aren’t right 
now, but I think they were increasing 7, 8, 10, 12 percent a year.
 (Interview with Donald Terry, 2009)
Fig. 2.5. World Bank chart comparing remittances favorably with other 
financial flows between 1991 and 2010. FDI, foreign direct investment; ODA, 
official development assistance. (Source: World Bank, 2011: 17.)
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Here, Terry readily admits that the spectacular growth rates 
seen in remittances data compiled by his and other international 
agencies were largely the result of better  reporting— the wide-
spread use of new data- collection and data- measurement tech-
niques. That is, these growth rates were largely the result of 
changing accounting practices: with greater focus and attention 
on data- collection procedures came higher volumes of recorded 
remittances. In this sense, the spectacular growth rates identified 
in the early- to- mid- 2000s were a fiction, the result of compar-
ing apples with oranges. But these headline- grabbing statistics 
were useful for their shock value, as they brought remittances to 
the attention of government officials, development agencies, and 
financial institutions.
The second issue to note about the construction of remit-
tances as a financial flow is related to the fact that, as we will 
see in the next chapter, this representation of remittances as a 
large, growing, and relatively stable financial flow laid the foun-
dation for a set of market- based solutions promising to “lever-
age” remittances for development purposes. Thus, despite the 
fact that the financial crisis unleashed in 2007 undermined 
the characterization of remittances as a countercyclical finan-
cial flow relatively immune to the vagaries of financial crises, 
recessions, and business cycles, this particular representation 
of remittances was far too important for the promoters of the 
R- 2- D agenda to let it fall so easily.
A 2009 MIF report lamented that “remittances to the LAC 
region will decrease in 2009, marking the first downturn since 
the Inter- American Development Bank began tracking these 
flows in the year 2000” (MIF, 2009: 3). However, the report reha-
bilitated the notion that remittances were relatively stable to 
conclude on the following optimistic note: “Despite the decline 
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expected in 2009, remittances will remain a far more stable source 
of foreign currency than other financial flows, while maintain-
ing millions of people above the poverty line” (MIF, 2009: 5, my 
emphasis). As a remittances specialist at the IADB suggests in 
the following lengthy quote, migrants’ ability and willingness to 
adapt is the key reason for this apparently greater stability:
The defining characteristic of remittances is that they are seen as a 
family obligation. Senders are more likely to cut back on their own 
consumption than to reduce the amount of money they send to 
their families. Unlike speculative flows or foreign investment, 
therefore, profit motives do not drive remittance levels. As a result, 
changing economic or political risks and natural disasters will not 
negatively impact the decision to send. In fact, remittances typi-
cally increase during such periods, providing recipient families 
and developing economies with a cushion in troubled times.
The current [2008] financial crisis, however, presents a new 
combination of factors, as both senders and recipients are con-
fronted by similar forces simultaneously. . . . This is causing concern 
that we may be testing the limits of remittance counter- cyclicality.
How remittance flows will be affected by the financial crisis is 
wholly dependent on the ability of migrant workers to find strate-
gies to adapt. Surveys and focus groups conducted for the [IADB] 
and by the IAD (Inter- American Dialogue) suggest that immi-
grants are working longer hours to compensate for lower wages, 
switching sectors after job loss, responding to labor demand and/or 
local immigration enforcement by moving from one state to 
another, and even tapping into their saving to maintain remittance 
levels. Immigrants have proven to be more adaptable than other 
parts of the labor force, and have been able to maintain remittance 
flows despite the current 8 percent Hispanic unemployment and 
job losses in traditionally important sectors such as construction. 
Current evidence suggests that we are not yet testing the boundar-
ies of this ability to adapt.
 (Meins, quoted in Migrant Remittances, 2008: 8)
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This revealing statement hints at the human aspects of 
migration so often obscured when remittances are aggregated 
into a financial flow. It reminds us that if remittances have main-
tained their relatively stable and countercyclical nature even 
in the face of an increasingly adverse political and economic 
climate, this results from ever- deepening levels of migrant 
(self- )exploitation. But the painful toll migrants experience 
in their efforts to keep the remittance monies flowing back to 
their homeland is not the focus of the policy experts behind 
the R- 2- D agenda: their main concern is to show that migrants’ 
apparently limitless capacity to “adapt” to deteriorating condi-
tions confirms this financial flow’s relatively stable and counter-
cyclical nature.
The discursive and visual representations of remittances ana-
lyzed here were not sufficient on their own to transform remit-
tances into a “development tool.” The advocates of the R- 2- D 
agenda had to take their new representation of remittances as 
a financial flow into the world, touting and diffusing it amongst 
public- opinion leaders, government officials, and financial- 
industry players in an attempt to link this representation to 
concrete changes in policy and practice. Before we turn in the 
next chapter to an analysis of the market- based policy interven-
tions flowing from the representation of remittances as a finan-
cial flow, the following section analyzes the political practices 
and power dynamics involved in the diffusion and transfer of 
new remittance- measurement techniques. I focus on the Latin 
American region and look at how MIF officials used forms of 
soft  power— including both offering grant funding to cooperat-
ing institutions and smearing the reputations of less cooperative 
 ones— to induce governments and central banks in the region to 
improve their official remittances data.
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media PressUre and grant fUnding:  
the soft PoWer behind remittanCe- statistiCs 
imProvements in latin ameriCa
In interviews with staff at MIF and IFAD, they told a consis-
tent story about how their maps of remittance flows had suc-
cessfully produced two primary effects: (1) they captured the 
attention of high- ranking officials within financial and devel-
opment institutions, and (2) they helped bring pressure to bear 
on national officials responsible for gathering and reporting 
data on remittance flows.
Donald Terry, the manager of the MIF from its begin-
nings until his retirement in 2008, described the work of map-
ping remittances flows as the most important thing that the 
MIF Remittances Program had done on the issue. Other staff-
ers within the MIF and IFAD concurred with Terry about the 
central importance of their mapping work. Beyond simply rais-
ing awareness and elevating the visibility of remittances within 
banking institutions and development circles, these maps and 
the surveys they were built from served to bring pressure on 
central banks across the LAC region to improve their data- 
collection practices and the official statistics they reported. 
One MIF staffer described to me how, when they first started 
looking at the official statistics, they realized that these could 
say nothing useful about remittances, even though other finan-
cial flows such as foreign direct investment were reported with 
seemingly exact precision (Interview with MIF staffer, 2009). 
Prompted by this recognition of the severe limitations of official 
statistics on remittances, the MIF program then commissioned 
a series of surveys of remittance senders in the United States 
and recipients throughout Latin America in order to generate 
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its own more accurate statistics. Alluding to both the initial 
motivation for these surveys and their eventual impact, Donald 
Terry told me:
I knew we had struck something of not just interest, but impor-
tance, when we started to get some pushback from central banks 
and the rest because we were basically willing to say, “Your num-
bers aren’t off .  .  . by 10, or 15, or 20 percent”—if that’s all it was, I 
wouldn’t have been that interested in doing these surveys—“you’re 
off by 300, or 400, or 500 percent. You have no idea of how much 
money is coming back in.”
 (Interview with Donald Terry, 2009)
Another former MIF staffer described in detail how the MIF 
surveys and maps were put to use in pressuring national officials 
to improve their official statistics. He mentioned that despite the 
large discrepancy between their estimates and the official statis-
tics MIF staffers initially found little traction when they com-
municated directly with central- bank officials. They confronted 
this official indifference by organizing public events in particu-
lar countries, releasing their own estimates to the national press, 
and trying to bring pressure on central- bank officials to improve 
their collection methods and official estimates. This national 
media coverage would often draw the attention of government 
officials outside the central bank and lead to rather immediate 
effects; upon publication of the MIF surveys and maps, central- 
bank officials who had initially rebuffed their overtures would 
contact MIF staffers to inquire about the discrepancies. Inevi-
tably this would lead the central bankers to look into their own 
estimating procedures, recognize their ad- hoc nature, and come 
to accept the need to improve their estimates. This staffer would 
describe this relationship not as conflictual but as a kind of 
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“constructive collaboration”—although central bankers initially 
resisted, they went through a process that went from surprise, to 
justification, and then finally led them to collaboration (Inter-
view with former MIF staffer, 2009).
Thus, employing the bully pulpit afforded to them as represen-
tatives of a relatively reputable multilateral financial institution, 
MIF officials used media outlets to publicly challenge the veracity 
of the remittances data coming out of national institutions. As the 
process of surprise, justification, and collaboration ran its course 
in the individual countries across Latin America, the MIF staff-
ers found success in convincing central- bank  officials to  pursue 
improvements in their collection methods and data quality. This 
was confirmed during my interview with Donald Terry, when 
he explained that: “The map that the [MIF] now puts out each 
 year— for the most part now, those are the official numbers of the 
central banks; there’s still a couple of central banks that aren’t doing 
it. But essentially, by doing those surveys, by getting a sense of how 
much money was being  sent— that sort- of forced the government 
officials to acknowledge that” (Interview with Donald Terry, 2009).
The use of national media to publicly challenge the legit-
imacy of the central bankers’ statistics was not the only form 
of soft power the MIF staffers used to ensure national officials’ 
collaboration with their regional project. The MIF program 
also used its grant funding to bring the LAC central bankers 
on board as collaborators. This is most clearly seen in the 2005 
IADB/MIF grant made to the Latin American Association of 
Central Banks (CEMLA) to develop a coordinated strategy to 
improve data- collection procedures across the continent.
While the MIF Remittances Program’s efforts appear to 
have been successful at inducing LAC central- bank officials to 
modify their measurement techniques, this process of change 
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does not appear to have been one of either smooth  collaboration 
or simple imposition. A closer examination of the outcome of 
the MIF/CEMLA grant project helps to illustrate the power 
dynamics involved in these efforts to improve the accuracy of 
remittance statistics across the region.
During a “launching seminar” for the MIF/CEMLA project 
held in Mexico City in 2005, the MIF consultant Manuel Orozco 
presented a paper entitled “Conceptual Considerations, Empir-
ical Challenges, and Solutions in Measuring Remittances.” In 
that paper, Orozco recommended a survey- based method for 
 measuring remittances (Orozco, 2005). The proposed method 
would draw from three sources of data, including U.S. census 
data, random nationwide migrant surveys to determine the per-
centage of migrants who remit money, and data from money- 
transfer companies on the “mode, median and average amount 
sent” (Orozco, 2005: 24). The information culled from these data 
sources would then be inserted into a relatively simple formula, 
whereby the total volume of remittances could be determined by 
multiplying (1) the total number of migrants; (2) the percentage of 
migrants that remits; and (3) the average amount remitted. Such 
a formula, according to Orozco (2005: 24), promised to “improve 
the predictive impact of remittances volumes.”
My intention here is not to ponder the strengths and/
or limitations of such an estimating formula. The more modest 
objective is to point out that this proposed measurement tech-
nique did not meet with the full- scale approval of the LAC central 
banks. CEMLA staffers working on the MIF grant to improve the 
remittance statistics compiled by Latin American central banks 
preferred a direct reporting method that would rely on informa-
tion provided regularly by financial institutions on the remit-
tances payments they process. A major product emerging from 
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the MIF/CEMLA grant project was supposed to be a “Manual on 
Best Practices for the Compilation of International Remittances.” 
The preliminary version of this best- practice manual did not 
embrace the estimating techniques favored by Orozco. Instead, it 
suggested that “the best compilation strategy is for central banks 
to focus on, and obtain reports from, companies that are directly 
engaged in the remittance process themselves, such as nonbank 
[money- transfer  companies] and individual banks transmitting 
remittances on their own account” (CEMLA, 2006: 35).
These different estimation methods could have important 
effects in terms of the representation of remittance flows. The 
direct reporting method advocated in the CEMLA manual, 
while potentially including a significant amount of nonremit-
tance cross- border transfers, would likely capture more of the 
fluctuations in total remittances than the type of survey- based 
estimates advocated by the MIF. Unless their surveys of remit-
tance senders and receivers are continuously updated, survey- 
based estimation techniques use a static coefficient of per- capita 
remittances sent by migrants. With the use of such a technique, 
it is really little wonder that remittance data show these flows 
to be growing and  countercyclical— this type of formula neces-
sarily leads to remittance- volume estimates that grow in a lin-
ear relationship with the size of the migrant population. The 
estimates of different organizations will differ as a result of the 
sources of data used to construct their “propensity to remit” 
coefficient. However, all estimates using such a technique will 
grow in lockstep with a rising population of migrants and remit-
ters, thus contributing to the representation of remittances as 
large, growing, and countercyclical.
The disagreements between the central bankers and the MIF 
officials are probably driven as much by their differential access to 
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various sources of data as by their perceptions of the accuracy of 
either of these methods. For officials within the Latin American 
central banks the use of data sources from within their own coun-
tries is likely both preferable and more practical than collecting 
data from sources in the United States. This is especially the case 
if these officials can use the power of the state to require financial 
institutions operating within their national territory to directly 
report information about remittances receipts.
In sum, while the Latin American central bankers may have 
conceded to the assertion of the MIF program and its expert 
consultants that their official statistics were less than precise, 
these bankers were apparently not willing to grant the inter-
national organization the power to impose its preferred tech-
nique for remedying these inaccuracies. These divisions were 
rendered partly moot when the proponents of the R- 2- D agenda 
successfully incorporated new remittances definitions and 
measures within revisions of the IMF’s balance- of- payments 
framework in 2009 (IMF, 2009a). However, even with this new 
international measurement regime it would appear that the 
debate between direct reporting and survey- based estimates 
has not been fully resolved; a guidebook published by the IMF 
explaining the new definitions and reporting procedures could 
only go so far as to advise governments to “develop data compi-
lation strategies based on the needs, constraints, and capabilities 
of their own countries” (IMF, 2009b: 3).
ConClUsions
This chapter began by examining the technical practices 
deployed by actors within international development agencies 
to construct remittances as a financial flow. These included 
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the elaboration of more accurate statistics and measurement 
tools, as well as the transformation of the improved data devel-
oped through these new tools into tables, charts and graphs 
that would forcefully demonstrate in visual form the growing 
importance of remittance flows. The chapter also illustrated 
the political dynamics involved as officials associated with the 
MIF and IFAD used various forms of soft power to spread their 
preferred data- collection techniques and representations of 
remittances as a financial flow across Latin America and the 
world.
The focus of this chapter has thus been on the discursive 
and technical construction of remittances as a financial flow of 
great importance for development in the global South and on 
the efforts of development- industry officials to spread particular 
measurement techniques that promised to improve the statistical 
data underlying such a construction. In creating and mobilizing 
these data- collection techniques and visual representations the 
purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda have rather successfully spread 
across the world the view that the relatively small amounts of 
money transnational migrants send to family and friends living 
back in the homeland constituted a large, rapidly growing, and 
relatively stable cross- border financial flow. But in and of itself 
this examination tells us little about how the proponents of the 
R- 2- D agenda articulated the connection between remittances 
and development. How, exactly, did they make the link between 
their representations of remittances as a financial flow and devel-
opment processes in the global South? The representation of 
remittances as a financial flow was particularly amenable to 
market- based policy interventions aimed at further incorporat-
ing migrants and their monies within financial institutions and 
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markets. And this is precisely the type of policy intervention the 
purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda designed, promoted, and imple-
mented as they sought to turn remittances into a “development 
tool.” In the following chapter I analyze the content and rationale 
of these market- based solutions, and the governmental work that 
made them possible.
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Ch a P t e r 3
Forging the Remittances- to- 
Development Nexus
Conceptual Linkages and Political Practices
The previous chapter analyzed the governmental work involved 
in the construction of remittances as a financial flow. In this 
 chapter I turn to look at the governmental work involved in the 
portrayal of the nexus between remittances and development and 
the identification of market- based solutions capable of exploiting 
that connection. How, exactly, have remittances been framed as 
a potentially valuable contributor to development in the global 
South? In the following pages, I examine the contours and con-
tent of this aspect of the R- 2- D agenda, dissecting the particu-
lar understandings of the connection between remittances and 
development that have animated the work of agencies such as 
the  Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Inter- American Dialogue 
(IAD), and the World Bank. In particular, I focus on how these 
institutions have forged the conceptual link between remit-
tances and development and on the specific practices that pol-
icy entrepreneurs within these institutions have undertaken in 
order to make their political project a reality. With this work, 
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the  purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda are involved in a process of 
“rendering technical” the complex relationship between trans-
national migration, remittances, and development. Tania Mur-
ray Li suggests that this process of rendering technical is about 
“extracting from the messiness of the social world, with all the 
processes that run through it, a set of relations that can be formu-
lated as a diagram in which problem (a) plus intervention (b) will 
produce (c), a beneficial result” (Li, 2007a: 265). In our case, the 
policy designers suggest that the problem of the underutilization 
of migrants’ remittances (a) can be remedied through a series of 
market- based interventions (b) that promise to result in greater 
(financial) development (c).
There have been some subtle differences in how each of the 
major development agencies has portrayed this relationship 
and the particular set of policy interventions that promise to 
transform remittances from an unrecognized and underuti-
lized international financial flow into a robust contributor to 
 development in migrant- sending countries and regions. Despite 
these minor differences, there are common themes that unite 
these agencies around a vision of how remittances can contrib-
ute to development processes in the global South. As we will 
see, each of these major themes identifies in its own particular 
way how the incorporation of migrants and their monies into 
financial institutions and markets constitutes both the means 
and the ends of development.1
In essence, remittances have been incorporated within an 
increasingly financialized development discourse and prac-
tice along three lines: reducing the cost of remittance- transfer 
services; promoting the democratization of financial products 
and services; and linking remittances to “innovative sources of 
development finance.” In the first of these areas, development 
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agencies focus on the cost of remittance- transfer services and 
suggest that these could be reduced through further market 
competition in the transfer- services industry. This part of the 
agenda is imagined to contribute to development by reducing 
costs to remitters and leaving more money in the pockets of 
migrants and their family members.
The second theme has been to encourage the use of formal 
financial institutions as a means to bring remitters and the recip-
ients of remittances into the financial mainstream and usher in a 
new epoch characterized by financial democracy and  economic 
citizenship. Here development would derive from grant-
ing migrants and their family members access to financial ser-
vices, which would help activate their entrepreneurial energies; 
development would also be propelled by further capitalizing 
the  banking sector in migrant- sending regions, as these finan-
cial intermediaries would then efficiently distribute these new 
monies to capital- hungry firms and entrepreneurs whose activi-
ties would create jobs and opportunities and, in the process, help 
bring an end to outmigration.
The third and final theme has focused on leveraging remit-
tances through innovative financing mechanisms such as 
remittance- securitization schemes. These innovative finan-
cial instruments, according to their promoters, promise to 
offer government and private- sector entities in remittances- 
receiving countries access to financing on more favorable 
terms in global capital markets. In these discussions it seems 
that access to global capital markets itself is an indicator of 
development.
In what follows I examine these three lines of action, empha-
sizing the concrete governmental work carried out by  policy 
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experts and entrepreneurs within the development  agencies 
as they attempted to reshape reality to conform to their 
 market- centric discourse.
the governmental WorK of marKet- based 
solUtions: redUCing transfer Cost
Shortly after the MIF remittances program began its work, 
it released what would become a recurring report, entitled 
“Sending Money Home” (MIF, 2003). This  report— subtitled 
“An International Comparison of Remittance Markets”— 
documented the costs associated with remittance transfers to 
the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, demonstrat-
ing that these were significantly higher than in any other region 
of the world. Aggregate costs paid by migrants to send their 
remittances to the LAC region reached some $4 billion in 2002, 
or a little over 12 percent of the $32 billion sent to the region that 
year. The MIF report noted that this 12- percent cost was around 
50 percent higher than the costs associated with sending monies 
to other “major recipient countries” (MIF, 2003: 6).
Demonstrating concern over these high costs, one of the MIF 
program’s primary objectives since the founding of its project 
cluster in 2001 was to “reduce the cost and facilitate the trans-
mission of remittances” (MIF, 2001: 5). By 2004 this had become 
one of the program’s two principal goals, which were laid out 
in a “Statement on Remittances” presented during its “Remit-
tances as a Development Tool” regional conference in Lima, 
Peru, in March of that year. With that statement, the program 
committed itself to: (1) reducing the cost of remittance trans-
fers to the LAC region by 50 percent within the following five 
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years; and (2) increasing to 50 percent the proportion of remit-
tance recipients receiving their monies through formal financial 
institutions (MIF, 2004: 2).
During the interview I conducted with the former manager of 
the MIF, Donald Terry, he described to me the different elements 
of the MIF program’s work on remittances over the last decade. 
We had the following interaction about the goal of cost reduction:
Donald Terry (DT): The second obvious [issue] was to help lower 
transaction costs. And, you know, we didn’t have to do all that 
much other than to make it clear that there were billions and bil-
lions and billions of dollars being sent . . .
MB: Because as soon as you did that you . . . encouraged compe-
tition in the industry . . .?
DT: Yeah, competition doesn’t always work, but in this case it 
did. . . . It was, “Oh, my God, there’s billions of dollars. We should 
get a piece of that.”
 (Interview with Donald Terry, April 26, 2009)
Terry is asserting here that there have been significant 
reductions in the cost of remittance- transfer services in recent 
years and that these reductions have been the result of mar-
ket forces; in essence he is arguing that, seeing significant 
profit- making potential, additional market actors entered the 
remittances- transfer industry and that the entry of these addi-
tional firms led to increased competition and, ultimately, price 
reductions for consumers. This representation is only a par-
tial accounting of the factors that went into price reductions in 
recent years. Most important for our purposes, Terry’s asser-
tion that the MIF “didn’t have to do all that much” to contrib-
ute to the reduction in transfer costs conceals the significant 
work that the program and its allies put into developing a par-
ticular understanding of the  remittances- transfer industry, its 
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 limitations, and the options they identified for improving the 
industry and market conditions.
During an earlier interview with another MIF staffer I was 
told that the program had engaged in a variety of practices to 
ensure reductions in transfer fees and costs. This staffer sug-
gested that the MIF program “put a lot of work into” its attempts 
to lower transfer costs, in large part because of the belief that 
the leading transfer companies were making unreasonable profits 
from these services. As he described it, the major transfer compa-
nies were charging fees that constituted 25 percent of a transac-
tion. Within the MIF program they found this cost structure to 
be “outrageous,” and they attempted to muddy the reputation of 
some of the major players in the industry, naming and shaming 
them for the “frothy profit” they were extracting from migrant 
remitters (Interview with MIF staffer, 2009).
These MIF program efforts at naming and shaming were 
among larger moves during the late 1990s and early 2000s aimed 
at tarnishing the reputations and forcing changes in the busi-
ness practices of the major money- transfer companies. In those 
years, these nonbank financial- services firms were repeatedly 
sued over their fee structures and advertising practices. One 
high- profile lawsuit was a class- action case brought on behalf 
of Mexican migrant remitters that accused Western Union, 
Orlandi Valuta, and MoneyGram of engaging in fraudulent 
practices because their advertisements, which would regularly 
make claims like “Send $300 to Mexico for $15,”2 did not alert 
their potential customers that the companies would also profit 
from the exchange- rate  spread— the difference in the price the 
companies paid for Mexican pesos and the exchange rate they 
offered their customers when converting dollars into pesos for 
distribution in Mexico. This class- action suit was settled before 
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judgment, with the companies offering, among other things, to 
provide nearly $400 million in coupons to their previous cus-
tomers and committing themselves to inform customers in 
future advertisements of the existence of the exchange- rate 
spread. A federal appeals court would later deny a challenge to 
the adequacy of this settlement and, in the process, offer some 
valuable ammunition to the transfer- service providers as they 
defended themselves from the extensive naming- and- shaming 
campaigns to which they were being subjected. In its decision, 
the appeals court suggested that the money- transfer business 
was really no different from any other type of retail activity:
This settlement is more in the nature of a PR gesture, coupled with 
the goal of freedom from a drumbeat of litigation (similar suits 
have been filed in many state and federal courts across the nation), 
than an exchange of money (or coupons) for the release of valuable 
legal rights. No state or federal law requires either currency 
exchanges or wire- transfer firms to disclose the interbank rate at 
which they buy specie, as opposed to the retail rate at which they 
sell currency (and the retail price is invariably disclosed). That is 
why plaintiffs have been driven to make generic fraud claims. But 
since when is failure to disclose the precise difference between 
wholesale and retail prices for any commodity “fraud”?
Money is just a commodity in an international market. [Citation 
omitted.] Pesos are for  sale— at one price for those who buy in bulk 
(parcels of $5 million or more) and at another, higher price for 
those who buy at retail and must compensate the middlemen for 
the expense of holding an inventory, providing retail outlets, keep-
ing records, ensuring the recipient is the one designated by the 
sender, and so on. Neiman Marcus does not tell customers what it 
paid for the clothes they buy, nor need an auto dealer reveal rebates 
and incentives it receives to sell cars. This is true in financial mar-
kets no less than markets for physical goods. The customer of a 
bank’s foreign- exchange section (or an airport’s currency kiosk) is 
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quoted a retail rate, not a wholesale rate, and must turn to the 
newspapers or the Internet to determine how much the bank has 
marked up its Swiss Francs or Indian Rupees.
 (In the Matter of Mexico Money Transfer Litigation, 267 F3d 743)
This judicial support for the transfer firms’ practices of wring-
ing concealed profits from the exchange- rate spread made clear 
that the strategy of legally challenging the pricing practices of the 
major players in the remittances industry was unlikely to pros-
per. This resolution, and the suggestion that money “is just a 
commodity in an international market,” also served to take the 
bite out of the naming- and- shaming campaigns portraying the 
industry’s practices as unethical and potentially unlawful. The 
remittances- to- development advocates were forced to accept that 
legal and reputational challenges to the industry’s leading firms 
would likely not be effective at bringing price reductions.
In subsequent years, the efforts of the MIF program staffers 
and their allies went well beyond these public attempts to smear 
the reputation of the large transfer companies. And indeed, 
as Donald Terry suggested in the quote above, the issue of 
increased competition would become central to the strategy and 
ultimate success in efforts to reduce costs. But, contrary to Ter-
ry’s suggestions, that competition did not spontaneously occur 
as a result of market forces, with new firms reacting to market 
signals, entering the profitable industry, and driving down costs 
to migrant remitters.
The suggestion that recent changes in the remittances indus-
try were solely the result of market forces and competition does, 
of course, hold real allure. This suggestion encapsulates and 
further extends a market- fundamentalist ideology that cham-
pions “free markets” over “intrusive” government action. The 
sway of this ideological interpretation was evidenced during a 
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2003 hearing in the U.S. House of Representatives’ Financial 
Services Committee, entitled “Remittances: Reducing Cost, 
Increasing Competition, and Broadening Access to the Market.” 
In his testimony, Texas representative Jeb Hensarling referred to 
a newspaper account of how banks and credit unions had begun 
to compete vigorously with the traditional money- transfer com-
panies and, as a result, fees had dropped “from approximately 20 
percent to as low as 4 percent in the last decade.” These devel-
opments suggested to Hensarling that market forces were suffi-
cient to bring transfer prices down to a reasonable level. He thus 
concluded that “The end product of this increase in competition 
and innovation is what is most important to consumers, more 
choices at lower cost. The free market, not the government, has 
brought about this result” (Hensarling, 2003: 4).
This free- market interpretation suited the MIF program 
as well, as it ran in line with the agency’s overarching mission 
to finance and promote private- sector development across the 
LAC region. I intend to illustrate, however, that despite this 
pro- market and antigovernment rhetoric, the introduction of 
increased competition and the resultant reduction of transfer 
fees was not the result of the hidden hand of the market. Instead, 
these resulted from the concerted and sustained efforts of those 
within the MIF program and allied organizations in govern-
ment and civil society whose promotion of the R- 2- D agenda 
brought this competitive environment into being. The govern-
mental work of these actors, whether located within a formal 
governmental agency or not, worked to shape the contours of 
the remittance- transfer industry and to govern the conduct of 
the market entities operating within it. In the following pages 
I examine three types of governmental work that went into the 
construction and implementation of this market- based solution 
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to the problem of high remittances- transfer costs: (1) creating 
knowledge about the structure of the industry; (2) elaborating 
best- practice recommendations for regulators and market enti-
ties; and (3) disseminating pricing information to consumers via 
dedicated Web sites.
Creating and CirCUlating KnoWledge aboUt 
the remittanCes- transfer indUstry
The MIF program and allied organizations such as the Inter- 
American Dialogue and the Pew Hispanic Center have since the 
early 2000s funded and/or conducted research into the structure 
of the money- transfer industry, highlighting the players involved, 
the transfer technologies in use, and the level and determinants 
of costs to consumers. This research has also strongly emphasized 
the importance of banks and credit unions entering the industry 
and competing with the long- standing money- transfer operators 
for a share of the market.
The research carried out by Manuel Orozco, director of the 
Remittances and Development Program at the Inter- American 
Dialogue, often funded by partner organizations such as the 
MIF (Orozco, 2002) or the Pew Hispanic Center (Orozco, 
2004), is indicative of this work. Orozco had begun conducting 
research on remittances in the late 1990s and, after coming to the 
attention of the MIF’s manager, Donald Terry, he was funded to 
develop detailed research on the structure of the remittances- 
transfer market. In the early 2000s, Orozco conducted a num-
ber of surveys of market entities and released reports (Orozco, 
2002, 2003, 2004) that documented the evolution of the market, 
highlighting the entry of new players, including a small num-
ber of banks and credit unions, and the gradual reduction of 
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costs to consumers, in terms of both exchange- rate differen-
tial and direct fees. While these survey findings indicated that 
fees rarely reached the “outrageous” 25- percent level that MIF 
staffers had suggested was the impetus for their cost- reduction 
work, these surveys showed that the cost to send $200 to Latin 
America in November 2001 was $17.46, or 8.7 percent (Orozco, 
2003: 4), and by February 2004 this had dropped to 7.6 percent 
(Orozco, 2004: 15). Despite these reductions, Orozco complained 
that, as an aggregate amount, “These costs represent more than 
two billion dollars in payments to wire transfer businesses by 
a consumer population largely composed of low- income immi-
grants” (Orozco, 2004: 16). This strategy of aggregating the total 
costs incurred in sending money was a central pillar in the 
development agencies’ argument about the remittances- and- 
development nexus and a recurring theme in their research 
reports and policy proposals for lowering transaction costs. An 
MIF report co- sponsored by the Pew Hispanic Center argued 
that “Reducing the cost to 5 percent of the amount remitted 
would free up more than $1 billion next year for some of the 
poorest households in the United States, Mexico and the Cen-
tral American countries covered by the Pew Hispanic Center 
projections. Between now and the end of the decade, the savings 
could amount to some $12 billion. It goes without saying that 
such a sum could change many, many lives” (Suro et al., 2002: 4). 
Donald Terry summed up the value of “billions and billions” of 
aggregate savings that cost reductions could represent by tell-
ing me “that is real money, as they say” (Interview with Donald 
Terry, April 26, 2009).
In identifying how to move toward still lower prices, Orozco 
and other researchers (Bair, 2003; Suro and Bendixen, 2002) inev-
itably noted that prices were lowest in markets with the greatest 
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number of competing firms. The market for sending remittances 
from the United States to Mexico was often invoked as the prime 
example of a highly competitive market that resulted in lower costs 
to remitters. The following excerpt from one of Orozco’s early 
reports (2002: 10) illustrates how this argument was presented:
The price of sending remittances varies significantly and a key 
determinant in those prices is the extent of market competition to 
send remittances to that recipient country. . . . Mexico is the country 
with the lowest fees among the nine countries studied. It is also the 
country with the greatest market choices for customers. The com-
petition in Mexico ranges from small businesses to large corpora-
tions. Significantly, among the reasons for expanded competition is 
the entrance of the banking industry into the remittance market.
Researchers associated with the World Bank would take 
up this type of research into the structure and characteristics 
of the remittances- transfer industry by the mid- 2000s. From 
2005 onward, the World Bank released a series of monographs 
presenting detailed research about the particular binational 
“remittances corridors” linking specific countries of origin and 
reception. In this body of research as well, competition became 
the central motif in explanations of the reduction of transfer 
costs, as in the following excerpt taken from the first of these 
monographs, which again addressed the U.S.- Mexico corridor:
In the past there was no real “market” for intermediaries in the 
U.S.- Mexico corridor. The role in the formal sector was dominated 
by MTOs [money- transfer operators], such as Western Union and 
MoneyGram. .  . . New competition from banks has brought about 
lower prices, faster services, and more reliable transactions. As a 
consequence, there is now a “paved road” for remittances between 
the United States and the urban and regional centers of Mexico.
 (Hernández- Coss, 2005: 22)
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What these two excerpts demonstrate is that the research 
on the structure of the remittance- transfer industry identi-
fied  competition— particularly from banking  institutions— as 
the key to driving down the price of transfer services. The 
(apparently) successful entrance of banking institutions in the 
Mexican case was used to illustrate this dynamic and to pro-
vide an example to be replicated in other remittance corridors. 
This logic was made explicit in the foreword to Hernández- 
Coss’s work on the U.S.- Mexico corridor, where we read that 
this research intended not only to “underline some of the crit-
ical themes that identify the corridor” but also to highlight “the 
experiences that could serve other economies to transform their 
own remittances corridors into transparent and more competi-
tive systems” (Waxman, 2005).
The research also aimed to demonstrate how banks and credit 
unions could be profitable in this competitive environment. 
Orozco, drawing from interviews he conducted with executives 
at banking institutions, suggested that banks and credit unions 
understood their interests as focused “not exclusively on trans-
fers, but on establishing a long- term relationship with senders,” 
which formed the basis for a strategy to “capitalize on money 
transfers as a way to increase their assets” (Orozco, 2004: 28). 
This research thus suggested that, even with significantly low-
ered transfer costs, banking institutions and credit unions could 
profit from migrant remittances, because these offered a means 
of capturing an “unbanked” sector of the population, bring-
ing them and their savings into the institutions and eventually 
engaging them with other financial products and services, such 
as credit cards, auto loans, and mortgages.
All this research into the structure of the remittances- 
transfer industry was not simply left on the shelves but was 
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actively disseminated by promoters of the R- 2- D agenda. The 
MIF remittances program, for instance, endeavored to put the 
particular knowledge gained from this research into motion by 
releasing research reports to great fanfare at numerous public 
events promoting remittances as a development tool in Washing-
ton, D.C., and across the continent. A 2010 evaluation of the MIF 
remittances program documents that it organized at least forty- 
five “conferences and roundtables in both remittance- sending 
and remittance- receiving countries, including events in the LAC 
region, North America, Asia, Africa and Europe” (Hall, 2010: 5).
Drawing on the commissioned research and its identifica-
tion of increased competition as the key to transfer- cost reduc-
tions, MIF staffers also put this knowledge into circulation by 
directly advocating for the entry of banking institutions into the 
industry. An indication of this was provided to me during my 
interview with an MIF staffer who spoke about his early work 
in the program trying to educate banking institutions about why 
they should care about migrants and their remittance transfers. 
He described how, in these early days, they understood that 
their financial- education efforts would have to address not just 
migrants but also officials within banks and credit unions. When 
addressing the latter, they would show them demographic pro-
jections and explain that any institutions that wanted to main-
tain a position within the banking business in coming decades 
would have to “be in the Latino banking business.” MIF officials 
marketed this as a tremendous opportunity for banking insti-
tutions, suggesting that offering remittance- transfer services 
promised much more than a onetime service fee; beyond that, 
these services could be used to attract a client base in need of 
a full range of financial products and services (Interview with 
MIF staffer, 2009).
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Similar direct- advocacy work with financial institutions, car-
ried out by MIF staffers and those working in other development 
agencies, continued in later years. It has been particularly com-
mon for these advocates to make their pitches at the meetings of 
financial- services trade groups. For example, the IAD’s Manuel 
Orozco, along with representatives from the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo, participated in a session enti-
tled “ Remittances— Sizing the Revenue Opportunity in Cross- 
Border P2P” at the Banking Administration Institute’s (BAI) 2008 
“BAI Payments Live” conference, where they discussed strategies 
that banking institutions might employ to gain a foothold in the 
lucrative remittances market. These advocates have also regu-
larly participated in the meetings of the National Money Trans-
mitters Association (NMTA). As he spoke to the money- transfer 
operators assembled at the NMTA’s 2008 convention, Gregory 
Watson of the MIF suggested that providing remittances services 
was “not just corporate social responsibility; it is a market oppor-
tunity for all of you.” Then he argued that:
There has to be a business case and it has to be part of your busi-
ness model to offer these types of products, to not look at a remit-
tance client as just a client that you’re taking the money from for 
the transaction, but that you’re building a relationship with . . . and 
that you have a strategy going forward to cross- sell other products. 
I know that that’s what the successful banks that have been working 
in this sector have been doing and . . . there’s a lot of room for part-
nerships between MTOs and banks in this regard.
 (Watson, 2008)
Just how entrenched these direct- advocacy efforts had 
become was made patently clear with the NMTA’s decision 
to organize a 2010 meeting, entitled “IMTC Mexico 2010, the 
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International Money Transmitters Conference,” in conjunction 
with the “RemesAméricas” conference organized by the Inter- 
American Development Bank in Mexico City in May 2010. This 
latter forum was advertised as “a platform that provides a space 
for dialogue and discussion where actors in the remittances 
market can exchange lessons learned and successful experi-
ences with projects implemented over the last 10 years in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.”3 We will see more of these direct- 
advocacy efforts in the case study of the Directo a México pro-
gram in chapter 5.
the design and diffUsion of best  
PraCtiCes on remittanCes
This work of conducting research into the remittance- transfer 
industry and identifying competition as the key factor driv-
ing down costs to consumers led to the second type of cost- 
reduction work carried out by the development agencies and 
their allies. This was to draw up recommendations for financial 
institutions, government officials, and civil society about “best 
practices” regarding regulatory issues, barriers to market entry, 
and the potential use of new technologies in the industry. The 
MIF drew up a set of such recommendations, which were pre-
sented at its 2004 regional conference in Lima, Peru (MIF, 2004: 
3– 4). These “basic” or “core” recommendations, later repro-
duced in many of the program’s reports and promotional mate-
rials, were apparently written in collaboration with a broad set 
of remittances stakeholders. In unveiling these core recommen-
dations, MIF manager Donald Terry described them as a set of 
best practices among the private sector and remittance- service 
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providers, public authorities, and civil society that would assure 
a more efficient, transparent, and competitive market:
In order to help reach [its policy goals], the MIF, after consulting 
with an Advisory Committee of 22 organizations, is today issuing a 
set of Core Recommendations to Promote Best Practices in the 
Latin America and Caribbean Remittance Market:
REMITTANCE  INSTITUTIONS— improve transparency; 
promote fair competition and pricing; apply appropriate technol-
ogy; seek partnerships and alliances; expand financial services;
PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES— do no harm; improve data; encour-
age financial intermediation; promote financial literacy;
CIVIL  SOCIETY— leverage development impact; support 
social and financial inclusion.
 (Terry, 2004: 4)
A report from an Inter- American Dialogue “Task Force on 
Remittances,” also released in 2004, offered similar recommen-
dations. That report outlined a series of agencies and interven-
tions that could lead to transfer- cost reductions and an increase 
in the participation of remitters and recipients in the formal 
financial system. Again in this report, we find that the recom-
mendations are targeted not just at state policymakers but at a 
wider swath of remittance stakeholders, including banks and 
other financial institutions, migrant associations, and nongov-
ernmental organizations. In fact, one of the more striking fea-
tures of the recommendations coming from these agencies is 
their antistatist nature. In the IAD task- force report, for exam-
ple, governmental authorities are repeatedly enjoined to help 
facilitate the realization of the remittances- to- development 
objectives; these prescriptions, however, do not entail much in 
the way of proactive state action that could help accomplish the 
objectives. Instead, the recommendations offer up a litany of 
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actions that states should not take, lest they interfere with the 
smooth functioning of market forces that promise to bring about 
an efficient and competitive industry. Thus, the report makes 
the following series of admonitions to public authorities: “Gov-
ernments should not, for instance, limit the amounts or restrict 
the destination of remittances, nor should they seek to prescribe 
how remittances are sent or used. They should not set prices for 
remitting institutions, nor should they collect taxes on remit-
tance transfers” (IAD, 2004: 14). The overall message is sum-
marized a few short lines later, using language identical to that 
found in the MIF’s core recommendations, where we are told 
that the report’s “strongest recommendation to governments 
and international agencies is to follow the advice of Hippocrates 
to the medical  profession— first, do no harm” (IAD, 2004: 14).
When the issue of remittances was addressed by Group of 
Eight (G8) leaders in 2004, fully incorporating remittances into 
the heart of official development discourse and practice, this 
led, among other things, to the formation of a working group 
on the “payment- system aspects” of remittances that would 
release another set of recommendations in 2007 (Bank of Inter-
national Settlements and The World Bank, 2007). Here again, 
this report, written on behalf of a task force composed of repre-
sentatives from central banks in both remittance- receiving and 
remittance- sending countries, as well as from the international- 
development agencies, was based on the “belief that the best way 
to reduce the price of remittance services and make them more 
accessible is to encourage  competition— in particular, to make 
the market for remittances more open and thus ‘contestable’ ” 
(Bank of International Settlements and The World Bank, 2007: 2). 
From this belief, the G8 task force developed a set of five gen-
eral principles designed to encourage transparent, efficient, and 
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competitive markets, “sound, predictable, non- discriminatory 
and proportionate” legal and regulatory environments, and 
“appropriate” governance and risk- management practices (Bank 
of International Settlements and The World Bank, 2007: 4). 
While the report is careful in suggesting that these “ general 
principles” are “not intended to be prescriptive but rather to 
give guidance” (Bank of International Settlements and The 
World Bank, 2007: 1), nearly a quarter of the report is dedicated 
to developing a strategy for implementation of the general prin-
ciples and detailing possible actions to ensure their realization.
Overall, the effect of these multiple iterations of best- practice 
recommendations by development agencies and researchers 
has been to construct, normalize, and diffuse a particular set 
of market- based solutions to the problem of high transfer costs, 
first developed for the Latin American region, across the entire 
globe.
PriCe- ComParison Web sites and the formation 
of KnoWledgeable ConsUmers
The third type of governmental work carried out by develop-
ment institutions and government agencies to lower transfer 
costs sought to make the costs of remittance- transfer services 
more transparent to consumers. In carrying out these activities 
these agencies and institutions demonstrated an apparent disbe-
lief that the remittance- transfer companies  themselves— that is, 
the  market— would actually carry out the best- practice recom-
mendations and “disclose in a fully transparent manner, com-
plete information on total costs and transfer conditions, includ-
ing all commissions and fees, foreign exchange rates applied, and 
execution time” (MIF, 2004: 3). But rather than pursue national 
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or international regulation of this sector of the financial- services 
industry, officials within these organizations again focused their 
energies on a market- based solution.
The most common technique used to make the full cost of 
transfer services transparent to consumers has been the con-
struction of databases and Web sites that provide detailed infor-
mation about the cost and characteristics (e.g., delivery times, 
geographic coverage, etc.) of all available services. Such data-
bases and Web sites promise to equip remitters with all the 
information necessary to make a rational calculation of the 
transfer provider that best meets their service needs and eco-
nomic interests. The Mexican Consumer Affairs Agency 
( PROFECO— Procuraduría Federal del Consumidor) initiated 
this type of information gathering and diffusion in 1998 with its 
“Quién es Quién en el Envío de Dinero” campaign.4 This con-
tinuing project provides weekly reports on the fees charged to 
send $300 to Mexico by the various service providers operating 
in nine major U.S. cities: Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Indianapo-
lis, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Sacramento, and San Jose.
The United Kingdom’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) launched a similar initiative in 2005. DFID’s 
“Sending Money Home?” project ran a Web  site— later 
 privatized— that “provides consumers with an independent 
comparison of the best value services offered by Banks, Money 
Transfer Operators (MTOs), FX [foreign- exchange] provid-
ers and prepaid cards for transferring money abroad taking into 
account their fees, real- time exchange rates, speed and method 
of transfer.”5 The Send Money Home Web site would later 
expand beyond the UK transfer market to provide cost informa-
tion about transfer services to and from nearly anywhere in the 
world.
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The World Bank also launched a price- comparison Web 
site, entitled “Remittance Prices Worldwide.”6 The bank soon 
coronated itself as the leading authority on price- comparison 
databases and Web sites and even took on the role of certi-
fying national databases. In a 2010 policy paper, the World 
Bank outlined twelve “mandatory requirements of a national 
remittance price database” (World Bank, 2010: 6). Under 
this policy, those national databases that met the minimum 
standards outlined were to be granted a World Bank seal of 
certification.7
The foregoing examination of these different types of gov-
ernmental work that went into the construction of a market- 
based solution to the problem of high remittance- transfer costs 
demonstrates the significant role played by development institu-
tions and public authorities in the construction of a competitive 
transfer market. As we have seen, the role that these agencies and 
organizations have played has largely eschewed the traditional 
role of a public authority that might be expected to implement 
and enforce legal and regulatory requirements. Such an option 
was, of course, always available, and it was at times contemplated. 
In the United States, for instance, representatives Luis Gutierrez 
and Barney Frank co- sponsored a bill in the 108th Congressional 
Session (2003– 4), the International Money Transfer Disclosure 
Act, that would have mandated price  transparency— full disclo-
sure of fees and exchange- rate  spreads— but that option did not 
make it through the legislative arena. Similarly, in the United 
Kingdom, the 2005 report of the UK Remittance Working Group 
suggested that consideration should be given to “whether it is 
practical to recommend that it be a requirement for remittance 
providers to display a single figure showing total charges” (UK 
Remittance Working Group, 2005: 28). In the end, DFID opted 
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not to implement a regulatory requirement. Instead, DFID drew 
up a voluntary “Remittance Customer Charter” that approx-
imately half the transfer companies operating in the United 
Kingdom chose to adopt (Kansal, 2008). The major commitments 
that the companies accepted with this charter included provid-
ing migrant remitters, prior to initiating a transaction, with “an 
estimate” of the fees that they would be charged and “an indi-
cation” of the exchange rate to be applied to their transaction, if 
requested by the customer (UK Remittances Task Force, 2008). 
Even with this charter, then, it seems the transfer companies had 
still not committed to full transparency.
This rejection of mandatory rules and regulations illustrates 
how the governmental work of the development agencies and 
public authorities, rather than emphasizing the implementation 
and enforcement of legal requirements, was oriented toward the 
construction of a competitive, transparent, and efficient market 
for remittances services that, it was assumed, would meet the 
ultimate public- policy objective of lowering transfer prices. It 
is probably too early to tell whether the transparency offered 
by the proliferation of internet- based price databases, and the 
increase in competition within global transfer markets that such 
transparency may help to bring about, will contribute to sig-
nificant price reductions over the long run. The results to date 
of these efforts at introducing greater price transparency have 
been impressive. Taking the Latin American region as a whole, 
the average cost to send $200 from the United States dropped 
from 8.7 percent in November 2001 (Orozco, 2003) to 7.27 per-
cent by September 2010 (Payment Systems Development Group, 
2010). In the U.S.- Mexico transfer corridor the average price 
dropped from 7.95 percent in November 2004 (Orozco, 2004) to 
4.47 percent by the second quarter of 2014.8
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And while entry of new competitors into the market may be 
part of this story, it is also clear that some of these new entrants 
are attracted by the reigning price structure and the “frothy” 
profits that this price structure offers them. While we saw some 
of the larger banking institutions in the United States that 
entered the market in recent years offer their clients very low- 
cost or even no- cost transfer services (Wells Fargo’s “Express-
Send” and Bank of America’s “SafeSend” products are two 
prominent examples), such offerings have been far from the 
norm. For the most part, according to a December 2010 analysis 
of the World Bank’s global- price database, the transfer services 
offered by commercial banks continued to be the most costly 
on offer (Payment Systems Development Group, 2010: 4). And 
recent developments suggest that many banks have shuttered 
their remittance- transfer windows altogether in response to lim-
ited consumer interest and/or perceived regulatory pressure to 
step up monitoring of cross- border money transfers. This has led 
some industry observers to suggest that the cost for transfer ser-
vices may increase in the near future. (See Corkery, 2014.)
Most important, significant reductions in the average price of 
available transfer services would not on their own lead to billions 
of extra dollars remaining in the pockets of migrant remitters 
and their friends and family back home. Rational, price- centric 
behavior by migrant remitters is the essential causal mechanism 
that would translate market transparency, increased compe-
tition, and lower average prices into cost savings for migrants 
themselves. Only if remitters were to favor those market play-
ers offering their transfer services at the lower end of the price 
structure could market competition lead to the developmen-
tal outcomes promised by this line of the R- 2- D agenda. How-
ever, migrants remitting monies to family and friends back 
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home may not act like automatons responding solely to price 
signals; convenience, familiarity, trust, and force of habit may 
be just as important as pricing when migrants make decisions 
among different transfer options. Migrants may someday come 
to resemble the ideal price- conscious consumer that they are 
assumed to be; but if migrants are going to act as good financial 
subjects, drawing upon a price- centric economic rationality to 
choose among the various remittance- transfer options available 
to them, they would need to be trained to think and act in this 
way. Such training is the objective of the financial- literacy cam-
paigns analyzed later in this chapter and in chapter 5, below.
This reliance on financial- education and financial- training 
campaigns indicates the larger point: even if transparency and 
competition do eventually lead to significant price reductions 
and leave more money in the pockets of migrants and remit-
tances recipients, this eventuality will not have resulted from 
the unleashing of market forces. The significant governmental 
work undertaken by development agencies and public authori-
ties intent on constructing this particular type of market- based 
solution will be the underlying cause if the much- desired cost 
savings do indeed take hold.
leveraging remittanCes for develoPment
Beyond their efforts to reduce the cost of transfer services and 
leave more money in the pockets of migrant remitters and their 
family members, the proponents of the R- 2- D agenda promoted 
means to leverage remittances for development by incorpo-
rating these monies within financial institutions and markets. 
As mentioned above in chapter 1, the question of the impact of 
migration and remittances on development processes in sending 
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communities, regions, and nations has long been of interest to 
scholars. The debates on the remittances- to- development prob-
lematic that unfolded in the latter part of the twentieth century 
were usually framed in terms of the use of remittances and their 
impact on economic life in sending communities. The central 
question at issue was whether remittance monies were (or could 
be) employed in productive activities. A camp of so- called pes-
simistic scholars (Alarcón, 2002) argued that the vast majority 
of remittances were gobbled up by everyday expenditures and 
conspicuous consumption, and thus contributed little to the 
expansion of productive capacity in migrant- sending regions 
(e.g., Mines, 1981; Reichert, 1981). In contrast, a more “optimis-
tic” camp argued that even this consumption brought positive 
impacts as these monies circulated through the wider economy 
and brought about “multiplier effects” that spurred productive 
activity (Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 1996; Taylor, 1999).
Given these earlier academic debates about the relation-
ships between migration, remittances, and development, the 
remarkable thing about the recent political and discursive 
interventions of the development industry regarding remit-
tances is not that remittances were finally discovered as a 
potential contributor to development processes in the global 
South. The most important effect of the development institu-
tions’ contemporary discourse on remittances- to- development 
has been to displace earlier discussions about the use of remit-
tances and whether it is possible to channel significant pro-
portions of these monies toward productive activity. In place 
of these earlier concerns, the contemporary discourse of 
remittances- to- development has centered attention not on 
migrants’ own use of remittances but on the pathways of trans-
mission of their monies.
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Building upon the representation of remittances as a finan-
cial flow, the recent interventions of the development institu-
tions have had two principal effects. First, they have decentered 
the issue of the productive investment of remittances and effec-
tively reframed the question of the development potential of 
remittances in terms of “financialization” (Erturk et al., 2007; 
Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Langley, 2008). Second, in center-
ing attention on the incorporation of remittances into financial 
markets, this discourse highlights the development potential of 
the products and services offered by banks and formal financial 
institutions and, consequently, devalues the alternative trans-
fer options often employed by migrants, which range from the 
social- network- based services of Salvadoran viajeros (Mahler, 
2001; Landolt, Autler, and Baires, 1999) or van operators in 
northern Mexico (Hernández León, 2008) to the formal- service 
providers, such as Western Union, that dominate much of the 
industry. In sum, these interventions have successfully reartic-
ulated the nexus between migration, remittances, and devel-
opment so that the issue on the agenda of the development 
industry is now mostly about how to leverage remittances for 
developmental purposes by incorporating the monies generated 
through cross- border migration into financial markets and for-
mal banking institutions.
This leveraging of remittances for the purposes of financial 
development is envisioned in two principal ways: (1) by link-
ing remittances to innovative financial instruments that could 
increase access to development finance in the countries of the 
global South; and (2) through the democratization of financial 
services whereby banks, credit unions, and microfinance insti-
tutions offer remittances- transfer services and begin to provide 
migrant remitters and remittance recipients expanded access to 
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a broader swath of financial services, including savings, insur-
ance, and credit products. In what follows I briefly examine the 
issue of remittance securitization before moving on to unpack 
the “financial democracy” element of the R- 2- D agenda. In both 
cases I analyze the discursive and programmatic aspects of these 
interventions and highlight the governmental work employed in 
attempts to make reality conform to these discursive models.
remittanCes as an innovative soUrCe of 
develoPment finanCe
A broad debate materialized in the early 2000s about poten-
tial new funding  mechanisms— often characterized as “inno-
vative sources” of development  finance— that might help to 
reach the international- development targets contained within 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).9 This search 
for new sources was necessitated because the traditional main-
stay of development finance, the official development assistance 
(ODA) provided largely by the OECD member countries, was 
seen as falling short of the monies needed to meet these newest 
international commitments to development. The 2001 report of 
the “High- Level Panel on Financing for Development”– often 
referred to as the Zedillo  Report— prepared for the United 
Nations in advance of the International Conference on Financ-
ing for Development to be held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 
2002 estimated that an additional $50 billion per annum would 
be needed to meet the MDGs. Reaching this funding threshold 
would require a doubling of then- current ODA levels (High- 
Level Panel on Financing for Development, 2001: 20). Yet most 
observers believed that this ratcheting up of ODA funding 
was unlikely in the near term. Thus, the search for innovative 
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sources of development finance was begun (Atkinson, 2004: 4– 6; 
Ketkar and Ratha, 2009c: 1).
Migrant  remittances— now constituted as a financial flow, as 
we saw in the last  chapter— have been a central component in 
these discussions of alternative sources of development  financing. 
For instance, a study conducted by researchers associated with 
the United Nations University included “increased remittances 
by emigrants” as one of the seven innovative funding mechanisms 
examined, along with global carbon taxes and the “Tobin tax” 
proposal for taxing cross- border financial transactions (Atkinson, 
2004; Solimano, 2004).
In most cases the integration of remittances into these dis-
cussions of innovative sources of development finance was 
understood in rather conventional ways. The only innova-
tive features were that a previously overlooked financial flow 
was brought into discussions about development finance and a 
variety of mechanisms were identified through which “remit-
tances can support economic growth in recipient countries” 
(Solimano, 2004: 177). The integration of remittances within 
discussions of development finance reached its zenith (or per-
haps its nadir) with the publication of the 2002 report by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) entitled 
“Foreign Aid in the National Interest.” One chapter within that 
report, penned by Carol Adelman, a fellow at the Hudson Insti-
tute, identified migrant remittances as an integral part of the 
development assistance provided by the United States. Adel-
man argued that the “full measure” of U.S. foreign aid could be 
understood only by including private, nongovernmental sources 
of foreign assistance and development aid in addition to official 
government assistance (USAID, 2002: chapter 6; see also Adel-
man, 2003, 2009). This exercise was designed to counter the 
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widespread portrayal of U.S. “stinginess” in regard to develop-
ment assistance (USAID, 2002: 131). Including private sources of 
development assistance, the scale of U.S. foreign aid more than 
 doubles— jumping from $23.6 billion in official U.S. government 
assistance in 2000 to over $52 billion, according to the report’s 
estimates (USAID, 2002: 131).
The extraordinary aspect of this new, fuller image of U.S. 
development assistance is that the “private assistance” figures, 
while including the voluntary contributions made by corpora-
tions, foundations, and other private donors, are made up pre-
dominantly by migrant  remittances— which, at $18 billion in 
2000, constitute 55 percent of private assistance and 32 percent 
of total U.S. development assistance in this new definition. Two 
things are worth noting about this particular way of integrat-
ing migrant remittances into discussions about development 
finance. First is the brutal irony of positioning remittances as a 
fundamental component of development aid at the same time 
that the United States pursued increasingly harsh immigration 
and border- enforcement policies. The policy contradiction is 
stunning. While U.S. policymakers were dedicating increasing 
resources to curtail the flow of unauthorized migrants and thus 
make the trek across the U.S.- Mexico border much more treach-
erous (see, among others, Andreas, 2001; Cornelius, 2001; Nevins, 
2002; Martínez et al., 2014), the remittances sent home by those 
migrants who had successfully skirted these efforts at deter-
rence were presented as evidence of the foreign- aid “largesse” 
of the United States (Adelman, 2003). Second, the report illus-
trates that, despite repeated pronouncements by the champions 
of the R- 2- D agenda that these monies should not be understood 
as a substitute for ODA (see Ratha, 2007: 8; Vargas Lundius et 
al., 2008: 7), in practice migrants’ remittances have been used to 
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justify limited expenditures on development assistance, at least 
within U.S. development- policy circles.
While it is difficult to find much that is really innovative about 
this incorporation of remittances into discussions of development 
finance, another set of scholars and policy  entrepreneurs— mostly 
affiliated with the World  Bank— were working on other ways to 
link migration and remittances to “innovative financing for devel-
opment” (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009b). Authors such as Dilip Ratha, 
Suhas Ketkar, and their associates10 have analyzed and promoted a 
number of financing mechanisms related to migration and remit-
tances that might “expand access to capital and lower borrowing 
costs” for developing countries and subsovereign and private- 
sector entities within them (World Bank, 2006: 86). In the view 
of Ketkar and Ratha, this need to expand access and cheapen 
the cost of capital for developing countries derives from changes 
in the structure of global finance in the wake of the global debt 
crisis of the 1980s. According to the history they narrate, financ-
ing for developing countries in the period leading up to the 1980s 
debt crisis came nearly exclusively from bank loans. As part of 
the resolution to the crisis brokered by the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment beginning in 1989, much of the outstanding debt held by 
developing countries was then converted to bonds. And while this 
“switch from bank loans to bonds increased the availability of cap-
ital[,] in all likelihood it also increased the volatility of financial 
flows” (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009c: 5). Thus, in a period marked by 
a dearth of official development assistance and increasing reliance 
on capital markets for development finance, it is the volatility of 
capital flows to developing countries that explains the contem-
porary search for innovative sources of development finance; as 
these World Bank researchers say, “Little wonder that developing 
countries and financial markets have attempted to come up with 
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innovations that provide access to funding during times of finan-
cial stress” (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009c: 6).
This conclusion may accurately describe the rationale for 
seeking out innovations in development finance given the cur-
rent structure of global capital markets. But in identifying 
developing countries and financial markets as the agents behind 
this search for innovations, the authors minimize their own role, 
and that of the institution they are attached to, in constructing, 
promoting, and implementing these innovative mechanisms. In 
discussing the principal remittances- related financial innova-
tion promoted by these  scholars— the securitization of remit-
tances as a future- flow  receivable— I want to illustrate not just 
the structure and promised outcome of this innovative financial 
mechanism but also the governmental work engaged in by these 
policy experts as they sought to bring such a model into being.
Researchers with the World Bank have been analyzing and 
strongly promoting the use of remittances- backed securities 
over the last decade (Ketkar and Ratha, 2001, 2004– 5, 2009a; 
World Bank, 2006; see also Terry, 2005: 14). How does this pro-
cess of remittance securitization work? And how exactly would 
this leverage remittances for developmental purposes? Like the 
securitization of other “future- flow receivables” in the develop-
ing world, the design of securitized remittances transactions is 
aimed at generating an improved credit rating for a particular 
bond transaction by setting up an offshore “special purpose vehi-
cle” through which future payments will be channeled before 
reaching the government or private- sector issuer of the securi-
tized bond (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009a: 26– 29).
Let me try to illustrate this innovative financing mechanism 
with a hypothetical example. A Mexican financial institution that 
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processes a significant volume of remittance transfers, paying 
funds to recipients in Mexican  pesos— let’s call this hypothet-
ical institution “Banco Jalisciense”—might attempt to leverage 
the remittance funds that flow through it by floating a securi-
tized bond and pledging future remittances receipts for repay-
ment. As part of this transaction, a special- purpose vehicle 
would be  created in the United States. Other banks and finan-
cial institutions would be instructed to channel future remit-
tance payments to be processed by Banco Jalisciense through 
this special- purpose vehicle. Before any future remittance funds 
ever reach Banco Jalisciense, the special- purpose vehicle would 
use the incoming remittance monies to pay off bond investors. 
Only after these payments to investors have been satisfied would 
excess funds then be forwarded on to Banco Jalisciense for distri-
bution to remittance recipients.
The securitization structure promises significant benefits to 
bond investors in that “the government of the borrower can-
not impede timely servicing of securitized bonds” (Ketkar and 
Ratha, 2009a: 27). As Gandy and Festa (2001) argue, the structure 
of future- flow receivable securitization is designed to mitigate 
the risk of “sovereign redirection,” whereby a government fac-
ing a severe economic crisis
may attempt to interfere with or redirect hard currency cash 
flows. . . . To mitigate these risks, obligors sign acknowledgements 
agreeing to make payments into trust accounts maintained outside 
the emerging- market country. These acknowledgements are typi-
cally governed by New York law, thus requiring an emerging- 
market government to convince a U.S. court to allow the redirection 
of these payments in violation of a security document, which is 
highly unlikely. (Gandy and Festa, 2001: 92).
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These risk- mitigation features built into the securitization 
structure promise, in turn, to allow borrowers to access credit 
on more favorable terms, which in effect gives financial institu-
tions and government agencies within developing countries the 
ability to “pierce the sovereign credit ceiling and obtain financ-
ing at lower interest costs and for longer duration” (Ketkar and 
Ratha, 2009a: 27). Improving a borrower’s investment rating and 
providing access to credit on more favorable terms are thus the 
central benefits offered by the securitized transaction.
Such securitization schemes are seen as a promising tool for 
governments and firms in the global South to further leverage 
remittances (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009a: 39). Analysts of securi-
tization repeatedly emphasize that there is significant poten-
tial for growth in this “asset class,”  which— if  exploited— could 
greatly expand access to global capital markets (Gandy and 
Festa, 2001: 95– 96; World Bank, 2006: 103; Ketkar and Ratha, 
2009a: 36– 39). For instance, World Bank researchers project that, 
by taking advantage of the opportunities for the securitization 
of remittances, “developing countries could potentially issue 
nearly $9 billion and low- income countries could raise up to 
$3 billion annually from international capital markets” (World 
Bank, 2006: 103).
In these discussions, this specific  outcome— improving access 
to capital  markets— comes to signify the ultimate goal of devel-
opment. This seems far removed from the search for alternative 
sources of funding to meet the Millennial Development Goals 
(MDGs), the task that had apparently given rise to the explora-
tion of “innovative sources of development finance” in the first 
place. But this result does give us an indication of the political 
meaning and implications of this World Bank– promoted invest-
ment vehicle and project. The objective here would seem to be 
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as much about using remittances as a vehicle to further extend 
the reach of financial markets in the global South as it is about 
finding new mechanisms to channel monies toward any type of 
human- centered development.
In his pioneering analysis of efforts to channel remittances 
into securitization instruments, Luis Eduardo Guarnizo sug-
gests that this type of financial innovation results in a situation 
wherein “migrants are unintentionally providing, through their 
monetary transfers, badly needed hard currency to comple-
ment and even subsidize some of the consequences of neoliberal 
reforms imposed by international financial agencies on develop-
ing countries” (Guarnizo, 2003: 688). He concludes that the use 
of migrants’ monetary transfers to improve the creditworthiness 
of their highly indebted home governments is “a clear expres-
sion of the creative malleability of capitalism to accommodate 
to new circumstances to reproduce itself” (Guarnizo, 2003: 689). 
Such a reading of the meaning and import of these innovative 
new financial instruments represents “capitalism” as a coherent 
unity itself capable of enacting changes in the world that will 
reproduce the conditions for capital accumulation. In conclud-
ing this section I would like to offer a different reading.
Rather than viewing these recent innovations as an indication 
of the internal and inherent capacities of capitalism to continu-
ously rework itself to meet its functional requirements, I want 
to emphasize the key role of development and economic exper-
tise in conjuring up these innovative financial vehicles and pro-
moting their application and extension across the world. This 
means highlighting the significant governmental work under-
taken by the policy experts and entrepreneurs within institu-
tions like the World Bank who have taken it upon themselves to 
analyze, promote, and implement these financial- market- driven 
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mechanisms for channeling resources for development to the 
global South.
To begin, it is important to acknowledge all the work done by 
development- industry officials and their  associates— analyzed 
in the previous  chapter— that went into the construction of 
remittances as a stable, growing, and countercyclical financial 
flow. This particular construction of remittances as a financial 
flow lays the groundwork for the expansion of financial instru-
ments and markets into this domain. In fact, we may say that 
these financial innovations are possible only because this por-
trayal has been widely circulated and has taken root, giving rise 
to the expectation that migrants’ future remittances will pro-
vide a steady and reliable stream of debt- service payments. But 
the researchers within the World Bank have done more than 
this in their attempts to promote these financial innovations as 
a means to further leverage remittances for development. The 
analytic work these policy experts have carried out on the his-
tory, present utilization, and future potential of these innovative 
mechanisms has been directed toward the identification of “con-
straints that have held back the issuance of future- flow- backed 
transactions” (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009c: 8).
Finally, having brought these constraints out into the open, 
these authors and the institutions they work for identify public- 
policy options for overcoming the constraints and fully exploit-
ing the potential of this market- based instrument. In these 
discussions they identify at least three ways that international 
financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank could help 
expand the use of this asset class. First, it is suggested that these 
institutions could “at the very least .  .  . play a useful function 
of educating public sector bureaucrats and private sector man-
agers in developing countries” on the benefits of future- flow 
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securities transactions and how they can and should be struc-
tured (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009a: 51). IFIs also have a role in 
encouraging countries to adopt an “appropriate legal infra-
structure,” mainly in terms of reforms to bankruptcy laws so 
as to recognize the “true- sale” of future asset flows, thereby 
granting these security instruments immunity from liquida-
tion in any bankruptcy proceedings (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009a: 
49– 50). Finally, these institutions could “boost the growth of 
future- flow remittance securitization” in more direct ways as 
well, such as by providing “credit enhancements,” “direct or 
indirect guarantees,” or credit- default swaps that would work 
to provide a series of benefits to investors, which would likely 
expand their thirst for these investment vehicles (Ketkar and 
Ratha, 2009a: 50– 51).
I will further analyze the meaning of these different forms 
of governmental work that go into the construction of these 
remittances- related financial innovations in the conclusion to 
this chapter. But first let me move on to examine a final theme 
within the R- 2- D  agenda— leveraging remittances to promote 
the democratization of financial services.
migrants, remittanCes, and the 
demoCratization of finanCe
The goal and the promise of the theme of “financial democracy” 
within the R- 2- D agenda is most clearly articulated in the MIF 
remittances- program cluster’s materials promoting its model of 
“remittances as a development tool.” In these documents, the 
aggregate volumes of remittances that the development agen-
cies have painstakingly endeavored to document are repre-
sented as “financial flows in search of financial products” (Terry, 
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2005: 14). This leads to the following description of the particu-
lar financial products that can serve to leverage remittances for 
development:
Over the past five years, remittances have undergone dramatic 
changes. Over the next five years, the system can be entirely 
transformed.
By the end of this decade, remittances to Latin America and the 
Caribbean can be moved from the current “cash to cash” system 
into the electronic or digital transfer system of “account to 
account.” The technology is already available; what is needed are 
entrepreneurial business plans and appropriate regulations frame-
works. The costs of sending money home will continue to fall. 
More people will be brought into the financial system and remit-
tances will be leveraged by linking flows to local microfinance 
institutions, home mortgages, and even the securitization of bonds 
for on- lending to local small businesses. (Terry, 2005: 14)
While the founding document of the MIF remittance- 
program cluster also proposed efforts to channel some por-
tion of remittances toward productive activity, within a few 
short years the program had largely abandoned this objective 
to focus intensively on the issues of incorporating migrant 
remitters, their family unit, and their monies into the formal 
banking system as a way to unleash financial democracy. This 
would soon become the dominant and recurring portrayal of 
the remittances- policy objective being pursued by much of the 
international development industry, forming the core of the 
MIF remittance cluster’s agenda (Terry, 2005: 10– 12; Orozco 
and Wilson, 2005: 385– 89) and the work of allied organizations 
such as the IAD and the IFAD (IAD, 2004: 9– 15; 2007: 9– 13; Var-
gas Lundius et al., 2008: 42– 47). The strategic logic of valoriz-
ing efforts to incorporate remittances within financial markets 
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over attempts to encourage direct migrant investment in pro-
ductive activity also prevails in much of the work on remit-
tances coming out of the World Bank. For instance, Dilip Ratha, 
undoubtedly the World Bank’s leading advocate of the R- 2- D 
agenda, argues that “efforts to channel remittances to invest-
ment have met with little success” and suggests as an alternative 
that “encouraging remittances through banking channels can 
improve the development impact of remittances by encouraging 
more saving and enabling  better matching of saving with invest-
ment opportunities” (Ratha, 2007: 8).
In the elaboration of the financial- democracy agenda, MIF 
officials have drawn connections to (and legitimacy from) the 
influential policy prescriptions of the Peruvian development 
economist Hernando de Soto (2000) and the U.S.- based man-
agement guru C. K. Prahalad (2004), who have, in their own dis-
tinct ways, argued that fully incorporating the poor within the 
dynamics of global capitalism, recognizing their value as both 
entrepreneurs and consumers, holds the key to the eradication 
of global poverty and inequality. The MIF discourse compares 
migrant remitters and their family members with de Soto’s 
informal  entrepreneurs— who are unable to free the “dead cap-
ital” locked within their untitled assets (de Soto, 2000)—and 
suggests that the former could potentially wield significant eco-
nomic power, if only their unseen assets were recognized by 
financial markets and institutions. The discourse identifies the 
rationale for banks and other financial institutions to open up 
to migrants and remittance recipients, granting them access to 
formal financial services in that, echoing Prahalad (2004), these 
long- ignored potential customers represent a “fortune at the 
bottom of the pyramid.” (See Terry, 2005: 8.) Drawing on these 
neoliberal mantras to present the case for financial democracy, 
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the MIF program has thus articulated the R- 2- D agenda in a 
way that centers the logic of market transactions and incen-
tives, rather than the guiding hand of state agencies or interna-
tional authorities that might facilitate the connection between 
remittances and development. This is illustrated in the follow-
ing excerpt from my interview with Donald Terry, where he 
contrasts his organization’s emphasis on freedom, choice, and 
“more options” for consumers with the more heavy- handed 
 conditionalities that the international financial institutions put 
on their loans in the recent past:
The real challenge here, and the real effort, is to leverage the 
development impact of those resources. For the first six months or 
so when we were realizing how big these flows were, I used the 
phrase that we should try to channel this money into more produc-
tive activities, and then I sort of slapped myself, realizing how f- ing 
arrogant I was. Because it’s not our money; it’s not like conditional-
ity on loans that these international organizations make. So the 
mantra really is: You leverage the development impact by giving 
the people who send and the people who receive more options to 
use their money. .  .  . The challenge, as I put it now, is to turn the 
world’ s— because I’m now dealing with the world, and it’s $300 bil-
lion, it’s not $75 billion, you know. Can you take what is the world’s 
most effective poverty alleviation  program— and again, foreign- 
aid people don’t like to hear that, but that’s too bad. Can you take 
the most effective poverty- alleviation program and turn it into the 
world’s largest and most effective grassroots economic- 
development program? I think it is an effective poverty- alleviation 
program. It is  not— remittances is not an effective local economic- 
development program, but it could be. And particularly it could be 
if you were to get the banking systems of both the sending and 
receiving sides  better at this.
 (Interview with Donald Terry, April 26, 2009)
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The effect of this discursive turn connecting remittances with 
financial democracy was to provide a way out of the impasse of 
the earlier scholarly  debates— the question was no longer about 
the specific pernicious or beneficial economic effects brought 
about by remittances or about how to design public policies 
that could effectively channel a greater portion of these monies 
toward productive endeavors. In place of these earlier concerns, 
the purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda posited a new model, whereby 
remittances could contribute to  development if the logic of 
financial markets were extended to this as- yet untapped source 
of capital, if the monies of migrants and their family members 
were effectively leveraged within formal financial institutions.
It should be noted that, although often left unstated, the 
objective in leveraging remittances for development (much like 
the recent Mexican- state migration policies analyzed in chap-
ter 4) is largely about stimulating economic activity in migrant- 
sending regions as a means to diminish pressures for future 
outmigration. This was made explicit, for example, in the pre-
sentation that the IFAD remittance- program coordinator Pedro 
de Vasconcelos made at the 2008 International Money Remitters 
Convention.
De Vasconcelos used the graphic contained here in figure 3.1 
to explain to his audience that the efforts of the international- 
development community to leverage remittances were designed 
to break a vicious cycle of migration- remittances- dependency:
[This is] the main idea from the development community that is 
interesting to understand. There is a circular phenomenon where if 
you send the remittances, they’re sent, they’re received, consumed, 
therefore you create some need and they are a circular phenome-
non. If you can leverage remittances at some point, when they are 
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received, by giving them, by giving those who are using them more 
 options— more options is more margins to use the money, basi-
cally, use their cash. More options to invest their cash. More 
options is also the way they receive it, just through a money trans-
fer company, or they can receive it in financial institutions. These 
are the more options. That leverage effect can be enhanced by 
actually using, for instance, small businesses in rural areas. When 
you do that, you create local economic activity and at the end you 
expect to have a lesser need to migrate. So this is basically the phi-
losophy behind it. (de Vasconcelos, 2008).
But how, exactly, is this conquest of financial democracy, this 
particular means of leveraging remittances flows, supposed to 
materialize? As we have seen, the neoliberal rationality of the 
MIF centers the logic of the market as the driving force behind 
Fig. 3.1. IFAD graphic showing the potential effects of leveraging remittances. 
(Source: de Vasconcelos, 2008: 12.)
Forging the Remittances- to- Development Nexus / 99
the transformations it envisions. For Terry (2005) the central 
factors driving financial democracy would appear to be the 
incorporation of new communications technologies, the cre-
ative energies of entrepreneurs, and the facilitating role of an 
“appropriate” regulatory environment. Elaborating the model of 
the agencies behind the leveraging of remittance flows in this 
way serves to displace attention from the governmental work 
required of the development agencies, and the partners they 
may be able to enlist in service of their project, to bring this 
vision of financial democracy into being.
This is, of course, necessary if the promoters of the R- 2- D 
agenda are to distance themselves from the tainted history of 
disastrous interventions by the international financial institu-
tions during the era of structural- adjustment programs, as we 
saw in Terry’s denunciations above of earlier efforts by offi-
cials within international  organizations— himself  included— to 
direct the actions of their target populations, be they debt- 
strapped governments or transnational migrants. In place of 
such policy mandates, the champions of financial democracy 
celebrate the exercise of individual freedom, migrants’ choice in 
the financial marketplace. But, of course, achieving this would 
also require the significant deployment of governmental power 
by officials within the MIF and allied organizations, because the 
forces and incentives of the market have not yet been enough to 
make their utopian vision of financial democracy into a reality.
While at the rhetorical level R- 2- D policy entrepreneurs 
minimize the work that would be required to recruit banking 
institutions to provide transfer services and convince these and 
other financial institutions to create and market new remittance- 
related financial products,11 the actual process of construct-
ing financial democracy in the here and  now— making reality 
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conform to this discursive  representation— involved significant 
governmental work to enlist government agencies and financial 
institutions as partners in the project of incorporating remit-
tances within financial markets.
The portfolio of projects funded and implemented by the MIF 
remittances cluster provides a concrete illustration of the types 
of governmental work that went into the construction of financial 
democracy and “more options” for migrant remitters and remit-
tance recipients. The cluster’s projects have addressed remit-
tances in a variety of ways, including the efforts to improve data 
collection and reduce transfer costs analyzed above, and, in early 
years, even to promote migrant investment in productive projects 
(Hall, 2010). But without a doubt, the cluster has been most active 
in promoting projects aimed at leveraging the developmental 
potential of remittances through their incorporation within for-
mal financial institutions, including banking institutions, insur-
ance companies, and specialized housing- finance companies. 
These projects recruited banks, credit unions, and microfinance 
institutions to provide remittance- transfer services; they encour-
aged financial institutions to create new remittance- based finan-
cial products and “cross- sell” these to remitters and recipients; 
and they helped fund financial- education campaigns designed 
to form migrants and members of their transnational households 
into appropriate financial subjects capable of and interested in 
utilizing these new financial products and services.
The MIF program’s portfolio included a variety of “ banking the 
unbanked” projects across the continent that  encouraged banks and 
other financial institutions to provide  remittance- transfer services 
and create and cross- sell other financial products and services 
to their remittances clients. A project in the Dominican Repub-
lic, carried out in collaboration with a microfinance institution 
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specializing in providing credit to women (Banco ADOPEM), 
for example, sought to establish relationships with international 
remittance- transfer companies that would allow the bank to oper-
ate as a receiver and distributor of remittances. Beyond this, the 
project aimed at the development of new “remittance- linked 
financial products,” including life and accident insurance as well 
as a variety of “scheduled savings plans” to pay for education costs 
or a family vacation. (See Hall, 2010: 75– 79; MIF- IFAD, 2005.)
Another project, this one carried out with the non- 
governmental organization (NGO) Apoyo Integral in El Salvador, 
also endeavored to create new remittances- based financial prod-
ucts. The “transnational credits” designed through this grant 
project were offered for a range of purposes, including land or 
home purchases, home improvements, and small- business for-
mation. (See Hall, 2010: 71– 74.) An even more ambitious project 
with the Mexican government’s second- tier development bank/
credit union Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros 
(BANSEFI) aimed at creating the technological infrastructure 
that would allow over fourteen hundred affiliated institutions to 
receive and pay out remittances in both rural and urban areas 
across the country. This project also contemplated creating 
a variety of new financial products, such as debit cards, credit 
cards, and housing- savings plans, that could be used to recruit 
“remittance recipients as clients” (Hall, 2010: 81). The MIF pro-
gram’s emphasis on developing these new financial products was 
due in no small measure to the fact that, for the relatively small 
financial institutions that often partnered with MIF on the 
projects, making remittance transfers is “not inherently profit-
able (unless scalable to a great degree) and entities must rely 
on cross- selling other products and/or lowering the cost of the 
remittance service to achieve benefits” (Hall, 2010: 148).
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Another common type of project within the MIF  portfolio 
attempted to channel remittance monies into housing mar-
kets across the continent. Projects carried out in Colombia, 
El  Salvador, Ecuador, and Mexico worked toward the design 
and marketing of transnational mortgage products to fund the 
purchase of houses in migrants’ countries of origin. A com-
mon challenge faced in each of these projects was to find an 
appropriate means to spread the word among remittance send-
ers about the availability of these new transnational mortgage 
products.  Promotional materials were often distributed through 
 consulates abroad. In the Salvadoran case, this strategy proved 
unsuccessful, because, according to Hall (2010: 32), “the major-
ity of the people who visit the consulates are undocumented, 
and therefore not a target clientele for the mortgage product.” 
The MIF- funded project in Colombia appears to have come up 
with the most ambitious marketing plan for the remittances- 
based mortgage product, as the implementing agency designed 
a national database including the names of remittance recipi-
ents to be used in marketing their newly designed financial 
products. (See Hall, 2010: 16.) In addition to its use in marketing 
the new transnational mortgage product, the information gath-
ered for the database of remittance senders and receivers was 
to be used to create a credit- scoring model that would include 
remittances receipts. A similar attempt to create and refine new 
credit- scoring models to assess the creditworthiness of poten-
tial mortgage holders was also contemplated in a project with 
the Ecuadorian financial institution Mutualista Pichincha S.A. 
(Hall, 2010: 34– 38).
It is worth noting that many of the institutions involved in 
these banking- the- unbanked projects with the MIF decided 
to cancel or suspend their new remittances- related financial 
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products as a result of the global financial crisis unleashed in 
late 2007. This decision was directly related to the particu-
lar characteristics usually attributed to remittances when con-
structed as a financial  flow— their nature as “countercyclical 
flows.” The promise of R- 2- D was predicated on this charac-
terization: financial institutions recognized transfers as largely 
unprofitable, but offering transfer services might make sense if 
financial institutions could link remittances to new and inno-
vative remittances- related financial products and services. 
However, the profitability of these remittance- related finan-
cial products could be realized only if remittances were indeed 
a stable financial flow. In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, many of the financial institutions that were recruited into 
the policies flowing from the R- 2- D agenda have come to see 
that these financial flows were susceptible to the turbulence and 
instability of the global political economy. For these institutions, 
it would seem that their clients may not have conformed to the 
MIF’s  representation— noted in the previous chapter (see Meins, 
quoted in Migrant Remittances, 2008: 9)—that the resilience and 
adaptability of migrants, their willingness and ability to take on 
new jobs and work longer hours, would ensure a continuing flow 
of remittances.
The financial- education component of the MIF program’s 
financial- democracy agenda is aimed, in essence, at reducing 
the divide between the discursive representation of migrant 
remitters and their households as entrepreneurial subjects and 
the actual financial and economic practices of migrants and 
remittance recipients. The discourse animating the financial- 
democracy project represents migrants and their family units 
as “profoundly entrepreneurial” (Terry, 2005: 7), as rational 
actors who have set upon the path of cross- border mobility in 
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no small measure because they lack access to credit and invest-
ment financing at home. The challenge of financial democracy 
is depicted as one of overcoming the exclusionary attitudes 
and practices of banking institutions in both the United States 
and the LAC region. This representation of the problem they 
faced was a common theme in my interviews with MIF pro-
gram officials, who repeatedly condemned the past practices of 
LAC banking institutions that explicitly defined their clientele 
in classist terms. One MIF official, for example, suggested that 
“cultural problems” in some countries led bankers to exclude 
working- class people “in their sombreros,” believing that their 
banks were only for “people in suits who work in Telefónica” 
(Interview with MIF staffer, 2009).
If the problem facing the promoters of the financial- 
democracy agenda were only about migrants and remittance 
recipients being excluded from banking services, then suc-
cessful work in convincing banks to open up access and pro-
vide new remittances- related financial products would be 
enough to unleash the far- reaching benefits they envisioned. 
But despite this rhetorical emphasis on the exclusionary 
practices and attitudes of banking institutions, the financial- 
democracy effort could never be limited solely to the work 
of convincing banks to open up to migrants and their family 
members; it must also attend to the ideas, practices, and iden-
tities of the migrants and remittances recipients at the center 
of the project.
In 2009, reflecting the limited success of this financial- 
democracy project, an MIF program document suggested the 
need for a restatement of the program’s strategic orientation. 
Accordingly, the program would now place front and center the 
issues of financial inclusion and banking the unbanked:
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To continue moving towards the objective of financial inclusion, 
MIF has taken on the task of reformulating its strategy, orienting it 
more clearly towards projects that allow for a clearer diagnosis of 
the problems facing the region in terms of financial inclusion and on 
the role that remittances can play in terms of improving access to 
financial services by the underserved segments of the population.
 (Analistas Financieras Internacionales, 2009: 18)
While this statement represents increased attention to the 
barriers to financial inclusion as a reformulation of the program’s 
strategy, it is probably more accurate to say that the already- 
existent financial- education or financial- literacy components 
of the decade- old strategy began to take on greater significance 
and become the program’s strategic priority. This is to say that, 
despite rhetorical moves to represent migrants and their house-
holds as already- existing entrepreneurial subjects, a signifi-
cant component of the R- 2- D agenda has addressed the need to 
engage directly with the process of forming migrants and remit-
tance recipients into good financial subjects. An important part 
of the MIF program’s work, and that of many other allied orga-
nizations (see, for example, IAD, 2004; Appleseed México, 2010), 
has thus involved financial- literacy or financial- education cam-
paigns. The 2010 external evaluation of the MIF program notes 
that eleven of its funded projects were at least partly focused 
on financial education (Hall, 2010: 203). These efforts have been 
directed, according to Orozco and Wilson (2005: 380), at the task 
of “creating new  incentives— and the capacities needed for peo-
ple to respond to these incentives—[in order to] make important 
changes in the way people think about and handle their money.” 
Building these capacities for migrants and remittance recipients 
to respond rationally to the new financial products on offer is 
necessary work because “many migrants and their families lack 
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financial literacy and thus are impeded in their ability to take 
advantage of new products and services” (Orozco and Wilson, 
2005: 385).
The MIF representative Gregory Watson sounded a simi-
lar note in his presentation at the 2008 National Money Trans-
mitters Association meetings. Noting the central role that the 
MIF and other development institutions could play in helping 
to mold migrants and their family members into new financial 
subjects, Watson told the financial- services- industry repre-
sentatives gathered at the conference that “you need to create 
demand for those [cross- selling] products and the way that 
you do that is by having the people involved in the transaction 
understand the benefits to them of those products. And that is a 
role that international institutions such as the IDB and others 
need to take  seriously— which is to help build demand for these 
services” (Watson, 2008).
The financial- education component of the development 
industry’s work thus often assumes that the failure of migrants 
and their family members to utilize financial services is a con-
sequence of their ignorance of the products and services on offer 
from formal financial institutions. It is for this reason that they 
need to be educated about the benefits of formal financial ser-
vices. This assumption tends to ignore another potentially rel-
evant factor that could explain the limited use of the products 
and services of formal financial institutions, namely a mistrust 
in these financial institutions bred from personal experiences 
and the historical memory of financial crises, asset freezes, and 
bank/credit- union collapses across the continent. (See Bair, 2005: 
118; Fagen and Bump, 2005: 234; Hernández- Coss, 2005; Paulson 
et al., 2006.) In addition, as pointed out by Paulson et al. (2006), 
when analyzing the financial services available to migrant remit-
ters, cost comparisons do not always favor banks over check 
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cashers and other informal financial services. This is because 
migrants, who like other people in low- income communities 
tend to experience fluctuating incomes and often live from pay-
check to paycheck, can be left vulnerable to high fees and penal-
ties for account overdrafts. These fees and penalties often make 
the financial services provided by banking institutions even more 
costly than those of the so- called alternative financial- services 
providers (Paulson et al., 2006: 20). For these reasons, we may 
reasonably believe that the problem facing the advocates of finan-
cial democracy is not simply the exclusionary practices of bank-
ing institutions, nor either the ignorance of migrants and their 
family members of the products and services on offer by those 
institutions. It may be that the phenomenon of financial exclu-
sion is just as much the consequence of migrants’ and remittances 
recipients’ well- justified self- exclusion from these institutions.
To sum up, this section has examined the significant gov-
ernmental work required to bring to life the vision of financial 
democracy. MIF officials and their allies recognized that finan-
cial institutions did not and would not open up to poor migrants 
and their family units solely as a response to market signals. 
Nor for that matter would migrants automatically flock to these 
institutions even if they were to become more welcoming of 
remittances costumers. Thus, those promoting this financial- 
democracy project engaged in a coordinated effort to entice 
financial institutions at both ends of migrants’ transnational net-
works to join their project. These efforts included: (1) recruiting 
financial institutions to provide remittance- transfer services; (2) 
funding projects with financial institutions and NGO partners 
to create innovative financial products and services that could be 
cross- sold to migrants and remittance recipients; and (3) funding 
and promoting a variety of campaigns to educate migrants and 
their family members about financial institutions, products, and 
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services, and about their utility. In fact, if market signals had any 
significant impact in terms of the project of financial democracy, 
this appears to have come as a result of the global financial crisis, 
which actually drove many of MIF’s partners to suspend their 
remittances- related financial products because of the instability 
of remittance flows.
ConClUsion
In this chapter I have documented and analyzed three facets of 
the R- 2- D agenda. The policies and practices contained within 
each of these facets of the broader agenda link remittances to 
development in different ways. This should really come as no 
surprise. Development is a positively charged “empty signi-
fier” that can take on a wide variety of meanings (Ziai, 2009). In 
our case, the different facets of the R- 2- D agenda posit a direct 
connection to the much- vaunted development by means of (1) 
reducing remittance- transfer costs and leaving a few extra dol-
lars in the pockets of migrants, and (2) integrating migrants and 
their monies within formal financial institutions that will pro-
vide them access to financial products and services from which 
they were previously excluded, and (3) by incorporating aggre-
gate remittance flows within financial markets via securitiza-
tion, which will help generate a new source of development 
finance for governments and subsovereign entities in the global 
South.
As components of a broader neoliberal agenda, the different 
policies and practices of these three facets share important fea-
tures. Most important, all three lines of the R- 2- D agenda being 
pursued by the international financial institutions and their 
partners promote market- based solutions that will help remedy 
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the problems they have identified, namely high transfer costs, 
financial exclusion, and the shortfall in development financing. 
However, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, what progress 
has been made in addressing these problems has not been driven 
by market forces. Rather, the construction and implementation 
of these market- based solutions has relied heavily on the sig-
nificant governmental work undertaken by actors within the 
international institutions and by their partners in national gov-
ernments, NGOs, and private- sector firms.
My intention in highlighting the governmental work done to 
bring about these market- based solutions is twofold. First, I am 
aiming to demonstrate the wide gulf between the ideology of 
market fundamentalism and the reality of neoliberalism in prac-
tice. The purveyors of this agenda may wish to portray the mar-
ket as the preferred mechanism for resolving the socioeconomic 
and political problems that they have identified. But these gov-
ernmental agents cannot sit back idly waiting for market forces 
to do their magic; instead, they actively intervene in an effort to 
bring about the market- based solutions that they envision.
Second, I hope that this analysis will provide a counter to 
accounts of contemporary political- economic transformation 
that center agency in the abstract logic of capitalism itself, or 
that portray governmentality as an anonymous, if not agency-
less, mode of power. As I have demonstrated, we can identify the 
specific agents, institutions, and interventions aimed at putting 
into operation the governmental power that would help trans-
form existing reality and bring about market- based solutions to 
the problems of migration and (under)development.
In many ways the materials examined in this chapter sug-
gest that the particular neoliberal project pursued and diffused 
by these governmental agents works to depoliticize the issues of 
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migration, remittances, and  development— at least at the level of 
public- policy debates.12 These efforts at depoliticization can be 
seen in a review of research on the connection between migra-
tion and development penned by two World Bank researchers. 
That article begins with the assertion that “the central question 
about migration is not whether there should be more or less of 
it, but which policy options, adapted to their varying circum-
stances, countries have to increase the development impact of 
migration and remittances on their economies” (Page and Plaza, 
2006: 318). This exemplar of the types of interventions in pol-
icy debate undertaken by the purveyors of the R- 2- D agenda 
demonstrates their efforts to reduce the space for political debate 
and discussion, centering attention on public policies that gov-
ernments of the global South can adopt to leverage remittances 
for developmental purposes. This and similar attempts to limit 
the issues up for debate displace attention from the migration- 
related policies of governments in the global North and, thus, 
studiously ignore both the barriers to lawful entry faced by 
migrants from the global South as they venture to the North 
and the unenviable experience of those migrants who risk the 
trek across increasingly militarized borders and, if they are suc-
cessful, often endure long periods of dislocation from families 
and communities of origin.
In this sense, the R- 2- D agenda may have depoliticizing 
effects (or intentions) on the imagining and discussion of politi-
cal alternatives. It is worth questioning, however, just how effec-
tive the R- 2- D agenda has been in reshaping reality to fit its 
policy models and objectives. The extent to which the discourse 
and practice of the R- 2- D agenda have been successful at engag-
ing migrants and their family members as “governable subjects” 
(Ghertner, 2010) who see themselves and act in the ways they 
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are expected to is one of the central questions addressed in the 
book’s next part. In this excavation of Mexican- state migration 
policy and recent collaboration between government agencies 
and financial- services firms in the United States and Mexico we 
see the origins, content, and consequences of the R- 2- D agenda 
on the ground in North America.

Pa rt 2
The Long Road to Financial 
Democracy in North America




Ch a P t e r 4
Bringing Remittances into the 
North American Economic- 
Integration Project
A Genealogy of Mexican State- Led 
Transnationalism
This second part of the book shifts from the discursive pro-
duction of remittances as a development tool at the global scale 
to examine the R- 2- D agenda as it hits the ground in particu-
lar migration- sending and receiving regions. The focus here is 
on the ways that the R- 2- D agenda came into being in North 
America. This particular regional focus is instructive for a num-
ber of reasons. First and foremost this is because of the impor-
tance of Mexican migration to the United States, as this is one 
of the largest and most sustained cases of international migra-
tion in the contemporary period. In addition, as we will see, in 
order to help advance the (trans)national development project 
the Mexican government has elaborated over recent decades a 
sophisticated set of state- led transnationalism policies designed 
to capture the political, economic, and social resources of its 
migrants living abroad. These policies are often portrayed as 
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exemplars of best practice for other migrant- sending states to 
learn from and emulate. And, importantly, this case illustrates 
well how, in the market- oriented zeitgeist of the new millen-
nium, such efforts became an important vehicle to further “roll- 
out neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384), promoting the 
financialization of migration and remittances in collaboration 
with key players within the governments of migrant- receiving 
countries, international institutions, think tanks, and private 
financial institutions.
This chapter endeavors to make sense of the increasing col-
laboration on remittances and development policy seen in 
recent years between public authorities from Mexico and the 
United States. It traces the evolution of Mexican state- led trans-
nationalism over the last quarter- century and identifies how 
the policies animating it connected with the R- 2- D agenda in 
the early 2000s. For analytic purposes, a distinction is made 
between two types of policies making up the Mexican state- led 
transnationalism project: emigrant policies, attending to los mexica-
nos en el exterior1 and attempting to (re)incorporate them within 
an emerging transnational development project, and emigration 
policies that may play a role in managing the outflow of migrants 
to the North.2
The discussion divides the evolution of these policies into 
three clearly distinct periods. The first of these periods marks 
the beginning of an ongoing, extraterritorial nation- building 
project and the elaboration of a coherent set of emigrant policies 
pursuing rapprochement with los mexicanos en el exterior. This 
extraterritorial project included a radical reimagining of the 
Mexican nation and its boundaries in explicitly transnational 
terms; however, during this period state policy and discourse 
remained silent about the continuing outflow of migrants and 
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any responsibility that the government might have for managing 
it, as officials held steadfastly to the notion that U.S. immigra-
tion policy was an issue of domestic sovereignty and strictly off- 
limits to the Mexican government.
The second period, beginning with the election of Vicente 
Fox in 2000 and running up to September 11, 2001, saw the 
continuation of the emigrant policies of the previous decade, 
although Fox and his administration gave these policies a more 
prominent public profile than had their predecessors in the Par-
tido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). What marks this period 
most clearly is that the Fox administration abandoned the gov-
ernment’s silence on U.S. immigration policy and began to ges-
ture toward an emigration policy that would recognize migration 
and its management as a “shared responsibility” (U.S.- Mexico 
Migration Panel, 2001) of both the U.S. and the Mexican govern-
ment. Negotiators from the two governments gave serious con-
sideration to such a policy during numerous meetings between 
March and September 2001. But the viability of any significant 
reformulation of North American migration policy along these 
lines lost all traction following the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11th.
The final period, from September 11, 2001, forward, has seen 
the further institutionalization of emigrant policies, including 
the creation and consolidation of the Instituto de los Mexicanos 
en el Exterior (IME). What remains of emigration policies in this 
period, focused on the objective of enhancing the developmen-
tal impact of migrant remittances, has increasingly converged 
with the R- 2- D agenda. These policies have been reduced to a 
very limited, market- oriented collaboration between the United 
States and Mexico aiming to contribute to development in 
migrant- sending regions, including migrants and their monies 
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within formal banking institutions, and expanding access to 
financial products and services all across Mexico. That is, the 
novelty of the emigration policy pursued earlier in the Fox 
 administration— seeing migration management and policy as a 
responsibility shared between the governments of Mexico and 
the United  States— has been reduced to a project of bringing 
migration and remittances into financial markets.
from a “PoliCy of having no PoliCy” to the 
“global mexiCan nation”
The administration of Vicente Fox often ascribed novelty to 
its approach to migration policy. In a speech to the Mexican- 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund just prior to 
his inauguration, Fox claimed that “Mexico’s migration policy 
of the  past— a policy that consisted of having no  policy— ends 
today” (Fox Quesada, 2000a). Although embedded here in the 
rhetoric of Fox’s ambitious project of full- scale economic and 
political change, the notion of the “policy of having no policy” 
has a long lineage.3
A decade after the demise of the Bracero Program, the tem-
porary labor- import program that brought millions of Mexicans 
to work in the United States between 1942 and 1964, the admin-
istration of Mexican president Luis Echeverría decided in 1975 
to abandon attempts to renegotiate a bilateral migration accord 
with the United States, because “the proposed conditions were 
not in line with Mexico’s interests” (Echeverría, 1976: 159). In the 
years following that decision, Mexico declined to engage in dis-
cussions over migration with the United States, believing that 
any such discussions could adversely affect the continued flow 
of migrants northward and potentially sour the larger, bilateral 
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relationship with the United States (Alba, 2007; Délano, 2006). 
Writing in the mid- 1980s, in the context of debates in the United 
States that would eventually lead to the passage of the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Manuel García 
y Griego (1988) encouraged the Mexican government to recon-
sider its strategic options, reject this “policy of having no pol-
icy,” and work toward the development of an explicit, national 
policy on migration.
By all lights Mexican policymakers took this advice to heart. 
In the aftermath of the IRCA and its granting of legal status in 
the United States to over two million Mexican nationals, Mexican 
officials were forced to recognize that their country was a “nation 
of emigrants,” that migration would continue to be an ongoing 
feature of its national identity and development strategy, and 
that its foreign policy needed to be adapted to that reality (Fitz-
gerald, 2009; González Gutiérrez, 2006: 200; Robert C. Smith, 
2003). This recognition led to the formation of a coherent set of 
state- led transnationalism policies addressing the newly imag-
ined global Mexican nation (Guarnizo, 1998). The central pillar 
in this effort was the Programa para las Comunidades Mexica-
nas en el Extranjero (PCME), created in 1990. The objectives of 
this program were threefold: to maintain cultural ties between 
Mexico and its nationals and their descendants living abroad; 
to promote migrant investment in sending communities; and to 
protect the rights and “promote the development of Mexicans in 
the United States” (Robert C. Smith, 2003: 306). In furtherance 
of this mission, the PCME carried out a variety of activities, 
including the creation of Mexican cultural institutes in major 
U.S. cities, which helped to raise awareness about Mexican his-
tory and culture; promoting the formation of migrant organi-
zations, such as sports leagues and home- town associations; 
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and sponsoring exchange programs designed to keep Mexican- 
American youth connected to the homeland.
Beyond policymakers’ spontaneous recognition of the coun-
try as a “nation of emigrants,” explanations for why the Mexi-
can government was driven to create the PCME in 1990 usually 
center on two interrelated political- economic factors. First, the 
PRI regime needed to shore up its political legitimacy among 
migrants in the aftermath of the 1988 elections. The PRI candi-
date, Carlos Salinas, emerged victorious from those elections, 
but his victory was marred by allegations that his main oppo-
nent, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, had been robbed of the election 
through vote rigging, disappearing ballot boxes, and other elec-
tioneering tactics long mastered by the PRI regime. Cárdenas 
had found significant support for his campaign among Mexicans 
in the United States, and the creation of the PCME was part 
of a strategy aimed at quieting opposition tendencies within 
the diaspora (Alarcón, 2006: 159). As the Mexican consul in Los 
Angeles at the time put it: “One of the greatest protest marches 
against the outcome of the elections took place in Los Angeles. 
This led to an awakening in Mexican political circles. . . . This 
recognition took place in the context of a radical reformulation 
of Mexico’s foreign policy. What we want to do now is build 
bridges with the Mexican community” ( José Ángel Pescador, 
quoted in Dresser, 1993: 94).
The second factor helping to explain the creation of the 
PCME was the “radical reformulation of Mexico’s foreign pol-
icy,” alluded to by Pescador in the quote above. As Mexico 
turned toward a neoliberal, export- oriented economic model 
in the 1980s, and particularly after the election of Salinas, the 
government began relying on its “embassies and consulates to 
promote the country’s image, inform the principal financial, 
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political, and academic centers abroad about the country’s inter-
nal changes and, in general, take full advantage of the opening 
and thus attract more foreign capital, technology, and trade” 
(González Gutiérrez, 1997: 50).
Enacting this shift was tricky, because the Mexican consti-
tution enshrines a set of principles to be used in shaping the 
nation’s foreign policy. Given these perceived constitutional 
constraints, the Salinas administration and its successors were 
not able to eschew completely the nation’s long commitment to 
principles such as self- determination, nonintervention in the 
internal affairs of sovereign nations, and caution in the face of 
asymmetrical power relations with the United States.  The turn 
away from those revolutionary nationalist principles and toward 
an export- oriented economy and more open integration with 
the United States was made possible only by a reinterpretation of 
the constitutional mandate. Officials within the Salinas admin-
istration began suggesting that the principles contained in the 
constitution were simply abstract orienting devices to be used in 
the pursuit of concrete interests. (See Dresser, 1993: 91.) This new 
interpretation gained its most explicit expression at the begin-
ning of the next sexenio, when the Zedillo administration’s Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo (PND, National  Development Plan) 
argued that:
Promoting our interests in the areas of national security and for-
eign policy is a political balancing act in which our principles 
should reinforce and orient but never restrict or limit the actions of 
the state. In facing our current challenges, it is indispensable that 
we make clear that our constitutional principles are effective not in 
the abstract but only inasmuch as they promote an adequate defense 
of our interests, the defense of an essential part of our sovereignty.
(Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1995: 14)
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This ideological shift in foreign policy facilitated the cre-
ation of the PCME, as it also allowed for a rethinking of the 
country’s relationship with los mexicanos en el exterior. Accord-
ing to González Gutiérrez (1997: 51) “the NAFTA negotiations 
encouraged consular officers in the United States to abandon 
their self- imposed and exaggerated cautiousness, which was 
based on a rigid interpretation of nonintervention.” In the con-
text of the shift toward greater integration with the United 
States, “it became possible for Mexico to also redefine its rela-
tionship with Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United 
States” (Robert C. Smith, 2003: 309). Central to this redefined 
relationship was the development of closer ties with “Hispanic 
elites with influence in the U.S. Congress” (González Gutiérrez, 
2006: 197), particularly during discussions over NAFTA. In a 
nutshell, Mexicans and their descendants living abroad were no 
longer to be seen as pochos, those tragic figures caught between 
two nations, not fully incorporated into either one and forever 
lost from the homeland (Michael Peter Smith and Bakker, 2008). 
Instead, in the eyes of the state bureaucracy, los mexicanos en el 
exterior had been transformed into potential bearers of political 
and economic capital that could be channeled toward the ser-
vice of the national interest.
There is a certain irony in this turn toward rapprochement 
with mexicanos en el exterior enacted by the Salinas adminis-
tration. The key architects of the policies implementing this 
agenda went to great lengths to frame the Mexican state’s efforts 
at establishing closer links with migrants and their descendants 
in the United States as something distinct from intervention in 
the sovereign affairs of the United States. For instance, Carlos 
González Gutiérrez (1997: 63) argues that “the mandate of Mex-
ican consulates is limited by the need to respect the internal 
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jurisdiction of the United States. A sine qua non of the consul-
ates’ activities is to ensure that nothing that they do constitutes 
interference in the domestic matters of the host country.” Inter-
estingly, these rapprochement policies seem to find their foun-
dation in the worries of Mexican- state officials about new risks 
to the sovereignty of their own state in an increasingly global-
izing world. For instance, Salinas’s National Development Plan 
(PND) states that the risks faced by countries in the new world 
of instantaneous communication have less to do with the tradi-
tional threats of occupation or political intervention but instead 
have more to do with the use of media and communication tech-
nologies to influence public opinion, “to penetrate a nation’s tra-
ditions, the communication among its groups, and finally, its 
sense of self- esteem” (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989: xii). It was 
this framing of new challenges to sovereignty in the emerging 
post– Cold War order that justified the Salinas administration’s 
“radical reformulation” of the nation’s foreign- policy objectives 
and its efforts to “intensify rapprochement with organizations 
and leaders abroad who can influence their country’s relation-
ship with Mexico” (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989: 27).
In sum, as part of its broader efforts to buttress the politi-
cal legitimacy of the PRI regime and generate support for its 
turn to a neoliberal model of global economic integration, 
from the late 1980s forward the Mexican government has con-
sistently engaged in efforts to cultivate improved ties with los 
mexicanos en el exterior. As one analyst concluded: “The adminis-
tration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988– 1994) broke with the 
past by creating new and coherent bureaucratic structures that 
had an unprecedented reach. Since Ernesto Zedillo took office 
in 1994, the Mexican state has consolidated Salinas’ initiatives” 
(Guarnizo, 1998: 60).
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When viewed against the backdrop of these developments, 
Vicente Fox’s claim to novelty for his migration policy can be 
seen as a misrepresentation of recent history and the substan-
tial changes in migration policy that had occurred in the previ-
ous two sexenios. In one important sense, however, his assertion 
carried real validity. The reconceptualization of foreign policy 
and Mexico’s role in the world carried out by the PRI adminis-
trations of Salinas and Zedillo went only so far. Officials in these 
administrations had certainly used their more open approach to 
foreign policy to develop more intensive emigrant policy and 
establish closer relations with los mexicanos en el exterior. But those 
administrations held steadfastly to the principle of noninterven-
tion when it came to U.S. immigration policy, suggesting that 
this was an issue of domestic sovereignty and strictly off- limits 
to the Mexican government. And this kept them from elaborat-
ing any significant new approaches to emigration policy.
Apparently, government officials still held to the logic that this 
situation offered Mexico the best of both worlds: the government 
reaped the benefits of migration bound for the United  States— as 
it served as a safety valve releasing pressures for social change 
and generated much- needed foreign currency in the form of 
migrant  remittances— but did not have to take on any respon-
sibility for regulating migrant flows. In the words of one well- 
placed analyst: “The country’s authorities and experts always 
believed that their neighbor to the north would never be able to 
close down the border, and that any negotiation between the two 
countries on immigration would inevitably entail some sort of 
Mexican co- responsibility in deterring outflows of an unautho-
rized nature. Better let sleeping dogs lie” (Castañeda, 2007: 55).
By the mid- 1990s, significant tensions regarding undocumented- 
migration flows were (re)emerging. The local concerns of border 
residents were leading to increasingly anti- immigrant policies in 
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the United States, such as California’s Proposition 187, and border- 
enforcement policies such as Operation Hold the Line and Oper-
ation Gatekeeper. These local concerns were transported to the 
federal level, helping to create the inhospitable policy debates 
that would lead to the enactment of two pieces of anti- immigrant 
legislation in 1996: the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act. In this context, the Zedillo 
administration did develop closer relations with its counterparts 
in the U.S. government. This move led to growing intergovern-
mental contacts, information exchange, the development of work-
ing groups, and a variety of other consultative mechanisms that 
served to “institutionalize the dialogue” between policymakers in 
the two countries (Alba, 2006: 36). However, despite these institu-
tionalizing moves, Mexican officials still had not pushed past the 
position that immigration policy was an issue of domestic concern 
for the United States and that intervention in internal debates over 
these policies could be interpreted as violating U.S. sovereignty.
Under the leadership of Fox, by contrast, this marked caution 
against developing an explicit emigration policy that might give 
Mexico some say in shaping U.S. immigration policy came to 
an end. As part of a vision of North American economic inte-
gration that went further than that of his PRI predecessors, Fox 
and other top government officials moved decidedly to place the 
issue of migration at the top of the U.S.- Mexico bilateral agenda.
toWard an exPliCit emigration PoliCy: nafta 
PlUs and the Whole enChilada
During the run- up to the election and as president- elect, Fox 
made waves in the United States by expressing his hopes for 
an expanded North American Free Trade  Agreement— which 
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he took to calling “NAFTA Plus”—more akin to the European 
Union. When pressed for details on this NAFTA Plus, Fox never 
wavered in suggesting that a central element would be the elim-
ination of controls on human mobility: “Our proposal is to move 
to a second phase of NAFTA where in five to ten years that bor-
der will be open to free flow of people, workers, transiting in 
the border between our two countries, same as we’re doing with 
products, services, and merchandise. (Fox Quesada, 2000b).
After Fox’s taking office and beginning substantive negotia-
tions with the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush, 
the timeline for realizing this part of his vision moved from can-
didate Fox’s “five to ten years” to a more amorphous “medium to 
long term,” but the goal remained the same:
In the medium, or in the long term there should not only be a lift-
ing of barriers for products, merchandise, services, or capital goods, 
but there should also be free movement of people, which we should 
be striving for as time goes on, because working together in this 
partnership for prosperity, together with the United States and 
Canada, we should be able to get there. (Fox Quesada, 2001b)
Opening the borders to human mobility was not the only 
feature of Fox’s NAFTA Plus proposal. He also envisioned an 
explicit and coordinated effort by the three partner countries to 
bridge the wide gulf in economic well- being separating Mexico 
from its partners to the North. During a gathering of business 
and political leaders in Los Angeles just months into his term, 
he outlined this part of his vision by referring directly to devel-
opments in the European Union:
The process of consolidating the European Union offers a number 
of positive lessons that can be learned from. In the European case, 
one of the things that I have mentioned is that they had the wisdom 
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and the ability to guarantee that each of the countries advanced 
together. Twenty- five years ago, the development divide between 
Germany and Spain was similar to the one that exists today 
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. That divide was 
reduced, and almost eliminated, within 25 years because Spain 
progressed to such an extent that it almost caught up to the levels 
of Germany, England, or France. For that reason, when you work 
together as a team, when there is solidarity, when one works to 
meet that objective, those divides can be eliminated and, obviously, 
that is something that we aspire to do over the long term. That is, to 
eliminate the income gap between Mexico and the United States.
 (Fox Quesada, 2001a)
What made possible Fox’s articulation of this grand vision for 
NAFTA Plus when his predecessors had been unable or unwill-
ing to do so? The obvious answer is regime change. Fox’s vic-
tory put an end to the seven- decade rule of the PRI regime, 
and this gave him and his supporters a bounty of political capi-
tal, often referred to as a bono democrático, unknown to his prede-
cessors. This political capital operated on two levels, internally 
and externally. On the one hand, toppling what for decades had 
seemed an invincible regime helped to generate a more expan-
sive political imaginary that invested Fox, his government 
officials, and their supporters with the belief that large- scale 
change was not only possible but achievable in the here and now. 
Under the influence of this quasi- revolutionary fervor, imagin-
ing a closer and more egalitarian set of relations with the United 
States did not seem so remote as it had in the past.
The change in regime also granted Fox newfound political 
capital by altering the perception of the Mexican government 
by the international community. In doing so, the bono democrático 
granted the Fox administration the opportunity to push for 
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the expansion of the North American integration project well 
beyond what the PRI regime had been able to accomplish. This 
is not to say that regime change fully released Fox’s government 
from the structural constraints faced in the past. To be sure, the 
foreign- policy objectives set out by the Fox administration in 
the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo mirrored those of the previ-
ous two administrations. For instance, like those earlier govern-
ments, the Fox administration continued to suggest that the new 
political and economic order brought about by globalization and 
the end of the Cold War necessitated a change in the foreign- 
policy agenda. And, like its predecessors, the Fox government 
also promised to respect the constitutionally mandated foreign- 
policy principles while arguing that those “general principles” 
should not be “exercised in the abstract, but must instead be 
focused on the defense and promotion of fundamental national 
interests” (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2001: 60).
However, having been brought to power through relatively 
free and fair elections, Fox was able to more credibly embrace 
the international community’s “universal” norms of human 
rights and democracy. No longer worried about international 
criticism about the country’s internal record on this score, the 
Fox PND put the promotion of democracy and human rights 
at the top of its foreign- policy agenda. This full- scale embrace 
marked a strong separation from the previous sexenio, when the 
respect for such international norms was qualified by worries of 
outside intervention, as in the following section of the Zedillo 
PND: “Mexico shares with all of humanity the objectives of 
defending human rights, combating drug trafficking and terror-
ism, struggling against ecological deterioration, and, even, pro-
moting democracy, but it should assure that these not be used as 
a pretext to justify intervention in our internal affairs” (Poder 
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Ejecutivo Federal, 1995: 13). Fox’s elevation of human rights and 
democracy as the fundamental pillars of Mexican foreign pol-
icy aimed to demonstrate that “Mexico had adopted as its own” 
these central pillars of U.S. foreign policy (Iruegas, 2006), in the 
hope that this might improve Mexico’s bargaining position as it 
sought deeper integration with the United States. Thus, during 
an address to the U.S. Congress in September 2001, Fox used 
his government’s adoption of these common values in justify-
ing his vision for deeper North American integration: “Mexico 
and the United States should also work constructively to pro-
mote our common values across the region; by adopting a clear 
and congruent position, our governments can work together in 
confronting the most burning and pertinent issues in our hemi-
sphere, like for example, deepening democracy and promoting 
human rights” (Fox Quesada, 2001d).
This newfound political capital allowed the Fox admin-
istration to go beyond the previous two sexenios in regard to 
establishing closer relations with and defending the rights of 
mexicanos en el exterior. In an oft- cited passage from its PND, 
the Zedillo government recognized that “the Mexican nation 
extends beyond the territory contained within its borders” 
(Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1995: 20) and offered to the millions 
of mexicanos en el exterior expanded consular protection, greater 
efforts at defending their rights, a continuation of the programs 
gathered under the PCME, and the administration’s support for 
legal reforms to allow for dual nationality. The Fox administra-
tion went one up on this effort at rapprochement. Beyond offer-
ing support, protection, and cultural bearings for mexicanos en el 
exterior, its PND suggested that “the issue of migration, partic-
ularly to the United States, requires a new long- term focus that 
will permit the mobility and residency of Mexican nationals in 
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a safe, dignified, legal and orderly manner, and which abandons 
the vision of the phenomenon as one of criminal enforcement, 
to recognize it as a labor and social phenomenon” (Poder Ejec-
utivo Federal, 2001: 61). That is, the Fox government not only 
continued with the policies of the previous two sexenios aimed at 
developing closer ties with mexicanos en el exterior, but addition-
ally, it finally brushed away all remnants of the “policy of having 
no policy” and sought to initiate bilateral negotiations with the 
United States on the issue of migration.
The previous two administrations had been content with 
the economic integration with the United States brought about 
by NAFTA. And their efforts at rapprochement were designed 
to quiet opposition tendencies in the diaspora, maintain the 
regime’s political legitimacy, and cultivate political and eco-
nomic capital to help serve “the national interest” and extend 
the neoliberal economic project. They did not attempt to nego-
tiate for migrants’ expanded access to safe and legal entry into 
the U.S. labor market, because this could have contaminated 
the other issues on the bilateral agenda, most notably economic 
integration. Drawing from a vast reservoir of political capital 
after toppling the PRI regime, the Fox administration was able 
to fold the migration issue into a larger and more expanded 
vision of North American integration. Far from worrying that 
migration would taint the larger agenda, migration and los mex-
icanos en el exterior became the centerpiece of Fox’s vision of 
NAFTA Plus.
Political leaders in the United States did not immediately 
embrace President Fox’s long- term vision for an expanded 
North American partnership with limited restrictions on 
human mobility. But Mexican officials were nonetheless suc-
cessful in getting migration and development onto the bilateral 
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agenda with the United States from the very first months of the 
Fox administration.
Not all the credit for initiating this dialogue and the broader 
momentum on migration reform in North America should be 
placed upon the shoulders of President Fox and his advisors. By 
the time Fox took office, concern with migration already was 
widely shared. NAFTA had not come through with its prom-
ised effect of improving the economic environment in Mexico 
so substantially as to reduce the flow of migrants to el norte. The 
greater institutionalization of U.S.- Mexican migration dialogue 
accomplished during the previous sexenio had brought together 
a group of government officials and migration scholars who pro-
duced a Binational Study on Migration and recommended to 
both governments “an enhancement of institutionalized and for-
ward looking consultative mechanisms to identify and develop 
mutually supportive policy options” (Binational Study on 
Migration, 1998: 65). Furthermore, NGO campaigners on both 
sides of the border had made visible the alarming consequences 
of the U.S. border- control policies and their strategy of “preven-
tion through deterrence,” which had led to a growing death toll 
among aspiring migrants, around five hundred of whom would 
perish in 2000 in their attempts to cross through ever– more 
remote and rugged border areas (Ong Hing, 2001: 136).
In this environment, a generalized hope had taken hold that 
a comprehensive immigration- reform package addressing the 
“problem” of undocumented Mexican migration to the United 
States might indeed be possible. In mid- 2000 another distin-
guished panel of migration experts from the United States 
and Mexico was convened, this time by the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and the Instituto Tecnológico 
Autónomo de México. Among the twenty- odd members of this 
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U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel figured two men who a short time 
later would come to occupy leading roles on the Mexican side of 
the subsequent migration- reform negotiations: Jorge Castañeda, 
who would hold the Secretary of Foreign Affairs post during the 
early years of the Fox administration, and Gustavo Mohar, who 
would become the lead negotiator for the Mexican delegation.
The panel’s report, “Mexico- U.S. Migration: A Shared 
Responsibility,” was timed for release just prior to the first offi-
cial meeting between Fox and Bush, the “Guanajuato Summit” 
in February 2001. The report argued that numerous factors had 
come together in the first years of the new millennium to make 
the time ripe for migration reform. First, while the simultane-
ous inauguration of presidents in the two countries occurs every 
twelve years, this was the first time that both incoming presi-
dents had come from the political  opposition— if only because 
Fox’s election represented the historic defeat of the PRI’s 
seventy- plus- year hold on power in Mexico. A second factor was 
that a sustained period of economic growth in the United States 
throughout the 1990s had resulted in unprecedented job creation, 
record- low unemployment levels, and an increasing dependence 
on Mexican migrant labor. Growing recognition of this depen-
dence, and concern with bringing this needed but legally unau-
thorized labor force out of the shadows and into a well- regulated 
system of labor migration, also made the current moment pro-
pitious. Finally, the expert panel suggested that complementary 
demographic trends in the two countries offered the possibility 
of a true “win- win” situation. For the United States, the spec-
ter of retirement for the baby- boom generation brought to the 
fore the need for significant new numbers of young workers to 
cater to the needs of its aging population. Given the booming 
economy and tight labor market, the report surmised, the vast 
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majority of these workers would have to be made up of immi-
grants and their children. Fortuitously, Mexico was well posi-
tioned to offer these needed workers. While the demographic 
pressures driving migration were projected to subside within 
fifteen or twenty years, “in the absence of a profound structural 
transformation of the Mexican labor market, Mexico will con-
tinue to need to send many migrants to the United States” over 
that period (U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel, 2001: 9).
One of the hopes of the report’s authors, suggested in its title, 
was that it might help political leaders to reposition migration 
issues at the top of the bilateral agenda by recasting the manage-
ment and regulation of the complex phenomenon as a “shared 
responsibility.” This could be done provided that forward- 
looking policy makers were willing to get past the conflict and 
stagnation of earlier negotiations over migration and come to 
see the issue as an “opportunity” rather than a “permanent bilat-
eral problem” (U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel, 2001: 7). If that 
were done, the current conditions offered the possibility of a 
“grand bargain,” wherein formal recognition of U.S. dependence 
on Mexican labor could lead to agreement around four central 
issues: expanded access to temporary work visas and permanent- 
residency status for Mexican nationals; cooperative efforts to 
crack down on human- smuggling operations and to protect 
would- be migrants contemplating dangerous crossings; work-
ing together to build a viable border region; and cooperation on 
economic- development initiatives in Mexico, particularly those 
targeted on migrant- sending regions (U.S.- Mexico Migration 
Panel, 2001: 2, 17– 32). The novelty of the report’s recommenda-
tions was to suggest that a realistic assessment of each country’s 
interests on the migration issue could lead to the trading of “safe, 
legal, orderly, and predictable” access to the U.S. labor market 
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for the Mexican state’s commitment to support efforts to con-
trol future undocumented flows toward the United States. And 
in the long term, the demographic pressures driving large- scale 
Mexican migration would diminish, and the flow of migrants to 
the North could be expected to “naturally decrease and stabi-
lize at moderate levels” (U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel, 2001: 2). 
This natural evolution of the phenomenon allowed the panel 
to envision, just as Fox had with his NAFTA Plus proposal, a 
future “North America with gradually disappearing border con-
trols,” where “permanent migration within the ‘region’ could remain at 
moderate levels” (U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel, 2001: 14, emphasis 
original).
The elements of this proposed grand bargain, and the stra-
tegic and demographic rationale to support it, would in large 
measure become the framework for the subsequent migration- 
reform negotiations between the two countries. Less than a 
month after taking office himself, U.S. president George W. 
Bush chose Mexico as the site of his first international visit. 
Meeting at the Fox family ranch in Guanajuato, the two pres-
idents initiated a set of discussions on migration and develop-
ment that would continue productively for months. At the end 
of their “Guanajuato Summit,” the governments released a joint 
statement, entitled “Towards a Partnership for Prosperity: The 
Guanajuato Proposal,” which described their accomplishments. 
The following excerpt from that statement shows just how much 
Fox’s broad vision of expanding North American integration 
and the U.S.- Mexico Migration Panel’s recommendations had 
been imprinted on their dialogue, even if these grand visions 
had been transformed into a more “realistic and pragmatic” 
(Alba, 2007: 327) statement of shared values, priorities, and com-
mitments on the paired issues of migration and development:
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Among our highest priorities is unfettering the economic potential 
of every citizen, so each may contribute fully to narrowing the eco-
nomic gaps between and within our societies. We acknowledge the 
dynamism achieved through NAFTA, which has ushered in dra-
matic increases in trade that have transformed our economic rela-
tionship. After consultation with our Canadian partners, we will 
strive to consolidate a North American economic community 
whose benefits reach the lesser- developed areas of the region and 
extend to the most vulnerable social groups in our countries. To 
this end, we support policies that result in sound fiscal accounts, 
low inflation, and strong financial systems.
Migration is one of the major ties that bind our societies. It is 
important that our policies reflect our values and needs, and that 
we achieve progress in dealing with this phenomenon. We believe 
that Mexico should make the most of the skills and productivity of 
their workers at home, and we agree there should be an orderly 
framework for migration which ensures humane treatment, legal 
security, and dignified labor conditions. For this purpose, we are 
instructing our Governments to engage, at the earliest opportu-
nity, in formal high- level negotiations aimed at achieving short and 
long- term agreements that will allow us to constructively address 
migration and labor issues between our two countries. This effort 
will be chaired by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General 
of the U.S. and the Secretary of Foreign Relations and the Secre-
tary of the Interior of Mexico.
 ( Joint U.S.- Mexico Statement, 2001b)
Following the Guanajuato meeting, the newly formed high- 
level working group on migration would meet on three occa-
sions between March and September 2001 and report substantial 
progress in reaching agreement on shared principles on migra-
tion policy. There was an expectation that these negotiations 
might produce a joint proposal in time for Fox’s state visit to 
Washington on September 5– 6, 2001. But, as domestic opposi-
tion in the United States flared up at the possibility of offering 
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“amnesty” and rewarding undocumented migrants for breaking 
the law, those negotiations slowed a bit.
In the meantime, under the leadership of Secretary of For-
eign Affairs Jorge Castañeda, Mexico ratcheted up the pressure 
on the United States. Castañeda and the rest of the Mexican 
delegation continued to hammer home the point that the only 
way that acceptable progress on migration reform could be 
achieved would be by dealing with the multiple aspects of the 
complex issue as a package rather than in a piecemeal fashion. 
In making that case to the American public, Castañeda came 
to refer to the package in the colloquial language of “the whole 
enchilada.” Emanating directly from the U.S.- Mexico Migra-
tion Panel report, the five ingredients of this “whole enchilada” 
were: legalization of the undocumented population living in the 
United States; a lifting of restrictions on visas; expanded access 
to temporary work visas; cooperation on security, including sav-
ing the lives of migrants stranded in the desert and pursuing 
human traffickers; and the promotion of economic development 
in Mexico, particularly in migrant- sending regions.
Following the high- level working group’s third meeting, in 
August 2001, Castañeda and his U.S. counterpart, Colin Powell, 
sought to lower expectations that a deal might be brokered in time 
for Fox’s September state visit to Washington. In comments to the 
press following the working group’s meeting, Castañeda said that 
“this is not something that will necessarily come to an end follow-
ing the Presidential visit. President Fox’s visit will be a very import-
ant step, but it is not the end of the road” (Cason and Brooks, 2001). 
The Mexican delegation thus seemed content with the progress 
being made within the framework of the high- level working group.
During the state visit in September, however, Fox used 
the opportunity to cast a challenge to his counterpart. After 
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 elaborating again the message that his democratic election had 
ushered in a new era of U.S.- Mexican relations, characterized by 
deeper cooperation and enhanced prosperity for both nations, 
Fox told a crowd assembled at the South Lawn of the White 
House that:
The time has come to give migrants and their communities their 
proper place in the history of our bilateral relations. Both our coun-
tries owe them a great deal. And working together, both of us can 
build new conditions of fairness for them, as well as for the develop-
ment and prosperity of our two nations. For this reason, we must, and 
we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end of this very 
year, which will allow us, before the end of our respective terms, to 
make sure that there is not a single Mexican in the United States who 
did not enter this country legally, and that those Mexicans who have 
come into the country do so with the proper documents.
 (Fox Quesada, 2001c)
The hope that this agreement on migration reform could be 
reached by the end of the year, as is by now well known, came 
crashing down with the towers of the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001. Less than one week had passed since the 
historic meetings at the White House and Fox’s speech at the 
Capitol, but it had become clear immediately that migration 
reform would take a back seat to the newly unleashed War on 
Terror. During his first weekly radio program following the 
terrorist attacks, Fox reported on his conversations with Bush:
This morning I spoke with President Bush. We have been in very 
close communication with them, with his administration, with the 
United States government. And this morning we were talking 
about how, while first things first and right now that issue [the ter-
rorist attacks] has to be dealt with, President Bush, even with that 
tragedy, has not forgotten about his commitment to work toward 
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regularizing the status of migrants, of all of our paisanos over there 
in the United States, of working towards giving order to the labor 
flows going to the United States. (Fox Quesada, 2001e)
Despite those reassurances, it would not be long before the 
U.S. negotiators would make clear to their interlocutors that the 
United States was no longer actively working toward a reform 
deal (Cason and Brooks, 2002). By May 2002, at a speech in front 
of the Council of the Americas, in New York, Fox was unusually 
frank and pointed in his critique of Bush, going so far as to say 
that he was unhappy that talks had stalled and suggesting that 
“there cannot be a privileged relationship between the United 
States and Mexico without a real advance in substantive affairs in 
our bilateral agenda. And there cannot be a substantive advance 
without addressing in an integral way the theme of migration” 
(Fox Quesada, 2002a). At the inauguration of the November 2002 
meetings of the U.S.- Mexico Binational Commission, Fox rec-
ognized that September 11th had forced both sides to give pri-
ority to security issues; but with a year now passed, he pleaded 
with the Bush administration, “Now is the time to start those 
negotiations again in earnest” (Fox Quesada, 2002b). Despite 
these calls, the window of opportunity had already closed for 
an integral reform package that would include both expanded 
access to legal immigration routes and legalization for the cur-
rently undocumented. Fox’s grand vision of NAFTA Plus had 
become another victim of the terrorist attacks.4
exPansion of emigrant PoliCy  
in the Post- 9/11 Period
Carlos González Gutiérrez, one of the chief architects of the 
Mexican government’s emigrant policies since the early 1990s, 
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described the difference between the Fox administration and its 
predecessors in the following terms: “[Fox] attempted to raise 
the volume on everything we did. I mean, it’s not that these 
efforts at rapprochement had not existed earlier, but the arrival 
of President Fox brought an end to the secretive and under- the- 
rug efforts that characterized his predecessors” (Interview with 
Carlos González Gutiérrez, 2008). In what follows I analyze 
these efforts to “raise the volume” on the Mexican government’s 
emigrant policies, looking at two of the central emigrant- policy 
initiatives designed by the Fox administration in the post- 9/11 
period. These are the creation of the Instituto de los Mexicanos 
en el Exterior (IME) and the strategic redesign of a consular- 
identification card, the Matrícula Consular de Alta Seguridad.
institUtionalizing the diasPora: the 
institUto de los mexiCanos en el exterior
Upon taking office, one of Vicente Fox’s first orders of business was 
to announce the creation of a cabinet- level office on migrant affairs, 
the Oficina Presidencial para Mexicanos en el Exterior (OPME). 
That office, headed by the flamboyant, Dallas- based Mexican- 
American academic Juán Hernández, coexisted with the other 
migrant- oriented policy vehicle, the Programa para Comunidades 
Mexicanas en el Extranjero (PCME), which had been operating 
within the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) since the 
early 1990s. This coexistence was not always amicable, and fric-
tions soon escalated between Hernández and the diplomatic corps 
led by Jorge Castañeda. These frictions led to the disappearance 
of the OPME in mid- 2002. Later that year, the two bureaucratic 
structures were essentially fused together under a new agency 
within the SRE: the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior.
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Shortly after the new institute was created, President Fox 
named a little- known migrant activist from northern Califor-
nia, Cándido Morales, as its general director; the rest of the 
institute’s staff was drawn from the diplomatic corps. The new 
organization was charged with “elevating the standard of living 
of Mexican communities living abroad” and assigned a series of 
“attributes,” including “to promote the revalorization of migra-
tion” and “to create meeting spaces and promote communica-
tion with and among the Mexican communities living abroad” 
(Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2003). In interpreting their 
mandate, IME officials understood the institute’s main tasks 
to be: “institutionalizing the dialogue” between migrants and 
the state; identifying a common agenda and generating “syn-
ergies” between migrant leaders and the state; and helping to 
strengthen migrant leadership so that it could more effectively 
carry out its political agenda (Interview with Carlos González 
Gutiérrez, 2008).
Carrying out these tasks, the IME professional staff pur-
sued what the institute terms an “information agenda” and a 
“services agenda” (González Gutiérrez, 2006: 203– 11). In pursuit 
of its services agenda the IME serves as a liaison for the wide 
range of federal agencies offering services to los mexicanos en el 
exterior on topics such as culture, sports, education, health, and 
housing.5 The information agenda responds to the concern that 
“in order for the government of Mexico to engage in the frank, 
constructive, and systematic dialogue that it aspires to main-
tain with its diaspora, it needs to contribute to the consolidation 
of its interlocutor” (González Gutiérrez, 2006: 208). Among the 
main activities undertaken through this information agenda has 
been the e- mail distribution of daily summaries of media con-
tent, including national and local newspapers from Mexico, the 
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United States, and Canada, regarding migration- related topics. 
Consular staff also distribute more irregular e- mail bulletins 
promoting government projects and actions.6 In addition, the 
IME organizes each year a half- dozen Jornadas Informativas, 
three- day training events that bring migrant leaders from vari-
ous thematic areas to Mexico City to “promote a better under-
standing of the migration problematic, the types of cooperation 
that Mexico can offer, and the position of the government on a 
variety of issues” (González Gutiérrez, 2006:209).7
In pursuing its information and services agendas, the IME 
has not proceeded much beyond the work of its predecessor, the 
PCME. However, the defining characteristic of the IME, and 
what clearly distinguishes it from the emigrant policies of ear-
lier sexenios, is its Consultative Council (CCIME), an advisory 
body constituted by over one hundred migrants appointed to 
three- year terms. These hundred council members are selected 
through a variety of different local electoral processes in each 
of Mexico’s fifty- two consular districts in North America. The 
number of counselors is granted proportionally to each dis-
trict based on estimates of its total Mexican- origin population. 
In addition to these elected leaders, the CCIME includes up 
to twelve members appointed by IME officials on the basis of 
their “merits and trajectory,” as well as another dozen members 
drawn from “Hispanic/Latino organizations representing the 
Mexican community abroad” (IME, n.d.[a]: 5). These council 
members are brought together on a semiannual basis to delib-
erate and offer nonbinding resolutions and recommendations 
to the Mexican government concerning the migrant commu-
nity, its issues and concerns, and the types of policy instruments 
and reforms that may best address those concerns. In addition 
to generating policy recommendations, the CCIME and its 
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individual consejeros and consejeras assist the IME in its efforts 
to promote and implement state policies dealing with migrants 
(IME, n.d.[b]).
This organizational structure contributes directly to the real-
ization of the IME’s goals of institutionalizing state- migrant rela-
tions, creating synergies, and strengthening migrant leadership. 
The creation of the advisory body itself served to institutionalize 
relations between state officials and migrants, or at least a particu-
lar fraction of migrant leaders. By bringing together both elected 
migrant leaders and representatives of well- respected U.S.- based 
Latino organizations, the council also serves to strengthen and 
extend the political capacities of los mexicanos en el exterior. The 
design would appear to be an explicit effort to create dialogue 
and help overcome a long- standing schism within Mexican- 
origin leadership in the United States (Ayón, Brown- Gort, and 
García y Griego, 2008: 10). The IME’s institutional structure 
brings homeland- oriented migrant leaders into contact with 
political networks engaged with what Michael Peter Smith has 
termed “the second face of transnational citizenship,” activism at 
all levels of politics in the United States (Michael Peter Smith, 
2007: 1105; Michael Peter Smith and Bakker, 2008: 167– 83). Indeed, 
by bringing together successive leadership cohorts, the CCIME 
may serve as something of a laboratory spawning more formal-
ized transnational- advocacy networks promoting the rights and 
interests of los mexicanos en el exterior. At the April 2008 CCIME 
meetings, it was apparent that these types of advocacy networks 
were already coming into being, as Consultative Council lead-
ers announced the development of an American- Mexican Anti- 
Discrimination Alliance (AMADA), which had grown directly 
from the leadership networks formed within the CCIME.
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While such emerging advocacy networks would seem to 
indicate that the IME’s attempts to cultivate a core of migrant 
leadership and develop “synergies” with them and their orga-
nizations has borne real fruit, there are indications of con-
tinuing conflict and contention between government officials 
and migrant leaders brought together through the auspices of 
the IME. This was clearly evident during the CCIME meet-
ing I attended in Dallas, Texas, in 2008. Underlying tensions 
in migrant- state relations were plain to see during the meet-
ing’s opening ceremony, which took place in the grand ballroom 
of a Dallas hotel. The ballroom was packed with hundreds of 
CCIME participants and invited guests facing a stage where 
Mexican president Felipe Calderón, Dallas mayor Tom Lep-
pert, the governors of three Mexican migrant- sending states, 
and two migrants chosen from among the CCIME leadership 
all sat. As these dignitaries left their seats to take their turns at 
the microphone, it was clear that this was a moment for grand 
visions and symbol- laden expressions of the “global Mexican 
nation.”
The visions expressed by migrant representatives and gov-
ernment officials were not altogether consonant. Government 
officials each gave their own personalized variant of the latest 
discourse of the Mexican state regarding migration: that migra-
tion was “a bad deal” for Mexico, a social ill that needed to be 
eradicated. The governor of Colima, Jesús Silverio Cavazos, 
expressed this position most clearly when he stated:
In Mexico we are trying hard to change conditions so that our 
country can create real opportunities for Mexican families, oppor-
tunities that will make it so we no longer have any migrants. This is 
your dream, and it is also our dream. We don’t want to see you all 
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here. We know that you have come here because Mexico still 
doesn’t have the opportunities needed for all of us that were born 
there, but we are working towards this. (Cavazos, 2008: 1– 2)
The migrant leaders who spoke did not immediately adopt this 
“dream” and equate expanded opportunities in Mexico with the 
need to put a full stop to migration bound for the United States. In 
fact, the migrant leaders who spoke seemed to more fully embrace 
the language and imagery of another prominent facet of state dis-
course on migration, with its evocation of the heroic migrant liv-
ing abroad as a vital element in the national project. The migrant 
speakers highlighted their continuing attachment and presence in 
the social spaces and political processes of Mexico, even though 
they had left the physical territory of the state. María Antonieta 
González, a CCIME consejera from San Antonio, articulated this 
vision eloquently. She began with a statement of her notion of the 
extraterritorial Mexican nation, saying “the motherland has no bor-
ders, because wherever you find a Mexican, that place is Mexico.” 
She continued by addressing President Calderón directly:
To claim that my humble message reflected the consensus of what 
all Mexicans feel would be impossible. It’s not even the feeling of 
all migrants. But where there is a total consensus is in our commit-
ment to Mexico. We migrants are like trees whose branches extend 
in all directions as they grow.
So, now let me offer you this little gift to mark your visit here 
with us. . . . It is a small gift to remind you of your visit; it is a com-
pass with the following message: Mr. President, remember that we 
are to the North, but our roots and our hearts are in your hands, 
and they are in Mexico. (María Antonieta González, 2008)
With this message, Ms. González suggested that some of 
the CCIME leadership continued to embrace the earlier policy 
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discourse regarding the global Mexican nation that extends 
beyond the territorial bounds of the nation- state. In this  imagery, 
migrants would appear fully at home living lives that straddle 
the U.S.- Mexico  divide— in sharp contrast to the new “dream” 
of political leaders like Governor Cavazos, who are now sug-
gesting that migrants’ life projects should be oriented toward a 
return to the places where they were born.
A second migrant, Miguel Ángel González, from Santa Ana, 
California, continued in a fashion similar to Ms. González, 
emphasizing the duality of migrant identity and the engage-
ment of migrants as political subjects in both countries. He was 
very insistent on migrants’ dual political engagement, evoking 
on numerous occasions the immigrants’- rights marches that 
broke out across the United States in 2006 and drawing upon 
some of that movement’s key slogans, such as Si, se puede, and 
Somos muchos, y seremos más. González received warm applause 
when he said that while migrants were increasingly demon-
strating their political power in the United States, they needed 
to advance more into Mexico. Seemingly putting into ques-
tion the value of the CCIME as a body that represents migrant 
interests, he called for constitutional reforms that would allow 
for migrant seats in the Mexican Senate and Cámara de Diputa-
dos, so that migrants themselves could legislate on migration 
issues because, having lived the experience en carne propia, they 
were the only ones who could know the trials, tribulations, and 
needs of migrants living in the United States. He would fin-
ish off this idea by saying, “Mexico should be a positive exam-
ple of what it means to be a binational state” (Miguel Ángel 
González, 2008).
The competing messages offered at this event indicate that 
migrant leaders may have taken the image and discourse of the 
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“global Mexican nation” embedded in the policy discourse of 
previous administrations more seriously than today’s govern-
ment officials recognize or desire. They also suggest differing 
levels of commitment on the part of migrant leaders and gov-
ernment officials to the task of constructing durable political 
institutions that reflect the transnational character of the social 
fields created through the migration process and that valorize 
migrants’ lives and their struggles. But more than anything, they 
suggest that even with the creation of the CCIME the Mexican 
government may still be some distance away from fully devel-
oping a “common agenda” with migrant leaders.
the Creation and Promotion of the  
matríCUla ConsUlar de alta segUridad
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 constituted a significant challenge 
for the state- led transnationalism efforts of the Mexican govern-
ment.8 The ultimate success of the transnational- development 
project relies upon migrants’ prosperity and continued inhab-
itance in the United States, at least in the near term. In the 
aftermath of 9/11 Mexican government officials acted quickly to 
minimize the adverse effects that those events would have for 
migrants, lest they undermine migrants’ ability to sustain their 
transnational lives. The SRE drew upon its consular- protection 
mandate in an attempt shield undocumented Mexican migrants 
living in the United States from an increasingly hostile polit-
ical climate, unveiling in 2002 a new “high- security consular- 
identification card” (the Matrícula Consular de Alta Seguridad 
[MCAS]) and embarking on the arduous task of negotiating its 
acceptance by public and private agencies across the United 
States.
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Despite significant limitations,9 the Mexican state’s revamp-
ing of the consular- identification card can be seen as an import-
ant tactical move in the struggle for the rights of Mexican 
migrants in the United States. Skillfully reading the political 
conditions in the United States and anticipating a much more 
adverse environment for undocumented migrants in the country, 
Mexican diplomatic officials adopted as their own the language 
of “security” and took on the task of updating the procedures 
and requirements for obtaining the matrícula. These were cru-
cial steps if the MCAS were ever to gain legitimacy as a valid 
form of identification in the United States, particularly given the 
increased scrutiny that identification documents were to face 
after revelations that some of the September 11th hijackers had 
used fraudulent documents to obtain social- security numbers 
and drivers’ licenses.
The Mexican government’s proactive campaign promoting 
the use and acceptance of the MCAS (see González Gutiérrez, 
2006) took advantage of the multiscalar federal structure of gov-
ernment in the United States. In spite of a contracting political- 
opportunity structure for migrant rights in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, Mexican officials were able to find allies and 
gain political victories in local, state, and federal venues. Their 
campaign was basically three- pronged, involving: direct negoti-
ations with financial institutions and officials at all levels of the 
U.S. government seeking acceptance of the MCAS; a more dif-
fuse public- relations campaign designed to generate a favorable 
political climate for its acceptance; and promotion of the card 
among migrants themselves.
The overall message of this offensive was that the acceptance 
of the MCAS promised to offer greater security to migrants and 
the general public, as well as generating added economic benefits. 
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To local governments and law- enforcement agencies, Mexican 
state officials argued that accepting the MCAS would reduce 
unnecessary government expenditures by allowing migrants 
detained for minor infractions to be released with a citation 
rather than hauled off to jail because their identity was unable 
to be ascertained. To this audience they also identified how 
acceptance of the MCAS would contribute to law- enforcement 
agencies’ community- oriented policing models, suggesting that 
acceptance of the card would facilitate greater cooperation with 
authorities, as migrants who might otherwise feel insecure about 
reporting crimes or coming forward as witnesses would do so 
if they knew their identification would be recognized. Another 
closely related claim was that crimes against migrants could be 
reduced. Mexican officials argued that with banks accepting the 
card as a valid form of identification, migrants would no longer 
need to carry large amounts of cash nor be easy targets for rob-
bery (O’Neil, 2003; IME, 2004).
In addition to these political rationales, Mexican consular 
officials also offered detailed technical descriptions of the secu-
rity features incorporated into the card’s design to protect 
against fraud. These new features included the use of a spe-
cial paper, a hologram print of the Mexican state seal, and a 
series of invisible images that were revealed only with the use 
of a decoder (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, n.d.). Signifi-
cantly, effort was also made to point out the limits of the MCAS. 
In particular, consular officials were adamant that the card was 
not designed to provide migrants with access to citizenship- 
based social- welfare benefits or to work permits, nor could it 
help in gaining or regularizing one’s immigration status (IME, 
2004). The intention here was likely twofold. On the one hand, 
this part of the message was aimed at silencing critics who were 
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characterizing the Mexican government’s efforts as aimed at 
building a surreptitious route to “quasi citizenship.” Equally 
important, the campaign helped to shield the undocumented 
from fire. Since the MCAS contains no details about legal status 
in the United States, its carriers are not automatically branded 
as undocumented.10
By most accounts the Mexican government’s campaign was 
extremely successful. From its debut, in March 2002, through 
June 2004, the Mexican government issued over 2.2 million of 
these new high- security consular- identification cards (IME, 
2004), and nearly a million more were issued in both 2006 and 
2007 (IME, 2006; Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
2008: 491). As for its acceptance, official calculations suggest that 
by 2008 1,439 police departments, 435 cities, 265 counties, and 
470 financial institutions had agreed to accept the card as a valid 
form of identification (Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexi-
canos, 2008: 490). Gaining the acceptance of these agencies and 
organizations was rarely an easy task. This often involved the 
painstaking work of consular officials meeting one by one with 
local officials in each jurisdiction to gain their support.11 In many 
cases the road to approval was filled with contentious debate and 
vociferous opposition. And success was never assured. Even in 
ordinarily pro- immigrant locales like New York City, local ini-
tiatives sometimes went down to defeat (Susan Sachs, 2002).
The most high- profile indication of the contention over 
acceptance of the MCAS arose in the context of the implemen-
tation of the USA Patriot Act. Section 326 of that legislation was 
designed to combat terrorist financing and money laundering. 
That section of the bill instructed the Treasury Department to 
come up with new regulations regarding financial institutions’ 
responsibilities in documenting and verifying the identity of 
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their accountholders. Such regulations could have stifled undoc-
umented migrants’ access to financial institutions if these were 
to require U.S. government- issued identification. However, the 
final rules adopted by the Treasury Department did not pro-
scribe the use of documents issued by foreign governments to 
verify customers’ identities. In fact, a Treasury Department 
report to the U.S. Congress describing the content of proposed 
regulations explicitly stated that these would “not discourage 
bank acceptance of the ‘matricula consular’ identity card that 
is being issued by the Mexican government to immigrants” 
(United States Department of the Treasury, 2002: 16).
Anti- immigrant pressures from both the grassroots and 
within government would soon force Treasury to reopen the 
question whether identification documents issued by foreign 
governments should be acceptable under its final rules. These 
pressures were channeled through the efforts of U.S. Repre-
sentative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., to thwart the new Trea-
sury regulations. In a letter to the Office of the President, dated 
May 23, 2003, Sensenbrenner asked the executive to postpone 
the enactment of the regulations for six months, “until scru-
tiny by law enforcement officials [could] be more intensively 
applied to modify it” (Sensenbrenner, 2003: 1). Sensenbrenner’s 
concerns focused on two issues: the regulations’ elimination of 
the requirement that financial institutions hold on to copies of 
the documents they use to verify a customer’s identity and the 
specific content of the regulations regarding acceptable forms of 
identification when opening an account. Sensenbrenner noted 
“continuing reports by federal law enforcement officers that 
certain nations’ consular identification issuance processes are 
susceptible to fraud and abuse” (Sensenbrenner, 2003: 2). If this 
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contention were to prove true, Sensenbrenner worried, “accep-
tance of such documents would undermine, rather than advance, 
the goals of the USA PATRIOT Act” (Sensenbrenner, 2003: 2).
In response, Treasury issued a notice of inquiry requesting 
additional comments on precisely the two issues Sensenbren-
ner had raised. Treasury then solicited responses to an online 
survey, to which they eventually received over twenty thousand 
comments. Through the IME, the Mexican government mobi-
lized networks of immigrant activists and their supporters to 
participate in the survey and express support for the MCAS. 
Largely as a result of those efforts, over 80 percent of the com-
ments received by the Treasury Department expressed support 
for the consular- identification cards and urged the agency to 
make no changes in its final rules (González Gutiérrez, 2006: 
210). After reviewing these comments, Treasury decided that 
no new information had been provided during the comment 
period and left the existing rules standing as final (United States 
Department of the Treasury, 2003).
The implicit support offered by the Treasury Department for 
the inclusion of undocumented migrants within American soci-
ety (or, at least, within the U.S. banking system) points to the 
policy contradictions that arise from the varying and competing 
interests of the agencies making up “the state.”12 But the success 
gaining recognition for the MCAS within various realms of the 
U.S. polity suggests even further complexity in the policymak-
ing process. Understanding and appreciating the multiple forces 
at work in the design, promotion, and ultimate acceptance of the 
MCAS require us to attend not just to the fragmented and multi-
scalar character of the U.S. system of government but also to the 
fundamental role played within these policymaking processes 
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by transnational actors, including Mexican- government offi-
cials and the allies they cultivated through the IME and other 
emigrant- policy efforts.
Of course, the fact that this particular piece of migrant- 
friendly policy was related to financial inclusion was clearly 
important. Acceptance of the MCAS by financial institutions 
was an essential complement to the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments’ shared commitment, within the context of the Partner-
ship for Prosperity project analyzed below, to “lower the cost to 
Mexicans working in the United States of sending money home 
by, in part, encouraging more banks to market aggressively the 
opening of accounts to Mexican workers and offer remittance 
features in their accounts” (P4P, 2002a: 3).
Acceptance of the MCAS fit well with a financial- education 
campaign being pushed within the consulates with the goal of 
incorporating Mexican migrants into the financial system in the 
United States. An IME official charged with coordinating the 
agency’s economic unit explained to me her agency’s interest in 
financial education:
We see this as a form of consular- protection activity. That is, 
for the migrant the best thing that can happen is to open up a 
bank or credit- union account, because this not only protects 
against those robberies that often happen to migrants that keep 
their savings under the mattress, but it also helps provide a 
much securer and cheaper mechanism to send money to Mexico 
while also giving them access to other types of financial 
services.
[We now] allow bank representatives, usually from those banks 
that accept the Matrícula Consular as a valid form of identification, 
to enter the consulate, and they give workshops on financial educa-
tion, on modes of sending money to Mexico.
 (Interview with Annie Carrillo, 2008)
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In essence, statements such as this suggest that consular offi-
cials engaged in a bit of horse trading with major financial insti-
tutions. Government officials gained acceptance for the MCAS 
by offering banks preferential access to the consulates and the 
immigrants within them to carry out financial- education activ-
ities and attempt to attract migrants toward their financial 
products and services.13 We will dig deeper into these efforts 
to connect migrants with banking institutions in the following 
chapter. But first let us examine the contraction of emigration pol-
icies in the post- 9/11 period and look at how the remaining ele-
ments of these policies would help bring the R- 2- D agenda to the 
ground in North America.
ContraCtion of emigration PoliCy after 9/11: 
toWard the finanCialization of migration
As discussed above, with the events of September 11, 2001, “the 
whole enchilada” fell apart, bilateral collaboration on compre-
hensive reform was essentially over, and the Bush administra-
tion turned its attention increasingly to its War on Terror. At 
least one element of the integral reform package was salvaged, 
however, as the two governments continued in the years follow-
ing 9/11 to collaborate on the promotion of economic develop-
ment in Mexico’s main migrant- sending regions. This collabo-
ration was most clearly articulated in a public/private initiative, 
the Partnership for Prosperity (P4P), that the two presidents 
announced during their September 2001 meetings.
Presidents Fox and Bush held a high- profile meeting in the 
context of the United Nations Financing for Development Con-
ference in March 2002. If nothing else, this meeting served 
notice that the migration negotiations had, for all intents and 
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purposes, come to an end. While the joint statement released 
after the meeting claimed that the high- level working group on 
migration had been instructed to continue its work, the state-
ment’s brief comments on migration were more valuable for 
their omissions than for their content. According to the joint 
statement, it would appear that the greatest accomplishment of 
the protracted negotiations over the year prior had been that 
they “yielded a clearer assessment of the scope and nature of 
this issue” ( Joint U.S.- Mexico Statement, 2002). Beyond that 
sterile evaluation of the migration negotiations, the statement 
was largely occupied with touting the “smart- border” initiative 
that the two presidents had just launched and with promoting 
their Partnership for Prosperity agenda, which was aimed at 
putting into practice their “shared vision to help unfetter the 
economic potential of every citizen, so each may contribute 
fully to narrowing the economic gaps between and within our 
societies.” What was this Partnership for Prosperity, and what 
does it tell us about what remained of emigration policy in the 
post- 9/11 period?
Although the joint statement that emerged from the first 
meeting of presidents Fox and Bush in Guanajuato in February 
2001 had been subtitled “Towards a Partnership for Prosperity,” 
the formal Partnership for Prosperity initiative was not actually 
formed until September 2001, when Fox made his state visit to 
Washington. Among the many accomplishments the presidents 
announced at the end of the Washington visit was this public/
private initiative that they promised would “address some of the 
root causes of migration” by “spur[ring] private sector growth 
throughout Mexico.” The partnership was deeply stained with 
the rhetoric of market fundamentalism. Its architects envisioned 
a market- friendly public- policy framework that could “harness 
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the power of free markets to boost the social and economic well- 
being of citizens particularly in regions where economic growth 
has lagged and fueled migration.” With this explicit statement 
of using the power of free markets to extend economic oppor-
tunity and potentially provide alternatives to Mexican migra-
tion bound for the United States, the presidents instructed their 
administrations to work together, consult with “the best exper-
tise among Mexican and U.S. economists, business people and 
civil society,” and prepare a formal Action Plan by March 2002 
( Joint U.S.- Mexico Statement, 2001a).
As part of the fanfare surrounding the United Nations 
Financing for Development Conference held in Monterrey, 
Mexico, in March 2002, a formal Action Plan was presented to 
the presidents. The document declares the objectives of the ini-
tiative in the following terms: “The Partnership seeks to create 
jobs where they are needed the most, to foster an environment 
in which no Mexican feels compelled to leave his home for lack 
of jobs or opportunity.” This statement of the partnership’s 
objectives would seem consistent with that aspect of the Mex-
ican government’s schizophrenic representation of migration 
that portrays it as a “bad deal” and a social ill to be eradicated. 
U.S. government officials, however, tried to distance themselves 
from any reading of the P4P as explicitly aimed at putting an 
end to Mexican migration to the North. For example, in con-
gressional testimony, Alan P. Larson, a State Department offi-
cial who helped design the P4P, rhetorically posed the question, 
“Will the Partnership effort stop the flow of undocumented 
migrants from Mexico?” and responded, “Of course not, nor 
is that its aim. Our Presidents do agree however, that we need 
to take urgent steps to foster growth, opportunity and job cre-
ation in regions where economic growth has lagged and where 
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opportunities are so limited that migration is the only attractive 
alternative for an enterprising individual” (Committee on For-
eign Relations, 2002: 20).
If the bilateral discussions over migration and development 
that unfolded from February through September 2001 seemed 
to be shaped most prominently by President Fox’s NAFTA 
Plus vision of expanded North American integration, the P4P 
Action Plan made clear that the Bush administration was no 
silent partner in these negotiations. While Fox’s initial expres-
sions of his vision suggested a preference for concerted trilat-
eral efforts at developing Mexico’s poorest regions, apparently 
something similar to the structural funds at the center of the 
European Union’s regional policies, the P4P framework would 
not approach that type of aggressive and coordinated approach 
to regional- development assistance. This was indeed a market- 
based development initiative and nothing more. According to the 
congressional testimony of the State Department official quoted 
above, the P4P included no additional U.S.- government expen-
ditures. Instead it “mobilized the U.S. government resources 
already devoted to Mexico and linked up with private sector and 
non- governmental organizations in the small business, housing, 
agriculture, information technology and infrastructure sectors” 
(Committee on Foreign Relations, 2002: 20).
The type of coordinated regional- development initiative that 
Fox had in mind was probably doomed from the start. The Bush 
administration’s newly emerging development- assistance doc-
trine did not bode well for an expansive program that would 
funnel significant amounts of public dollars into Mexico’s poor-
est regions, those places “where economic growth has lagged 
and fueled migration.” Upon taking office, the Bush admin-
istration had reoriented U.S. development- assistance policy 
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in a market- centric direction. The administration advocated 
a carrot- and- stick approach, largely akin to the structural- 
adjustment programs that the international financial institutions 
had imposed on debtor countries in the previous decades. In this 
latest incarnation, U.S. development assistance would be tied to 
legal and economic policy reforms promoting the sacred goals 
of U.S. foreign policy, “economic freedom, political liberty, the 
rule of law and human rights” (Bush, 2002). This reorientation 
was most evident with the creation of the Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation, which would focus assistance on lower- and 
lower- middle- income countries and make aid conditional on 
recipient countries’ performance in a set of seventeen indicators 
of good governance, people- centered investment, and economic 
freedom.14
In this new context, the rhetorical strategies used by Mexican 
government officials that had made a favorable migration- reform 
package appear viable prior to 9/11 (e.g., presenting Mexico as a 
valuable partner with strong economic institutions and a new-
found commitment to the values of democracy and human 
rights) worked against targeting significant amounts of develop-
ment assistance toward the country’s poorest regions. In effect, 
by presenting the case that Fox’s democratic election ushered in 
a new era of political and economic cooperation across North 
America, Mexican political leaders excluded the country from 
consideration for U.S. development assistance. The Bush admin-
istration’s development- assistance doctrine followed the logic 
that, upon adopting the appropriate institutional reforms, devel-
oping countries should “grow and prosper beyond the need for 
any aid” (Bush, 2002). With Mexico having now fully embraced 
the ideals of free markets, democracy, and human rights, its new 
institutional environment was expected, according to this logic, 
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to stimulate private initiative, attract foreign investment, and 
generate significant economic growth without the need for any 
official development financing.
Accordingly, the type of development cooperation contained 
in the P4P initiative emphasized institutional improvements, 
training and education for government officials, and sharing of 
best practices from the U.S. government and private sectors. But 
it offered none of the public- development financing from the 
United States that Fox had initially envisioned. The P4P Action 
Plan identifies four broad goals to be pursued by the partner-
ship: expanding access to credit; sharing technical knowledge 
and best practices; facilitating cross- border communication 
between similar organizations; and encouraging private- sector 
investment in infrastructure projects (P4P, 2002a).
Two features of the Action Plan, its various components, and 
the discourse of partnership in general are worth emphasizing 
here. First is the relative importance given to migrant remit-
tances and investments in the collaborative projects implement-
ing the various goals. Here we see the imprint of the R- 2- D 
agenda starting to emerge in what remains of the two govern-
ments’ shared commitment to migration control and manage-
ment. The very first objectives elaborated in the Action Plan 
were “ Remittances— Lowering the Cost of Sending Money 
Home” and “ Housing— Promoting Private Investment to Meet 
Demand and Strengthen Roots.” The former of these two is 
directed at “lower[ing] the cost to Mexicans working in the 
United States of sending money home.” Echoing the discourse 
of the R- 2- D agenda, this was to be done by encouraging finan-
cial institutions to market aggressively to migrants and, in turn, 
educating migrants about the benefits of using formal finan-
cial institutions. The latter promised to “facilitate investment 
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in Mexican housing by Mexicans in the United States through 
cross- border mortgages and construction loans.” While this 
component of the initiative is touted as “focus[ing] on improv-
ing Mexican entrepreneurs’ and farmers’ access to new and 
existing sources of capital,” “enhanc[ing] understanding of the 
financial system,” and “equip[ping] citizens with the tools they 
need to make good economic choices,” there is surprisingly 
little in the way of “new sources of capital” besides migrant 
remittances and investments. This policy statement appears as 
nothing more than a utopian vision of the beneficence of finan-
cial markets, whereby migrants’ participation in formal banking 
institutions would free up new sources of capital and miracu-
lously lead to expanded access to credit in poor and rural com-
munities in Mexico.
In the end, for all its celebration of the goals of providing 
“access to the window of opportunity offered by broader and 
deeper global connections in the 21st century,” creating “jobs 
where they are needed the most,” and ensuring that “no Mex-
ican feels compelled to leave his home for lack of jobs or oppor-
tunity,” the P4P contains little in the way of concrete policies 
directly channeling investment into migrant- sending regions in 
ways that may bring these goals to fruition. Instead, and in line 
with the market- centric R- 2- D policies simultaneously being 
promoted by international organizations, the smooth opera-
tion of financial markets and institutions across all of the con-
tinent was expected to provide beneficial outcomes without the 
need for much in the way of government intervention. As in the 
broader R- 2- D agenda, here the market is projected as the most 
promising agent of change, and the  importance— indeed the 
very  possibility— of concerted state policy to address uneven 
development is obscured.
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The second noteworthy feature is that the entire project, 
although couched in the language of “partnership” and a tech-
nocratic idiom of identifying barriers to sustained growth and 
improved livelihoods, reproduces a developmentalist hierar-
chy that identifies U.S. corporations, experts, and government 
institutions as purveyors of the expert knowledge, business, 
administrative experience, and capital that provide the key to 
unleashing growth in Mexico’s poorest regions. In practice, this 
meant that much of the collaboration promoted by the P4P was 
designed to impart to Mexican officials, business leaders, and 
“financial and investment managers” the ways of the U.S. brand 
of late- twentieth- century, finance- driven capitalist growth. In 
hindsight, and given the global financial meltdown precipitated 
in 2008 by the excesses of that model, the dangers and limita-
tions inherent in this growth strategy are plain to see in the 
P4P’s leading example under the objective of “sharing best prac-
tices and technical expertise”:
The U.S. Treasury will coordinate the provision of technical assis-
tance to Mexico’s Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF) to encour-
age securitization of mortgages and the creation of a secondary 
mortgage market in Mexico. In these efforts, Treasury will draw 
upon experts with experience in housing finance from private 
financial institutions, government- sponsored agencies (like Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae), and the U.S. Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise and Oversight. (P4P, 2002a: 6)
In sum, following the demise of the comprehensive binational 
migration- policy reform negotiations in September 2001, Mex-
ican and U.S. government officials continued to collaborate on 
migration- policy issues, but their interests had narrowed. The 
regularization of migration and the eventual lifting of restrictions 
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on human mobility across the U.S.- Mexican divide had all but dis-
appeared from the binational political agenda. The focus had now 
turned almost exclusively toward using remittances to promote 
the extension of U.S.- style financial products and markets into 
all of Mexico. But of course, despite the market- fundamentalist 
rhetoric this policy objective would not arise automatically as the 
result of market forces. This too would require significant gov-
ernmental work to construct market- based solutions and promote 
their use among financial institutions, migrants, and remittance 
recipients. The following chapter examines the most prominent 
of these market- based solutions generated through this intergov-
ernmental collaboration along with the governmental work that 
brought it into being.
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Ch a P t e r 5
From Promise to Practice
Toward Financial Democracy in North 
America
This chapter centers attention on the cross- border collaboration 
of U.S. and Mexican government agencies working to imple-
ment specific policies to turn the promise of the remittances- to- 
development (R- 2- D) agenda into reality. The chapter focuses 
on the design, implementation, and marketing of “Directo a 
México,” the brand name given to a financial mechanism cre-
ated by the Federal Reserve Banks and Banco de México that 
offers financial institutions in both countries the opportunity to 
provide low- cost remittance- transfer services. 
The core focus of the chapter is on the governmental work, 
including both policy design and diffusion and subject- formation 
work, carried out by the central actors charged with translating 
the discourse of R- 2- D from promise to practice, with trans-
forming the utopian ambitions of the Partnership for Prosperity 
(P4P) into reality. For the government agencies involved, this 
included three principal activities. First, they created a low- cost 
remittance- transfer mechanism that could be used to promote 
the financial inclusion of migrants and remittance recipients. 
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Second, they had to convince banking institutions that it was 
worth their while to recruit Mexican migrants as customers. 
And third, with the banking institutions on board and often 
working as allies, the agencies had to find ways of bringing 
the migrants themselves to enter the financial mainstream and 
come to think and act as good financial subjects. In what follows 
I examine the work put toward these tripartite objectives. Fol-
lowing this examination, I conclude by discussing the minimal 
results of all this work and exploring possible explanations for 
migrants’ rather limited use of the Directo a México service.
remittanCe transfers and banKing  
the UnbanKed migrant: the direCto  
a méxiCo Program
The Directo a México program emerged from the framework 
of the P4P agreement between Mexico and the United States 
discussed in the previous chapter. Directo a México was one 
element designed to meet the P4P objective of “expanding and 
broadening access to capital” (P4P, 2002b: 6), in this case by 
incorporating Mexican migrants in the United States within the 
formal financial sector and allowing them and their friends and 
family members back home access to a wide range of financial 
products and services. The program was initiated by the central 
banks from the two countries, the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) 
and the Banco de México (Banxico). These agencies, relatively 
insulated from political pressure because of the independence 
that central banks have been granted in recent decades to pursue 
monetary policy (Polillo and Guillén, 2005), were well placed 
to carry out the politically delicate work of promoting migrant 
financial inclusion. Such independence has proven valuable, 
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because migrant financial- inclusion policies run contrary to 
the objectives of the policies of other U.S. government agencies, 
designed to exclude Mexican migrants (particularly those who 
are in the country without legal authorization) from the territo-
rial boundaries of the country and its political, economic, and 
labor- market institutions. The importance of the central bank’s 
independence is well illustrated by the fact that the FRB have 
been able to continue their participation in Directo a México to 
this day, whereas other U.S. government agencies that carried 
out similar efforts at migrant financial inclusion over the course 
of the 2000s were compelled to backtrack in the face of mount-
ing political pressure relating to immigration policy and reform.1
How exactly does the Directo a México program function, 
and how does it promote migrant financial inclusion? In 2003 
the FRB and Banxico created a link between their national 
electronic- payment systems, or in technical terms their “auto-
mated clearing houses” (ACH).2 This interconnection made it 
possible for electronic payments to be made between any finan-
cial institutions in the United States and Mexico. On the basis 
of this new binational- payments infrastructure, in October 2003 
the FRB began offering the “FedACH International Mexico 
Service” to financial institutions in the United States. This ser-
vice was rebranded “Directo a México” in 2005. In promotional 
materials, Directo a México is presented as an opportunity for 
U.S. financial institutions to provide a “secure, fast, low- cost and 
convenient way to remit funds to Mexico” by adopting this “very 
competitive service within the market for remittance transfers 
between the United States and Mexico.”3
While the P4P initiative clearly envisioned the creation and 
use of this type of transfer mechanism as a means to promote 
development in migrant- sending regions in  Mexico— and to 
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slow, if not completely halt, outmigration from those  places— the 
government officials working to implement and market Directo 
a México sometimes downplay this causal connection. In an 
interview with Elena Whisler, a Federal Reserve Bank official 
working on the promotion of the service, for example, she ini-
tially told me that contributing to development in Mexico “was 
not a main objective”; however, she then clarified how Directo a 
México might help contribute to the expansion of financial ser-
vices and the much- coveted development across North America:
Our main objective was really to lower the cost of sending pay-
ments to Mexico.  .  . . I think one of the benefits (and it could be 
unintended benefits) is certainly the fact that because we are pro-
viding a lower- cost and more efficient solution to sending pay-
ments to Mexico, more money can be transferred to Mexico, into 
an  account— which, I think, if you’re bringing in financial services 
and you’re bringing more money into a financial system, that in 
itself will bring about development.
 (Interview with Elena Whisler, 2008)
Consistently with the broader contours of the R- 2- D agenda, 
then, the designers of Directo a México have attempted to create 
an attractive alternative within the remittance- transfer indus-
try that would help promote financial democracy. In line with 
other forms of “neoliberal populism” (Roy, 2010) the logic here 
is that bringing migrants and their family members into formal 
financial institutions would expand access to capital, unleashing 
individuals’ entrepreneurial energies and generating significant 
economic opportunities for people previously excluded from 
the financial products and services that they needed.
One of the major selling points of Directo a Mexico is that it 
offers banks and credit unions in the United States the  opportunity 
to provide remittance transfers to their customers at very attractive 
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rates. The true price consumers pay for remittance- transfer ser-
vices is generally made up of two components: an exchange rate dif-
ferential, or what is commonly referred to as the “fx spread,” and a 
transaction fee. The cost of the Directo a México service appears 
attractive on both counts. First of all, the fx spread offered through 
Directo a México is extremely competitive. When it began in 2003, 
the exchange rate offered through the service was equivalent to the 
wholesale currency exchange rate, published on a daily basis by 
Banxico, minus 1 percent. Within the first year of operation, this 
rate dropped to 0.21 percent below the wholesale rate (Solís Robledo, 
2004).
In terms of the transaction fee, the FRB charge financial 
institutions $0.67 per transaction for Mexico- bound transfers.4 
While there are no explicit rules dictating the amount that par-
ticipating financial institutions can charge their customers, the 
system’s architects “expect the cost savings to be passed on to 
customers” (P4P, 2002b: 6), and in practice this appears to be 
the case. A Banxico official estimated in 2008 that participating 
financial institutions charge their customers, on average, around 
$3 per transfer using the Directo a México service (Medina, 
2008: 8). FRB officials have been less specific but claim that 
financial institutions “generally charge less than $5” per trans-
action (Federal Reserve Bank, 2006a: 4). If we take the higher 
of those estimates, $5 (USD), to be a typical transaction fee, 
that equals 1 percent of a $500 transfer. At 1.21% of the typical 
$500 remittance, the total cost of a Directo a México transfer (fx 
spread [0.21%] + transaction charge [1%]) compares favorably to 
the price of other service providers. The World Bank’s “Remit-
tance Prices Worldwide” Web site, for example, calculates the 
average total cost to transfer USD 500 from the United States to 
Mexico in the third quarter of 2013 at 2.91 percent.5
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While on price alone the Directo a México service does com-
pare favorably to other available services, some of its other char-
acteristics may not be so attractive to potential customers. Two 
important characteristics to note about Directo a México are the 
speed of the transmission and the modality of the transfer. In 
regard to the speed of the transfer, the Directo a México service 
delivers monies to recipients one business day following the initia-
tion of a transfer. Once the remitter initiates the transaction, those 
monies flow through their local financial institution to FRB, which 
then transfer the funds to Banxico. At 12:30 P.m. the next business 
day, Banxico exchanges the USD for MXN (Mexican pesos), and 
payment information is input into the Mexican financial sys-
tem. Shortly after 1:30 P.m. the money is credited to the recipient’s 
account (Solís Robledo, 2010). This one- day turnaround does not 
necessarily compare favorably with other transfer- service provid-
ers, many of whom offer nearly instantaneous transfers.
As regards the modality of the transfer, Directo a México 
requires customers to have a bank account on both ends of the 
transaction.6 This bank- account requirement, while not always 
attractive to potential customers, is perhaps the service’s most 
important feature. This is not a technical necessity. Payments 
could hypothetically be sent from an account in the United 
States to an institutional account in any Mexican financial insti-
tution, which could then disperse the money to the recipient in 
cash. However, Elena Whisler, from the Retail Payments Office 
of the FRB- Atlanta, explained that the central banks were not 
interested in offering the “account- to- cash” service:
The ACH format .  .  . and processing includes an account on the 
origination side as well as the receiving side, so in order for a pay-
ment to go through it needs to reach an account. Now this isn’t to 
say that account- to- cash . . . wouldn’t be available if, say, it’s going 
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to a general account of Bancomer. Bancomer, for example, would 
then, through the payment information, be able to disburse it in 
cash, if that’s an agreement that we have with them. But we do not 
at this time. .  .  . That’s not what  we— what was first done, and it’s 
not what we had thought was needed in the industry at the time.
 (Interview with Elena Whisler, 2008)
From this explanation of the service it is clear that the gov-
ernment officials designing and implementing Directo a México 
perceived their transfer service as a means to promote financial 
inclusion on both sides of the border by requiring the remit-
tance operation to both originate and disburse in an individual 
account within a formal financial institution. Officials from the 
two countries’ central banks endeavored to parlay the attrac-
tive price characteristics of the Directo a México transfer ser-
vice into a means of enticing both remitters in the United States 
and recipients in Mexico to open bank accounts and join the 
“financial mainstream.” But their transfer service was not widely 
available, nor was its attractiveness immediately apparent to 
potential customers. This would require additional work.
marKet maKing: develoPing a netWorK of 
direCto a méxiCo serviCe Providers
In order to make their project of using remittance transfers as a 
route to financial inclusion a reality, the agencies behind Directo 
a México had to get their product into the hands of financial 
institutions. They did this in two ways. First, they engaged in 
public educational and marketing activities at a variety of stra-
tegic venues, including trade- association meetings. Second, 
culling information from the Mexican government’s Matrícula 
Consular database to identify significant translocal connections 
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between specific localities on both sides of the border, they con-
ceptualized migrant networks as corredores financieros (financial 
corridors) and targeted financial institutions on both ends of 
these financial corridors that could offer the Directo a México 
service.
marKeting the serviCe to finanCial 
institUtions
FRB officials have made regular presentations marketing their 
Directo a México service at strategic venues and gatherings over 
recent years. Among the most important of these venues have 
been trade- association meetings. These public presentations are 
often done in concert with officials from the international finan-
cial institutions who created the discursive representation of 
remittances as a financial flow. In these trade- association meet-
ings, FRB officials are also occasionally accompanied by rep-
resentatives of financial institutions that have already adopted 
Directo a México.
Officials from FRB also worked with their colleagues in the 
Mexican agencies Banxico, Bansefi (Banco del Ahorro Nacional 
y Servicios Financieros), and IME to organize a “roadshow” in 
2006 to market Directo a México across the United States. In my 
interview with Annie Carrillo, the Instituto de los Mexicanos 
en el Exterior (IME) director of economic affairs, she told me 
that her agency had “associated with Banco de México and with 
Bansefi to promote the Directo a México program. . . . In 2006, 
for example, we supported Banxico to carry out a road show in 
the consulates across the United States, with folks from the Fed-
eral Reserve and representatives of Banxico to try to  identify 
banks and credit unions that would be interested in offering 
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Directo a México” (Interview with Annie Carrillo, 2008). A 
press release by the FRB described the road show as visiting 
twelve different cities to “introduce more financial institutions 
to a more efficient way to transfer funds to Mexico” (Federal 
Reserve Bank, 2006b).7
In addition, IME  officials— working closely with their col-
laborators in other  agencies— have used their Jornadas Informa-
tivas project to inform financial institutions of the importance 
of remittances and the benefits of the Directo a México service. 
Two such Jornadas have been targeted directly at officials from 
financial institutions, one at IME headquarters in Mexico City 
in 2006 and another, hosted by the Federal Reserve Banks, in 
Atlanta in December 2010. For the 2006 Jornada Informativa, 
IME brought forty- three participants from twenty- eight U.S. 
and Mexican financial institutions to Mexico City for three days 
of workshops and presentations on the theme “Cross- border 
payments: Access to financial services, remittances, and Directo 
a México.” According to the published proceedings from the 
event, the overall objective was “to introduce the banking offi-
cials to a service offered by Banco de México and the Federal 
Reserve called Directo a México .  .  .  , which utilizes the pay-
ment system administered by each central bank in order to 
take advantage of both countries’ payments infrastructure and 
reduce the cost of transferring money.”8
The FRB- hosted Jornada in Atlanta in late 2010 apparently 
followed the same script. The flyer announcing the event sug-
gested that its potential participants should come from “financial 
institutions interested in serving the Hispanic market” and that 
these participants “should have a relevant position in the deci-
sion making process” in their institutions. The objective of the 
Jornada would be to “share Directo a México success stories and 
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best practices from institutions [on] both sides of the border” 
and to “promote a better mutual understanding between U.S. 
and Mexican institutions interested in serving the immigrant 
community[’s] financial needs,” among other things (Federal 
Reserve Bank, 2010). This event was attended by some seventy 
officials from U.S. and Mexican financial institutions. These 
participants were offered presentations by both the government 
agencies promoting Directo a México and financial institutions 
that have already begun providing the service, including the 
North Carolina– based Latino Community Credit Union and 
the Mitchell Bank from Milwaukee. They were even offered a 
presentation by the former head of the Multilateral Investment 
Fund, Donald Terry, who according to an IME summary of the 
event “declared his support for Directo a México” (IME, 2010).
What is the thrust of the message conveyed in these educa-
tional events and marketing presentations? Elena Whisler from 
the FRB explained that they were attempting not simply to sell 
Directo a México but also to educate financial institutions to 
overcome stereotypical representations of the Mexican migrant. 
Voicing concerns about the exclusionary nature of the banking 
sector, she argued that:
One of the biggest hurdles is providing that level of knowledge that 
makes them feel comfortable in saying, “Okay, these customers are 
valuable customers,” not only just to send money but also for you to 
cross- sell your other services, loans and things like that. That has 
been the biggest challenge. I think you have [an] industry that 
really stereotypes these types of customers into a bucket, that 
[thinks], “Oh, well they’re not good customers, because they don’t 
have financial services; they don’t have money”—which is com-
pletely false. But they have these preconceived notions of who 
these customers are. And so it’s just education.
 (Interview with Elena Whisler, 2008)
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The presentations were largely structured around a discus-
sion of the opportunities represented by the unbanked- migrant 
market and the challenges that would need to be overcome by 
financial institutions interested in capturing this market poten-
tial by offering the Directo a México service. The discussion 
of the opportunities available to financial institutions aimed 
at demonstrating that remittance transfers are “big business” 
(McQuerry, 2007b). In other words, the presentations drove 
home the point that, as Donald Terry once provocatively 
claimed, remittances are “financial flows in search of financial 
products” (Terry, 2005: 11) and, most important, that U.S. finan-
cial institutions could profit by taking up the task of providing 
these products. To make this case, the marketing presentations 
offered data about the scale of the remittance market, estimates 
and projections of the size of the Mexican migrant and broader 
Latino populations in the United States, and the limited share 
of the remittance- transfer market currently captured by formal 
banking institutions.
Financial institutions were then told that, if they could find 
a way to tap into this market potential, they stood to benefit 
from an essential characteristic of the Mexican migrant: his/her 
strong customer loyalty (McQuerry, 2007b, 2010; Whisler, 2008a, 
b, c; Maloney, 2010). Whisler’s presentation at the National 
Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) Payments 
2008 conference illustrated this representation well, as she told 
her audience: “This type of individual has strong customer loy-
alty. They are . .  . loyal to the people that serve them well and 
the people that they trust.”9 This customer loyalty is partic-
ularly valuable, because these unbanked migrants need a full 
range of financial services, not simply remittance transfers. Lur-
ing this loyal customer in with an attractive remittance- transfer 
From Promise to Practice / 173
service would lead to additional cross- selling opportunities as 
the loyal migrant might look to the institution for all his or her 
other financial needs. The loyalty of Mexican- migrant custom-
ers thus represents a great opportunity for financial institutions 
if they are able to bring them inside their institutions.
Here it appears that, in seeking to undermine the financial 
industry’s stereotypical representation of the Mexican migrant 
as poor and unprofitable, the government officials marketing 
Directo a México substituted another equally essentialist and 
stereotypical representation of the Mexican migrant. In this 
new essentialist representation, “the migrant” was no longer 
projected as a poor and unprofitable customer; on the contrary, 
some of the essential characteristics of “the migrant”—partic-
ularly her/his customer  loyalty— should make her/him quite 
attractive to financial institutions. But, the marketing presenta-
tions quickly remind their audience, there are significant obsta-
cles that would have to be overcome in order to turn migrants 
into customers. This is where the discussion of the challenges 
that financial institutions will face in trying to use the Directo a 
México service to bank the unbanked migrant comes to the fore.
Most of the challenges underlined in these Directo a Méx-
ico marketing presentations relate again to characteristics pro-
jected onto the Mexican migrant population. The essentialist 
portrait that emerges in these discussions of challenges char-
acterized Mexican migrants as lacking in four respects: they 
are unbanked, undocumented, uncomfortable, and uninformed. 
Fortunately, the marketing audience was told, these deficiencies 
inherent in the potential customer base could be overcome, and 
a central objective of the presentations was to provide financial 
institutions with pre- formed strategies that would help them to 
successfully address these challenges. Elena Whisler pointed 
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this out when she described her goals for the presentation at 
NACHA Payments 2008, “Hopefully, at the end, you’ll be able 
to go back to your institution with some practical tips in build-
ing your successful remittance program.”10
One major challenge financial institutions would face in their 
quest to bank the unbanked Mexican migrant is that this poten-
tial customer often “lacks traditional documentation” (McQuerry, 
2007b: 4), given that a significant proportion of the target popula-
tion is unlawfully present in the United States and thus incapa-
ble of accessing generally accepted forms of identification, such as 
state- issued driver’s licenses or Social Security cards. This led to 
the suggestion that financial institutions, in performing due dili-
gence to comply with “know your customer” regulations, may 
need to accept nontraditional forms of identification, such as the 
Matrícula Consular card. In making this suggestion, the presenters 
made clear that federal regulations in the United States permit this 
practice. Whisler told her audience at the 2008 Latino Credit Union 
Association, for example, that “Section 326 of US Patriot Act lists 
forms of acceptable identification such as [the] Matricula Consular 
card” (Whisler, 2008b: 7; also Whisler, 2008a, McQuerry, 2010: 7).
The account- to- account mechanism underlying Directo a 
México is itself a significant challenge, as remittance recipients 
in Mexico rarely have a relationship with a bank or credit union 
where their monies can be received. Once again, the agencies 
involved in promoting the service have a ready- made solution 
for this problem, and the discussion of this solution was a cen-
tral element in the marketing presentations. The promoters of 
Directo a México have designed an innovative solution to this 
problem: Bansefi created a system whereby financial institutions 
in the United States, at the request of a potential remitter, can 
pre- open an account for recipients at participating institutions 
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in Mexico. A significant component of many of the public pre-
sentations promoting Directo a México thus involved the dis-
cussion of a “beneficiary account registration” (BAR) Web site 
designed by Bansefi for this purpose.
If the migrant customer that the financial institutions seek to 
attract is uncomfortable with formal financial institutions, how 
is this to be overcome? Directo a México’s marketing presenta-
tions suggested that this challenge could be overcome through 
special customer- service and marketing efforts that would make 
potential customers feel at home in the financial institutions. 
Important special services might include offering extended 
banking hours and hiring Spanish- language staff (Whisler, 
2008b: 6, 7), as well as marketing around particular holidays that 
might be “high- volume remittance times,” such as Mother’s Day 
(Whisler, 2008c: 30). Directo a México officials even designed 
a suite of customizable promotional materials that are made 
available to participating financial institutions. These materi-
als include brochures, posters, lobby cards, the script for a radio 
commercial, and an information sheet about the exchange- rate 
spread. These are provided as “white- branded” materials, which 
allow participating financial institutions to insert their own 
logos in appropriate areas (McQuerry, 2007a: 11).11
The final challenge that the presentations often address is 
that the Mexican migrant is largely uninformed about the work-
ings and benefits of the financial- services industry. The presen-
tations regularly inform their audience that “financial education 
is vital” (Whisler, 2008b; also, Whisler, 2008c; McQuerry, 2010) 
in helping the potential customers to realize how they can ben-
efit from the products and services on offer within formal finan-
cial institutions. Whisler (2008a) described the need to educate 
the uninformed migrant in the following terms:12
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Financial education is extremely important for you to really make 
[these individuals] aware that [they] need an account. A lot of indi-
viduals don’t realize the benefits to having an account, such as 
access to credit and building a proper identity here in the United 
States, and also in the receiving country. They don’t realize that 
that is important and a great benefit [toward] being a successful 
individual here in the United States.
Here again the government agencies promoting the service 
have a prepackaged solution. In this case, that prepackaged solu-
tion comes in the form of a standardized financial- education 
package created by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) known as “Money Smart.” This Money Smart curricu-
lum contains distinct modules dealing with a variety of financial 
topics and is designed for use among individuals with little to 
no financial training (Cruz- Taura, 2008: 7). This theme of finan-
cial education and the associated work of promoting Directo a 
México among the potential migrant customers is addressed in 
greater detail below.
Before we get there, let us first turn to an examination of 
the project carried out by Directo a México officials to identify 
translocal migrant networks spanning the U.S.- Mexico border 
and to convince financial institutions on both sides of those net-
works to offer and promote the transfer service.
from migrant netWorKs to Corredores 
finanCieros
The other way that U.S. and Mexican government officials worked 
to bring financial institutions on board with their  project was by 
identifying particular translocal migrant networks as corredores 
financieros, financial corridors. Beginning in 2007,  officials in IME 
used the information available from the  consulates’ Matrícula 
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Consular database to identify important translocal migrant net-
works.13 Carlos García de Alba (2010: 7), then executive director 
of IME, explained that they “use the statistics provided by the 
Mexican Consulates to identify Mexicans from the same com-
munities of origin [on] both sides of the border.” After identify-
ing these translocal migrant networks, IME officials, along with 
partners in Bansefi, Banxico, and FRB, would contact financial 
institutions on both sides of the networks to encourage them to 
offer Directo a México. Once these partner institutions were 
recruited, government officials worked with them to “organize 
localized events with the Mexican community so individuals can 
learn about the benefits of Directo a México.”14 Annie Carrillo, 
IME’s economic- affairs director, described the whole process to 
me in the following terms:
In 2007 we initiated a pilot project that turned out quite interest-
ing: identifying migrant corridors. So, what we  did— in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, there is a very large proportion of migrants from 
Tarímbaro, Michoacán. So, what we did was to identify a credit 
union in St. Paul, which was St. Paul Federal Credit Union. And 
one in Mexico, which was the Caja Morelia Valladolid, which had a 
branch in Tarímbaro. Then, well, what we did was to put the two 
financial institutions in contact, and we organized a community 
event at the offices of St. Paul Federal Credit Union, and we invited 
everyone from the home- town association from Tarímbaro to 
come to the credit union. It was a community celebration, you 
know? There was a merry- go- round and everything. The idea was 
to present the Directo a México service. There was a satellite con-
nection, because at the same time there was also an event in Tarím-
baro, so people could see their family members.
 (Interview with Annie Carrillo, 2008)
I will discuss the details of this and similar community 
events in more detail in the following section, which examines 
governmental efforts to recruit migrant remitters to the Directo 
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a México service. But first, let us look at how U.S. financial insti-
tutions were brought into these corredores financieros.
David de Santiago, a manager at St. Paul Federal Credit 
Union, the institution involved in the pilot corridor, explained 
to me how his institution got involved in the corredores proj-
ect. The coincidence of a number of important events in the 
mid- 2000s led St. Paul Federal to target more aggressively the 
Mexican- migrant population in the St. Paul area. Around 2005 
the institution received a new charter from the National Credit 
Union Association, requiring it to focus on “underserved” pop-
ulations. At around the same time, the Mexican government 
opened its consulate in St. Paul. This was also the time that de 
Santiago was hired as the credit union’s first Spanish- speaking 
employee (Interview with David de Santiago, 2009). De Santi-
ago described how the intersection of these internal events with 
the Directo a México promotional campaign led by U.S. and 
Mexican government officials brought St. Paul Federal to offer 
the service:
Through our program of trying to help the underserved, we’ve 
been kind of in constant contact with a number of consulates and 
the Federal  Reserve— any avenues that we can find that connect us 
to any particular area or community. And we were actually invited 
(it was three years ago, I think) . . . Federal Reserve had a presenta-
tion of the Directo a México product right  at— they had it at FRB 
Minneapolis, actually. So we went there and had the presentation, 
and it kind of just snowballed from there.
(Interview with David de Santiago, 2009)
The community- affairs officer from the Mexican consulate 
would later convince St. Paul Federal officials to participate in 
a financial corridor connecting their community to Tarímbaro, 
Michoacán. De Santiago and consular officials organized an 
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event to inaugurate the Directo a México service and the new 
financial corridor linking the two credit  unions— from Tarím-
baro and St.  Paul— across the border. The event attracted a mod-
est crowd of perhaps two hundred people. David de Santiago felt 
it was a success, suggesting it was a virtue that “it wasn’t just peo-
ple that are interested in using the service, as it was other credit 
unions that came out, banks that came out. So we had a mix of 
everything show up from the community, that were interested 
in, ‘Well, what’s this all about?’ ” (Interview with David de San-
tiago, 2009). The government officials driving the corredores proj-
ect also deemed the St. Paul– Tarímbaro pilot to be a success. An 
FRB press release following the event states: “The success of the 
meeting was evident in the interest of the attendees and the new 
accounts opened that day at the St. Paul Federal Credit Union 
and in the Tarímbaro branch of Caja Morelia Valladolid” (Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, 2007). De Santiago estimated that they opened 
some sixty to one hundred new accounts within the first three 
months following the event, although at the time of our interview 
St. Paul Federal was processing only thirty to forty- five transfers 
per month (Interview with David de Santiago, 2009).15
As a result of this successful experience, the government offi-
cials decided to identify and expand to other corredores finan-
cieros. While there are literally thousands of translocal networks 
connecting localities across the U.S.- Mexico border, to date the 
number of these networks that have been converted into corredores 
financieros is still quite small. The most recent data available show 
that fifteen corridors have been established, connecting financial 
institutions in cities in California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, and Texas with sister institutions 
in Coahuila, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco,  Michoacán, Puebla, 
San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, and Zacatecas.16
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While the number of financial corridors does still appear 
quite limited, overall the work that U.S. and Mexican govern-
ment officials carried out in marketing to and recruiting finan-
cial institutions to offer their Directo a México service has been 
relatively successful. As of December 2010, over four hundred 
banks and credit unions offered the service to the public (Díaz 
de León, 2010: 12). But the ultimate success of the Directo a Méx-
ico initiative would depend upon migrant remitters’ actually 
utilizing the service to transfer money home. To make this a 
reality, government officials had to engage in more work, aim-
ing to attract Mexican migrants toward Directo a México. It is 
to that aspect of the government officials’ work that I now turn.
shaPing migrants as good finanCial sUbjeCts
This section examines the third major type of governmental 
work involved in the efforts of Mexican and U.S. government 
officials to translate the promise of the R- 2- D agenda into real-
ity: recruiting migrants as customers of Directo a México and 
shaping them into good financial subjects. I discuss first the con-
tent and organization of the corredores’ launch events as sites of 
financial education and recruitment. Then I examine less direct 
forms of marketing Directo a México and educating migrants 
about the benefits of financial services.
Corridor laUnCh events
The events inaugurating the corredores financieros in particular 
U.S. cities appear to be one of the fundamental modes of edu-
cating migrants about the Directo a México service and encour-
aging its use. What happened at these events and to what extent 
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were they capable of educating migrants and drawing them into 
the institutions offering Directo a México?
Government officials used two principal means of attract-
ing individuals to the events and spreading the word about the 
newly available Directo a México service. The first of these was 
for Mexican consular officials to tap into their existing networks 
of contacts with leaders from the migrant community. Annie 
Carrillo alluded to this strategy in the excerpt from our inter-
view discussed in the previous section, when she described how, 
after organizing the community event at the offices of St. Paul 
Federal, they “invited everyone from the home- town associa-
tion from Tarímbaro to come to the credit union” (Interview 
with Annie Carrillo, 2008).
The use of this strategy was also apparent at the launch event 
of the Los Angeles– Guadalajara corridor that I attended at 
the downtown Los Angeles branch of Cityside Federal Credit 
Union in early 2009. The limited space within the branch lobby 
made this location a rather cramped setting even for the rel-
atively modest crowd of approximately fifty people attend-
ing this “community event.” As we waited for the event to get 
under way, a handful of migrants milled around, chatting with 
friends and family members and enjoying the complimentary 
popcorn, nachos, and soda that event organizers provided. The 
remaining  attendees— almost all of whom were dressed in for-
mal business attire during this Saturday- afternoon community 
 event— included government and credit- union officials from 
both countries and a who’s- who of migrant leaders from Los 
Angeles. Not only was the president of the Federación de Clubes 
Jalisciences de California (FCJ) in attendance, but so was FCJ’s 
founding president, along with the president of the Casa del 
Migrante Poblana, an organization of migrants from the state of 
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Puebla, and leaders from the federation of clubs from the state 
of Durango (Author’s field notes, March 28, 2009).
This pattern of focusing the outreach and advertising for 
the launch events on the leaders of migrant- led organiza-
tions appears to have played out at the Porterville, California– 
Puruándiro, Michoacán, corridor launch as well. Accounts of 
that event document that it involved a reception at the Porter-
ville offices of the Comisión Honorífica Mexicana, an organi-
zation with roots that go back decades.17 While not a translocal 
organization like the typical home- town association (HTA), 
these organizations were formed in ways quite similar to the 
contemporary HTAs. Such comisiones were formed across the 
United States by Mexican consulates as early as the 1920s to 
help organize patriotic festivals (fiestas patrías) that would allow 
migrants to maintain connections to the home culture and tra-
ditions (Pichardo, 1988).
The idea behind this form of marketing and outreach is that 
the leadership cadre of these migrant- led organizations con-
stitutes an important conduit for spreading information to the 
broader migrant community. The notion that the consulates’ 
connections with the migrant community offered a promising 
and effective avenue of communication appeared to be the com-
mon sense among the financial- institution and government offi-
cials involved in the launch events I attended. In a discussion 
with the Los Angeles consulate’s IME representative at the cor-
ridor launch at Cityside Federal, she told me that government 
officials were happy with the (relatively sparse) attendance, 
because they believed that the only way the program would be 
successful was if the information about Directo a México spread 
by word of mouth. She and her colleagues were confident that 
they had invited the right people to the event, as most of their 
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advertising had been conducted through the various southern 
California HTA federations (Author’s field notes, March 28, 
2009). In similar fashion, advertising for an event launching the 
corridor connecting Lamont, California, with Cerano, Guana-
juato, was left in the hands of officials from the Mexican consul-
ate in Fresno (Author’s field notes, May 3, 2008). My discussions 
with the government and financial- institution officials at these 
events made clear that they concurred with Elena Whisler’s 
opinion that “we have been very fortunate to work with the 
Mexican consulates, which have that trust with the Mexican 
population. If we collaborate with the Mexican consulate and a 
U.S. financial institution collaborates with the Mexican consul-
ate, you build that trust, and so [migrants] are more willing to 
listen to you” (Interview with Elena Whisler, 2008).
The events themselves featured official presentations from 
representatives of the sponsoring financial institutions and gov-
ernment agencies. These presentations unfailingly described 
the origins and extolled the virtues of the Directo a México ser-
vice. The event in Lamont, for example, began with one speech 
by the consul general from the Mexican consulate in Fresno and 
another by the executive director of the participating U.S. finan-
cial institution, Kern Central Credit Union. The Kern Central 
official did not seem to succeed in making much of a connection 
with the assembled migrants or in capturing their attention, 
much less their imagination. His prepared speech about the 
benefits that migrants might enjoy by opening an account at the 
credit union lacked any real charisma or energy. Perhaps even 
more damagingly, he largely failed to look up from his notes, 
and when he did it was only to make eye contact with the repre-
sentatives from the other financial and government institutions 
present (Author’s field notes, May 3, 2008). The  government 
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officials’ speeches at the Los Angeles  event— by the local consul 
and by a representative from  Banxico— were similarly formal 
and rehearsed.
Apart from these general introductions to the service, 
migrants were sometimes offered additional information. At the 
launch event I attended in Lamont, California, migrants were 
invited to participate in on- site financial- education classes on 
the workings of credit scoring and the value of homeownership. 
But with little enthusiasm generated by the official speeches and 
introductions to Directo a México, uptake on these workshops 
was quite limited; the conviviality of the conversation with 
other attendees and the carne asada on offer were clearly a stron-
ger draw than these financial- education opportunities (Author’s 
field notes, May 3, 2008).
One feature of the events that seems to have been very 
attractive to the migrant attendees was a videoconferencing 
connection between the simultaneous events at the two finan-
cial institutions on either side of the U.S.- Mexico border. At 
the launch in Los Angeles, for example, one videoconference 
between a woman in Guadalajara and her children and grand-
children at City Federal in Los Angeles was projected on a big 
screen in the lobby for all to see. The rest of the videoconfer-
ences were not so publicly transmitted; instead the few ordinary 
migrants that were present at the event took turns making their 
way into a private office to participate in a videoconference with 
family members attending the simultaneous community event 
at the offices of Caja Popular Oblatos in Guadalajara (Valenzuela 
Martínez, 2010; author’s field notes, March 28, 2009).
This feature of the events gives an indication of the second 
strategy that officials used to attract migrants to participate in 
these events and to learn about the Directo a México service: 
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the cajas populares in Mexico communicated with their existing 
members and asked them to invite their migrant family mem-
bers to the events at the U.S. financial institution, enticing them 
with the prospect of a face- to- face videoconference. This was 
made clear to me in my conversations with migrants from Gua-
najuato at the Lamont event. They told me that they themselves 
had been members of the Caja Popular Cerano before leaving 
Mexico and they had learned of the day’s event from their fam-
ily members back home in Guanajuato, who encouraged them to 
attend (Author’s field notes, May 3, 2008).
indireCt forms of marKeting: bringing 
edUCation to the Waiting room
In addition to the work done through the corredores launch events, 
government officials have conducted other efforts to educate 
migrants about Directo a México, although this is somewhat less 
targeted. This work might be thought of as the indirect market-
ing of Directo a México. It often involves a form of financial edu-
cation within the physical premises of the Mexican consulates. 
The salas de espera (literally, “waiting rooms”) program involves 
the distribution of popular education materials, including book-
lets and brochures, and the continuous projection of educational 
videos on monitors placed within the consulates’ waiting rooms.
At the Dallas meetings of the IME Consejo Consultivo in 
April 2008, the Mexican Subsecretary for North American Affairs, 
Ambassador Carlos Rico Ferrat, discussed the origins and objec-
tives of this program. He told those assembled at the meeting how 
he was in a consulate in Raleigh, North Carolina, on the day of 
major raids on meat- packing plants across the country in 2006. 
When he walked into the building, he noticed that the television 
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in the waiting room was showing a telenovela, entertaining migrants 
while they waited to be served. Seeing this, Rico asked himself, 
“Why aren’t we giving them the information that they need?” 
and from there the salas de espera program was born. Rico believed 
that this continuous projection of informational videos to the cap-
tive audience within the consulate would be a more appropriate 
and effective educational method than simply providing written 
informative materials. He claimed that in previous years the con-
sulates had distributed between one and one and a half million 
Know Your Rights cards to migrants. If that is so, he asked, “Why 
don’t people know their rights?” The answer to that question, Rico 
suggested, is that the written card probably is not the best way 
to distribute the information. He insisted that the consulates had 
to “use the technologies that are at our disposal,” and this is why 
they worked with Spanish- language media companies to create 
the salas de espera program’s educational videos to give migrants 
“the information they need” (Author’s field notes, August 23, 2008).
The videos have been created by the Los Angeles– based media 
company Saber es Poder (SEP). Despite the ambassador’s sugges-
tion that these videos are a more appropriate technology than writ-
ten educational materials, the SEP videos are actually designed to 
accompany informational booklets that SEP also distributes in the 
consulates. These videos and accompanying booklets deal with a 
variety of topics that may be of interest to migrants, such as auto 
insurance, air travel, financial institutions and remittances, and 
medication and prescription requirements in the United States.18
The salas de espera program’s materials discussing financial 
institutions and remittances are not focused solely on the promo-
tion of the Directo a México service but provide a more general 
orientation on banking and remittance- transfer services. None-
theless, these educational materials resonate with the goals and 
objectives of the Directo a México program, in that an overriding 
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message in these materials is about the benefits of establishing a 
banking relationship with a formal financial institution. The SEP 
video addressing the importance of financial services, for exam-
ple, begins by telling migrants: “The first thing we have to do is 
to open a bank account. The times of saving our money under 
the mattress have passed.” After a brief mention of the four “rela-
tively easy” steps involved in opening an account, the video con-
cludes by directing migrants to the more extensive information 
contained in SEP’s written booklets, saying, “Don’t wait any lon-
ger. Learn more with our Saber es Poder booklets, and visit the 
bank of your choice. Establish your financial identity today and 
 everything— everything—will be easier for you.”19
In addition to the educational materials circulating through 
the salas de espera program, Mexican and U.S. government officials 
use other forms of indirect marketing and educational materi-
als to promote Directo a México among migrant remitters. Most 
important among these are a Web  site— www.directoamexico. 
com— that contains information about the service and the insti-
tutions in the United States where it is offered. The Web site offers 
a multimedia tutorial guiding visitors through various aspects of 
the service and describing all the benefits that migrants will real-
ize by using Directo a México instead of other money- transfer 
services.20 The Web site also contains a number of promotional 
videos, from direct advertisements for particular financial insti-
tutions to more general popular education pieces extolling the 
virtues of Directo a México for individual migrants.
signifiCant governmental WorK and limited 
resUlts: PUrsUing exPlanations
What has been the result of this significant promotional and 
recruitment work carried out by government officials and their 
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allies within the Directo a México program? As pointed out 
above, government officials have had some success in recruit-
ing financial institutions to provide the service, and over four 
hundred banks and credit unions in the United States now do 
so (Díaz de León, 2010: 12). The service is clearly available in 
a number of communities across the country, but the question 
remains: Is it being utilized?
In fact, migrants’ use of the service appears to be severely lack-
ing. Official figures document modest use. In my interview with 
Elena Whisler, I was told that there were nearly thirty thousand 
transfers being made through the service each month as of late 
2008. Similarly, Mendoza (2010: 5) presents figures showing that 
31,002 transfers were processed through the system in May 2010. 
Recent statistics from Banxico document 37,005 transfers made 
during April 2015.21 These figures demonstrate some significant 
growth in the use of the service since its beginnings in 2005 and 
suggest that the marketing and educational work carried out by 
government officials striving to translate the promise of financial 
democracy into reality may be achieving some limited success. 
We should keep in mind, however,  that— according to Banxico’s 
official statistics on remesas  familiares— in April 2015 there were 
over 6.76 million remittance transfers sent to Mexico.22 Consti-
tuting just over 0.5 percent of the total remittance- transfer mar-
ket, Directo a México’s thirty- seven thousand transfers have 
still not made much of a dent in the larger transfer market.
The true impact of all this promotional and educational work 
is, however, even more limited than these figures suggest. These 
official figures obscure the fact that the number of migrant trans-
fers going through Directo a México is actually much lower. It 
turns out that the vast majority of transfers sent through Directo 
a México are not migrant transfers at all but actually U.S. 
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government payments to Social Security beneficiaries living in 
Mexico (Interview with Elena Whisler, 2008). Mendoza’s fig-
ures, for example, note that of the 31,002 transfers processed in 
May 2010, only 1,471 were “commercial items,” whereas the other 
29,531 transfers were “government items” (Mendoza, 2010: 5). 
Those approximately fifteen hundred commercial transfers are 
only 0.02 percent of the total remittance transfers made to Mex-
ico in May 2010. Considering the attractive price characteristics 
of Directo a México and the significant governmental work that 
has gone into its marketing and promotion over the last five- plus 
years, how may we explain these shockingly low numbers? Let 
me discuss two competing explanations.
the marKet- CentriC exPlanation: on 
attraCtiveness and ChoiCe
The government officials working on the design, implementation, 
and promotion of Directo a México believe that these extremely 
sobering results are to be explained by remitters’ dissatisfaction 
with the account- to- account requirement. Elena Whisler inti-
mated as much to me in our December 2008 interview, when 
she mentioned the conclusion that FRB officials had drawn from 
their internal evaluations of the low volume and from the feed-
back they had received from participating financial institutions: 
“One reason [is that] it requires accounts on both ends when the 
market is really cash- to- cash or using money- transfer companies 
that don’t need accounts.” This led her, and presumably others 
working on the Directo a México program, to reflect upon the 
difficulty of reshaping the subjectivity and practices of migrant 
remitters: “We are starting to see what the industry is doing and 
really learning about [laughs] the fact that changing behavior of 
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individuals when they’re used to a cash- to- cash market, we’re 
seeing it to be very  slow— that change in behavior” (Interview 
with Elena Whisler, 2008).
The director of a participating credit union in the Central 
Valley of California pointed to a related but slightly different 
obstacle facing the program. For this official, the problem with 
the Directo a México service was not so much that migrants were 
unwilling to transfer money into an account in Mexico but that 
they were unsatisfied with Bansefi’s beneficiary account regis-
tration (BAR) system mentioned above. Experience working 
with migrants suggested that “people want to be able to open up 
accounts for themselves in México, and from that account pos-
sibly move over funds to their families or help them establish 
.  .  .  , but establishing accounts for their family is secondary to 
establishing [accounts] for themselves.” But this was not possible 
through the BAR system, because it required a beneficiary desig-
nated by the migrant remitter to physically present him/herself 
in the financial institution and provide valid identification before 
the “pre- opened” account would be finalized. This credit- union 
official believed that Directo a México had a “hell of a lot of 
potential” to really expand the account- to- account possibilities:
But as long as people constrain themselves and limit themselves in 
terms of its ultimate potential and utility, it’s going to go nowhere. 
There’s twelve other programs. I actually went to Mexico, and I 
spent time there with people from [the Mexican credit union], and 
I visited most of their sites. And in each one of those sites we went 
and reviewed the remittances that were being sent down. And the 
remittances that were being sent down, received by them, were 
from groups that were the highest cost, such as Western Union. . . . 
People were basically looking at convenience.
 (Interview with credit- union official, 2009)
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S/he argued that if officials wanted Directo a México to go 
somewhere, to be able to compete with these “twelve other pro-
grams” offering transfer services, they had to adapt their ser-
vice to migrants’ needs. But s/he recognized that “the wheels 
of bureaucracy move very, very [slowly]. [That] what is ideal 
isn’t always the practicality of the situation.” In meetings with 
the staff involved in the promotion and implementation of the 
program, this official proposed modifications that might more 
directly address migrants’ needs, saying:
Look, if you’re saying the person has to be in Mexico . . . has to be 
in the bank, why can’t an individual go to el consulado mexicano and 
go through the authentication process there, where they review the 
identification and certify that it’s valid? Or use a notary here to do 
a power of attorney?
 (Interview with credit- union official, 2009)
While s/he found the mid- level bureaucrats working within 
the program to be well intentioned, their lack of decision- 
making authority limited their ability to introduce modifica-
tions to address the lived realities they were observing on the 
ground. Their conversations about necessary modifications 
were fruitless, because, as s/he put it, “you need to talk with 
the right people. If you’re talking about middle management, 
you’re not going to get anything done: they can’t make deci-
sions” (Interview with credit- union official, 2009). Modifications 
would eventually be introduced to the Directo a México service 
in April 2010, although they were not the ones that this credit- 
union official had recommended. The pago en ventanilla (“pay-
ment window”) option now available through the service allows 
recipients in Mexico to pick up their money in cash at any of the 
branches of the national Telecomm- Telégrafos network.23
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With this surprising innovation, Directo a México officials 
seem to have abandoned one of their main  objectives— that of 
using the affordable price of their service to promote inclusion 
for remittance recipients in Mexico. Even with this modifica-
tion, however, the program still potentially promotes “bank-
ing the unbanked migrant” in the United States by requiring 
remitters to themselves be account holders. But even this is 
apparently not always a requirement. Mitchell Bank, for 
instance, now offers Directo a México transfers to nonclients. 
These nonclients pay a higher transaction fee for the service, 
but they do not need an account at the bank. Instead, they 
provide the money they want to remit in cash, which the bank 
then deposits into one of its institutional accounts in order to 
make the electronic transfer (Interview with Mitchell Bank 
official, 2011). If this practice by Mitchell Bank is or becomes 
widespread, it must appear that Directo a México’s lofty goal 
of parlaying reduced transfer fees and favorable exchange 
rates into financial inclusion has been lost. The more limited 
objective of helping formal banking  institutions— including 
community banks and credit  unions— to get a larger slice of 
the revenue from the remittance- transfer industry seems to 
be taking its stead. If the U.S. and Mexican government offi-
cials behind the Directo a México program have given up on 
the utopian promise of this particular instrument of financial 
 democracy— the promise of using an attractive remittance- 
transfer mechanism to make needed financial products and 
services accessible and affordable to migrants and their 
 community— it is hard to imagine how the representation 
of remittances as a development tool in North America can 
retain its luster.
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the legaCy of exClUsion: distrUst and a 
transnational habitUs of resistanCe
The specific details of the Directo a México  service— particularly 
the requirement that transfers be made between bank accounts 
on both sides of the  border— may go a long way in explaining 
the limited impact of the initiative. However, I want to explore 
a different explanation for the sobering results of the significant 
promotional and educational work carried out by Mexican and 
U.S. government officials. I want to move away from the assump-
tion that migrants’ election to use the Directo a México service 
(or not) derives from a rational cost- benefit calculation, a weigh-
ing of their preferences in terms of price, transfer modality, and 
accessibility. This alternative explanation centers instead on the 
political subjectivity of migrants and their experiences and per-
ceptions of public authorities on both sides of the U.S.- Mexico 
divide. The collaborative efforts of Mexican and U.S. government 
officials have clearly been successful at recruiting banking insti-
tutions to their transfer service. But perhaps they are bound to fail 
at their second important  objective— that of bringing migrants to 
act as good financial subjects and to utilize the Directo a México 
 service— because migrants do not trust the government officials 
seeking to reshape their financial identities and practices.
Recognition of a significant trust and credibility deficit faced 
by the consular staff would fly in the face of the message that 
Mexican government officials transmitted to their allies in 
United States government agencies and financial institutions. 
An IME representative concluded his presentation to the 2010 
Jornada Informativa held in Atlanta by inviting the financial- 
institution officials gathered there to “work closely with the 
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Mexican Consulates, to see the Mexican Foreign Affairs Min-
istry and the Institute for Mexicans Abroad as an ally to pro-
vide financial education and to give access to financial services 
to Mexican nationals” (Díaz de León, 2010: 15). In his presenta-
tion to the audience assembled at the 2010 Latino Credit- Union 
Conference, IME’s then– executive director, Carlos García de 
Alba, boasted about the state- led transnationalism policies pur-
sued by the Mexican government since the Salinas de Gortarí 
administration. He characterized these as an “efficient public 
policy to reach the Mexican community abroad.” As a result 
of these policies, according to the executive director of IME, 
“The Mexican Consulates provide confidence to our nationals” 
(García de Alba, 2010: 10).
There is reason to doubt whether these policies have really 
generated such trust and confidence among Mexican migrants 
in the United States. This was brought home quite clearly to 
me in a conversation I had with a migrant in Davis, California, 
just days after I returned from a Jornada Informativa organized 
by IME in Mexico City in 2008. This migrant, who had saved 
up a considerable sum of money during years of working long 
hours and seven- day work weeks in local restaurants, was seri-
ously considering returning home to Tapachula, Chiapas. His 
plan was to invest in a musical group there, with the hope that 
he and the other musicians could make a living playing in clubs 
and on the party circuit. Since I had just returned from the Jor-
nada Informativa and had learned details of government pro-
grams designed to facilitate migrant investment in “productive 
projects” back in Mexico, I suggested to him that there might be 
government funds that could help to make his dream of starting 
a business upon return a reality. His response to my suggestion 
brought me right back to earth and reminded me of the gaping 
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divide between the rhetorical promise of these government pol-
icies and migrants’ lived reality and fundamental distrust in the 
Mexican government. He told me, “You don’t actually believe 
that, do you? If they were to give me a peso, they’d end up tak-
ing three more away from me somehow.” He had absolutely no 
interest in pursuing any potential funding opportunity avail-
able through the consulate or any other government apparatus 
(Author’s field notes, June 25, 2008). Such skepticism and dis-
trust is part of a transnational habitus of resistance, one that my 
experience suggests is widely shared among Mexican migrants. 
This is an embodied and largely unconscious resistance to any 
and all initiatives prepared and promoted by government offi-
cials, whom they deem crooked and untrustworthy.24
While the transnational habitus of resistance poses difficult 
challenges for policymakers attempting to reshape migrants’ 
financial identities and practices, it can be  argued— and govern-
ment officials from both the United States and Mexico certainly 
do  so— that the Mexican government’s state- led transnation-
alism efforts have generated trust and confidence among the 
leaders of home- town associations and other migrant- led orga-
nizations. After all, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
policies of acercamiento pursued by successive Mexican adminis-
trations over the last two decades have been targeted at an elite 
sector of the migrant population, including relatively wealthy, 
long- term migrants with legal status or even U.S. citizenship. 
This would give credence to the Directo a México marketing 
and outreach strategy employed by the consular staff who have 
focused their efforts on these leaders in the hope that they will 
effectively transmit information about the service throughout 
the wider migrant population through word of mouth. But even 
among this elite class of migrants, it is safe to say that much of 
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the migrant leadership targeted by these policies maintains a 
certain level of distrust of government agencies and officials.
This was clearly seen in the conflictual interactions I wit-
nessed between officials from Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
(SEDESOL) and Efraín Jiménez, one of the leaders of the Fed-
eración de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California (FCZSC) 
and a representative on IME’s consultative council, at the Dallas 
CCIME meetings in 2008. The defiant attitude and caustic com-
ments Jiménez directed toward those government officials demon-
strate that even leaders from some of the organizations with the 
closest relationships with the Mexican  government— FCZSC 
member organizations have been leading contributors to the Tres 
por Uno  program— maintain a healthy level of skepticism and 
mistrust for officials of a government that they perceive as ineffi-
cient, if not fully corrupt.
Even the IME representative from the Fresno consulate 
recognized that lack of trust constituted a significant barrier 
in her work. In our interaction of the corridor launch event 
in Lamont, California, she told me that consular officials had 
trouble in California’s San Joaquin Valley engaging migrants 
with many of the main emigrant policies, including the flag-
ship Tres pro Uno program, because migrants lacked trust in 
the government and its representatives. She thought that, over 
time, they would be willing to overcome that mistrust, but she 
recognized that it would take time and require a lot of work 
and demonstrated honesty and goodwill (Author’s field notes, 
March 28, 2008).
Migrants’ distrust of government agencies and officials 
surely extends to the U.S. government as well. I return to this 
issue in the concluding chapter below. For the moment, suf-
fice it to say that the U.S. government’s failure to approve any 
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meaningful immigration- reform package in recent years and the 
 continuation— indeed, the  acceleration— of exclusionary policies 
at the border and of detention and deportation efforts in the inte-
rior have done little to boost the credibility, in the eyes of migrants, 
of those agencies claiming to promote their inclusion and empow-
erment within the financial system of the United States.25
ConClUsion
This chapter has examined the work of translating the R- 2- D 
agenda from promise to practice by looking at the signifi-
cant efforts that U.S. and Mexican public officials put into the 
design, implementation, and promotion of the Directo a México 
remittance- transfer service. This included the technical work of 
interconnecting the two countries’ electronic- payment systems; 
identifying and constructing a network of service providers; and 
finally, attracting migrants toward the service and attempting to 
reshape them into good financial subjects.
Unfortunately for the government officials conducting 
all this work, their efforts have borne little fruit. They have 
brought a modest number of banking institutions on board 
as service providers, but they have yet to convince a substan-
tial number of migrants to utilize Directo a México for their 
remittance- transfer needs. Driven by a market- centric under-
standing of their program’s limited  successes— one that identi-
fies its account- to- account requirement as the main impediment 
to widespread  use— Directo a México officials have introduced 
the new pago en ventanilla cash- payout option. They hope that 
this modification will boost their service’s popularity and use. 
It is too early to tell whether this new option will prove any 
more attractive to potential migrant customers. Either way, this 
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modification signals policymakers’ abandonment of their goal of 
financial inclusion for remittance recipients in Mexico.
Directo a México’s limited successes to date may indicate 
that most migrants are not even aware of the service and its 
characteristics. This brings in to question whether a marketing 
strategy that relies on relations with the leaders of migrant- led 
organizations is really an effective way to get the service into 
migrants’ hands. An evaluation of a previous attempt to employ 
migrant HTAs as a marketing conduit for remittance- transfer 
services was unimpressed by the results and concluded that 
the Mexican HTAs in that project were “not the best organiza-
tions for the credit unions to focus on in their outreach efforts” 
(North American Integration and Development Center, 2006: 
1). The limitations of such a marketing strategy may derive 
from its very logic. This strategy assumes that the leadership 
role attributed to the migrant elite through its engagement with 
the Mexican government is naturally recognized in the larger 
migrant population. But it may well be that this elite stratum of 
the migrant population has nowhere near such power and influ-
ence over their fellow migrants as government officials believe.
Beyond this practical issue, a more critical interpretation of 
the limited results of all this governmental work centers upon 
the agency and resistance of those targeted by these efforts. Even 
if this significant marketing work successfully reached migrants 
and remittance recipients, they might simply be apprehensive 
about utilizing financial products and services designed and 
promoted by government agencies that they do not fully trust.
The limited results achieved so far suggest that the neoliberal- 
populist message directed at migrants and remittance recipients 
has not been particularly attractive. It seems that migrants and 
their friends and family have not recognized themselves in the 
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mirror being placed before them. They have not come to see 
themselves as atomized individuals whose economic marginal-
ization and physical mobility can be understood as driven solely 
by exclusion from formal financial institutions; nor do they 
presently suppose that the most pressing problems they face 
are to be resolved solely by gaining access to financial products 
and services. The power of this political- economic project to 
transform the identities and practices of Mexican migrants in 
the United States thus appears rather limited. Despite the hopes 
and desires of government officials from both countries, it would 
appear that ordinary people hailing from Mexico’s migrant- 
sending regions have not (yet?) been successfully reshaped as 
good financial subjects.
However, it is important to recognize that, inasmuch as the 
limited reception that migrants and remittance recipients have 
given to Directo a México is a form of resistance, this is, in 
many ways, limited and limiting. Migrants’ nonuse of Directo 
a México is not an explicit form of resistance and opposition 
to the broader structural conditions generating inequalities 
and injustices across North America (and the world). It is much 
more indicative of an embodied resistance, a transnational hab-
itus of resistance to governmental efforts of any kind. We can 
only hope that this  widely shared and embodied resistance to 
the predations of the “political class” may someday be extended 
and/or redirected to challenge the logic and dynamics of eco-
nomic exploitation and injustice as well. But as yet, it appears 
that Mexican transnational migrants’ resistance mostly takes 
the form of what David Spener (2009) has termed resistencia hor-
miga, antlike resistance oriented more toward everyday survival 
than toward any explicit challenge to the structural violence of 
dominant political and economic arrangements.
200 / The Long Road to Financial Democracy in North America
Time will tell whether the recent modifications to the service 
and the continuing efforts by Mexican consular officials to over-
come migrants’ resistance will be effective at generating greater 
interest in and use of Directo a México. At the moment, how-
ever, it is hard to conclude that the significant work carried out 
by U.S. and Mexican government officials in the design, imple-
mentation, and promotion of Directo a México has been any-
thing other than a total and utter failure. Thus far, the promise 
of the R- 2- D agenda has foundered on the rocks of reality in 
North America, as Mexican migrants’ enduring distrust of gov-
ernmental initiatives constitutes an unassailable obstacle for this 
neoliberal- populist pathway to financial democracy and a post-
migration future.
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Ch a P t e r 6
Conclusions
The main question addressed by Migrating into Financial Markets 
is how migrant remittances—the resources of some of the world’s 
least affluent inhabitants—became a development tool around 
the turn of the new millennium. I have shown how this discursive 
construction and the policies emanating from it originated in 
the work of remittances experts and policy entrepreneurs within 
a handful of international institutions dedicated to the design, 
application, and spread of a market-based model of development. 
Given this discursive model’s resonance with the neoliberal ide-
ology widely shared among policymakers the world over, these 
experts and policy entrepreneurs had little trouble finding part-
ners within other international organizations, national govern-
ment agencies, think tanks, and the like. The confluence of these 
various actors generated a relatively cohesive policy consensus—
the R-2-D agenda—that presented the incorporation of migrants 
and their monies within global financial markets and institutions 
as a promising means to spur development in the migrant-send-
ing countries and regions of the global South.
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In this concluding chapter, I want to elaborate on the major 
findings of the book and draw out its broader political and the-
oretical implications related to the making of neoliberalism and 
migration and development policy.
the governmental WorK of  
marKet-based solUtions
Throughout this book I have analyzed the significant govern-
mental work carried out by officials within national government 
agencies and international financial institutions (along with 
allies outside government) as they sought to make remittances 
into a development tool. As we have seen, the upshot of all this 
work was the identification of remittances as an underutilized 
financial flow amenable to a variety of market-based policy solu-
tions. The significant work put into the construction and imple-
mentation of this market-based development tool brings to light 
a recurring paradox, if not performative contradiction, faced by 
advocates of neoliberalism and its historical precursors: despite 
the antigovernment rhetoric of its promoters, the “free mar-
ket” can be created and maintained only by public action and 
intervention.
Karl Polanyi noted this paradox in his writings on the “dou-
ble movement”—the advance of economic liberalism in nine-
teenth century England and the spontaneous self-protection of 
society that followed those advances. According to Polanyi, “the 
road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enor-
mous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism.  .  .  . Even those who wished most ardently to 
free the state from all unnecessary duties, and whose whole phi-
losophy demanded the restriction of state activities, could not 
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but entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs, 
and instruments required for the establishment of laissez-faire” 
(Polanyi, 2001: 146–47). Michel Foucault made a similar point in 
his investigations of economic liberalism. He noted that liber-
alism is a practice centered on the question of how to govern 
as minimally as possible, of how to best achieve what Benjamin 
Franklin termed “frugal government.” But according to Fou-
cault, this project of frugal government is always accompanied 
by a series of contradictions and paradoxes, as it relies on the 
“intensive and extensive development of governmental practice, 
.  .  . the invasive intrusions of a government which nevertheless 
claims to be and is supposed to be frugal” (Foucault, 2010: 28). 
This paradox has not been lost on contemporary scholars of 
neoliberalism who also emphasize that this market-based ide-
ology and practice relies upon the state for its construction and 
maintenance. (See, e.g., Davies, 2014: 310.)
The making of remittances as a development tool shows the 
important place in the making and maintenance of neoliber-
alism not just of the state, but also of international institutions 
and the policy entrepreneurs and experts working within them. 
The conventional story about the global spread of neoliberalism 
in the 1980s and 1990s, of course, highlights the role of inter-
national institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, that imposed neoliberal mandates through 
policy-based lending and structural-adjustment programs. This 
study shows that the role of these institutions has not been lim-
ited to the design and imposition of the macroeconomic-policy 
recipe of neoliberalism—privatization, liberalization, deregu-
lation, and austerity—but they have also been involved in the 
more intensive work of extending the logic of the market into 
previously excluded or ignored terrains. Throughout the book 
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we have seen how, in pursuit of their market-based solution, 
the purveyors of the R-2-D agenda—variously situated within 
international institutions, government agencies, and beyond—
productively engaged with a variety of subjects, from banking 
institutions to migrants, in their efforts to reshape the way peo-
ple across the global landscape viewed, imagined, and acted 
upon remittances.
Such engagements involved three forms of governmental 
work that, while analytically distinct, often overlap in real-world 
practices and interventions. The first of these was the knowledge 
work put into reconstituting the meaning and value of remit-
tances, offering up a new way for peoples around the world to 
understand the role of migration, migrants, and their monies in 
the global economy. This involved the displacement of previous 
debates and understandings of the meaning and value of remit-
tances, and it worked through the creation of new data-collec-
tion techniques, statistical calculations, comparisons, and visual 
representations to portray remittances as an underutilized 
financial flow that could be leveraged for development purposes.
This knowledge work, however effective, would not be 
enough on its own for the R-2-D agenda to have a meaningful 
impact on the world; if the agenda had any chance of making 
the world conform to its discursive representation, this would 
require even more governmental work. Foremost among these 
was policy design and diffusion work, through which the purveyors 
of the R-2-D agenda constructed particular market-based pol-
icy solutions and pitched them to government agencies, finan-
cial institutions, and civil-society actors around the world. Such 
work addressed a variety of obstacles to the full-scale incor-
poration of remittances within financial markets and institu-
tions. For example, in an effort to improve available data and 
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make remittance flows legible to development policymakers 
and financial markets, new data-collection techniques and pro-
cedures were codified and offered up to national-government 
agencies responsible for official reporting of remittance receipts. 
Cost-comparison Web sites would later be identified as a valuable 
means for generating transparency for consumers in the remit-
tance-transfer industry; best practices in the design of such Web 
sites were identified, and standards and official requirements 
were laid down in a World Bank certification procedure. Some-
times the lead agencies behind the creation and implementation 
of the R-2-D agenda moved beyond a facilitator role to create 
services directly for the marketplace. This was evident with the 
Mexican and U.S. central banks’ co-creation of the Directo a 
México service, which they would market across the continent 
to financial institutions on both sides of the financial corridors 
linking particular locales across the international divide; it was 
also evident with the World Bank’s creation of its own remit-
tance cost-comparison Web site, which now tracks costs in some 
220-odd “country corridors” (http://remittanceprices.world-
bank.org/en/about-remittance-prices-worldwide).
Such work often bled into a final type of governmental 
work—subject formation work—whereby various agencies sought 
to reshape the economic practices and calculations of finan-
cial institutions, to bring banks and credit unions to see the 
once-excluded population of migrant remitters and remit-
tance recipients as a potentially profitable client base, a ver-
itable “fortune at the base of the pyramid.” This work also 
involved efforts to reshape the actions, desires, and identities of 
migrants and the friends and family they left behind, to bring 
these individuals to imagine themselves as good financial sub-
jects and to act accordingly. This was recognition that, despite 
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the discursive representation of them as already fully entre-
preneurial subjects, migrants and their household units would 
require “improvement” (Li, 2007b), as they lacked the requi-
site knowledge and capacities to engage effectively in financial 
markets, managing risks, rationally processing all known mar-
ket information, calculating costs and benefits, and ultimately 
deciding upon particular financial products and services. To 
conform to the neoliberal discourse extolling the potential 
of remittances as a development tool, migrant remitters and 
their friends and family members back home were thus tar-
geted by financial education and literacy campaigns, interven-
tions designed to reshape their subjectivity, to “make important 
changes in the way that people think about and handle their 
money” (Orozco and Wilson, 2005: 380): that is, to make them 
into good financial subjects.
Thus, despite a market-fundamentalist rhetoric that cele-
brated the transformative power of the market and continually 
counseled against public action interfering with migrants’ use of 
“their own money,” the making of remittances as a development 
tool came about only as the result of significant governmental 
work by a range of agencies across various geopolitical scales. 
To say that remittances were made into a development tool as a 
result of the governmental work analyzed throughout Migrating 
into Financial Markets is not to suggest, however, that the pur-
veyors of the R-2-D agenda always and unquestionably suc-
ceeded in their efforts. The episodes recounted throughout the 
book demand a more nuanced evaluation of the effects of this 
neoliberal reform effort. Certainly those pursuing the agenda 
at various scales have achieved success on many fronts. At the 
most basic level, the agenda has been a tremendous success in 
that it brought newfound attention to remittances and generated 
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widespread enthusiasm around the idea that these monies could 
help catalyze development processes in the global South. In 
more specific terms, the agenda also succeeded in encouraging 
many national governments to improve the quality of the remit-
tances data that they report. And the increasingly visibility of 
remittances did bring about increased competition in the remit-
tance-transfer industry and reduce the costs borne by remitters 
in much of the world.
Not all the governmental work behind the agenda, however, 
has met with such success. Perhaps most clearly, the efforts to 
reshape the subjectivities of banking institutions, migrants, and 
remittance recipients appear to have faced greater challenges. 
The policy entrepreneurs promoting the financial-democracy 
aspect of the agenda did successfully engage banking institu-
tions, and their message about the potential value of migrants 
and their monies seems to have resonated with many of them. 
This was apparent when many major banking institutions in the 
United States began offering low-cost remittance-transfer prod-
ucts over the last decade. But as mentioned in chapter 3, this 
interest seems to be waning recently, as banks are increasingly 
abandoning these services in response to both stepped-up reg-
ulation and a lack of customer demand. And while significant 
numbers of local banks and community credit unions bought in 
to the Directo a México program and agreed to offer the ser-
vice, the startlingly low number of transfers processed through 
the service suggests that few of these institutions have whole-
heartedly embraced the vision and truly committed to recruit-
ing migrants as valuable members and clients. The task of 
reshaping the financial imaginations, identities, and behaviors of 
migrants appears an even more challenging task, as I discuss in 
the following section.
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transnational engagement: beyond 
interstate ComPetition
Existing scholarship on state-led transnationalism has gone 
a long way in documenting and analyzing the efforts made by 
migrant-sending states to retain the loyalties and resources of 
their absent populations—helping to explain, in other words, 
what “governments do when a large part of their population 
simply gets up and leaves” (Fitzgerald, 2009: 2). The analysis of 
the emergence and application of the R-2-D agenda provides 
additional insight, elaborating and extending our understanding 
of transnational migration, the public policies addressing it, and 
the possibilities for social justice and transformation emanating 
from it.
We have seen that the transnational-engagement policies 
addressing migrants are no longer unilaterally adopted and pur-
sued by sending states; the R-2-D agenda has forged a collabo-
ration between sending and receiving states, as well as a broader 
range of international financial institutions and development 
agencies. As initially formulated, the transnational-engagement 
policies of migrant-sending states would seem to have been 
driven by a logic of interstate competition. Those policies were 
designed to capture the political, economic, and social resources 
of an absent population, gaining access to increased knowledge 
and skills through the so-called brain circulation (Saxenian, 
2005) and to foreign exchange through continued remittance 
flows. Successful application of such policies held the promise of 
favorably repositioning migrant-sending states within the global 
political-economic system. The logic of the R-2-D agenda is dif-
ferent; this is transnational collaboration—not competition—
based on a shared commitment to the expansion and extension 
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of markets, the pursuit of utopian, market-fundamentalist public 
policies aimed at least rhetorically at tackling global inequality 
and injustice by fully incorporating migrants and their monies 
within global financial markets, trying to “make markets work 
for the poor.” This project aims, in other words, at extend-
ing neoliberalism to encompass previously marginalized and 
excluded peoples and geographies; it is an attempt to use trans-
national migration as a relay to reproduce and further entrench 
neoliberalism.
But achieving this goal of further extending the reach of neo-
liberalism and its market-based solutions by engaging previ-
ously excluded peoples and places is not always easy. One of the 
central difficulties in making reality conform to the discursive 
construction of remittances as a development tool is that the 
R-2-D agenda’s ultimate target population, the migrating sub-
jects whose conduct it seeks to shape, transform, and improve, 
is often characterized by clandestinity, mobility, and mistrust. 
The case of Mexican migrants is instructive on this point. Mex-
ico’s state-led transnationalism policies—aimed precisely at 
reincorporating Mexico’s absent population, at capturing the 
loyalties, energies, and resources of the population of mexicanos 
en el exterior—have regularly been touted as best practices for 
other governments to learn from and follow. The other agen-
cies and organizations working to implement the R-2-D agenda 
in North America rely upon the Mexican government’s trans-
national-engagement policies, agencies, and institutions as their 
means to gain entry and to connect with this mobile population. 
The officials within organizations and agencies collaborating 
with the Mexican government undoubtedly assume that these 
policies and practices have been effective at recapturing this 
absent population—and the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the 
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Mexican officials running these programs (e.g., García de Alba, 
2010) probably does nothing but reinforce such beliefs.
But as we have seen, there are reasons to doubt the effec-
tiveness of this transnational-policy apparatus as it expands 
its reach, moving beyond an elite stratum to engage the full 
range of migrants—and their friends and family back home—
in the types of financial-education and literacy training that 
they hope will make the individuals within this population 
into good financial subjects. As noted in the previous chapter, 
many migrants mistrust government officials and are suspicious 
of their intentions when they claim they want to help improve 
migrants’ lives. This constitutes a significant challenge for the 
transnational-policy apparatus and those programs aimed at 
educating migrants, at reshaping their attitudes and identities in 
ways more consistent with the logic and ethos of market funda-
mentalism. The fact that these educational efforts are currently 
being carried out in collaboration with agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment likely does not help to quiet migrants’ mistrust; in fact, 
it may well exacerbate such mistrust. This is because the inclu-
sionary project of the R-2-D agenda sits uneasily beside another 
governmental project targeted at Mexican migrants within the 
United States—one that aims at their physical exclusion at the 
territorial boundary and the insertion of those who make it to 
the interior into what Nicholas de Genova terms a “social space 
of ‘illegality’ ” (2002: 427).
These inclusionary and exclusionary governmental projects 
run at cross-purposes. Given that most Mexicans from peasant 
or working-class backgrounds have little to no realistic chance 
of entering the United States legally (Spener, 2009: 9–10), con-
temporary Mexican migration is largely unauthorized. Nestor 
Rodríguez has usefully conceptualized this as “autonomous 
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international migration” (Rodríguez, 1996; Spener, 2009), 
migrant self-activity undertaken despite the existence and 
objectives of state regulations seeking to restrict their move-
ments across the international boundary. Autonomous migrants 
have developed an elaborate repertoire of attitudes and actions 
to evade detection by the agents of government who would deny 
them a livelihood within the United States, practices that have 
been carefully honed through a process of what Rodríguez (1999: 
70) terms the “social accumulation of knowledge and skills.” This 
set of attitudes, practices, and mentalities adopted by the popu-
lation of undocumented Mexican migrants to remain untouched 
by government authorities, to keep themselves outside the view 
and reach of boundary policing and immigration-enforcement 
regimes, render this population slippery and intractable when 
government agents of various sorts target them with productive 
modes of power, with attempts to include them in financial mar-
kets, shape their individual subjectivities and practices, and turn 
them into good financial subjects by way of financial-literacy 
and education schemes. In large part this is because migrants do 
not stop to inform authorities on either side of the boundary of 
their comings and goings. The prevalence of clandestine entry 
means that there is no accurate register documenting the iden-
tities of migrants or where they are physically located. The lack 
of such registries makes it difficult to develop any finely cali-
brated efforts to target and recruit migrants for financial educa-
tion and training.
While the prevalence of clandestine and autonomous migra-
tion constitutes a significant obstacle for governmental projects 
targeting and seeking to “improve” migrants and their commu-
nities, the agents pursuing the R-2-D agenda are elaborating and 
drawing upon new surveillance technologies that may facilitate 
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this task. In the North American case, for example, certainly no 
accurate register exists of the entire population of autonomous 
migrants entering the United States from Mexico. But Mexican 
authorities are trying to remedy this deficiency through their 
Matrícula Consular (MCAS) initiative. As we have seen, the 
MCAS played a key part in the Mexican consular corps’s efforts 
to promote financial education and literacy, particularly as a 
means to negotiate with banks and other financial institutions to 
provide workshops and public presentations to the captive audi-
ence of Mexican migrants within consulate waiting rooms. These 
authorities are also beginning to use their database of all MCAS 
cardholders to target particular segments of the larger migrant 
population. This is most clearly seen with the corredores finan-
cieros program. Here the database is being used to identify com-
munity-level trends, to specify geographic concentrations in the 
United States of migrants from particular localities in Mexico, 
and to shape and engage those migrants as good financial subjects 
within these socially constructed translocal financial corridors.
Autonomous migration is sometimes presented as fully 
transformational, as having somehow freed the undocumented 
migrant from the moorings of nation-building projects and 
states’ “monopoly on the power to assign identities to those 
who enter [their] space” (Kearney, 1991: 58). The findings of this 
project would seem to caution against any such overly celebra-
tory readings of the meaning and consequences of autonomous 
migration. The pursuit of the R-2-D agenda in North America 
may face challenges in reaching and impacting certain segments 
of its target population, particularly undocumented migrants, 
but that does not mean that this target population has been freed 
completely from the gaze of these governmental authorities. 
Quite the contrary. The elaborate governmental project that 
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public officials in both the United States and Mexico, as well as 
their partners in international organizations, have carried out—
targeting migrants, their monies, and their communities for 
improvement—dispels any facile suggestion that autonomous 
migration necessarily transgresses the reach and power of the 
territorial nation-state and the more expansive networks of gov-
ernmental power that these are currently forging.
Today’s undocumented Mexican migrants may have more 
latitude and room for maneuver than if they were enrolled in 
a new guest-worker program, and they would certainly seem 
more “free” than the Philippine migrants caught up in that 
state’s “labor-brokerage” programs, which involve government 
officials in all aspects of the migration process, from recruit-
ment and training to job placement and contract enforcement 
(Rodriguez, 2010). But that freedom comes at a price, includ-
ing the monetary cost of hiring coyotes to guide migrants around 
the militarized enforcement apparatus of the U.S. Border Patrol, 
the physical cost of the perilous journey across the international 
boundary, the emotional cost of living with the ever-present 
danger of disruption and dislocation as the U.S. government’s 
detention and deportation regime further penetrates the spaces 
of migrants’ everyday lives, as well as the less tangible costs of 
enduring family separation. Lamentably, all these costs, and the 
human suffering that they entail, are erased from view as the 
R-2-D agenda touches ground in North America.
Unseating the hegemony of  
marKet-based solUtions
Finally, a few words are in order regarding the political implica-
tions of the foregoing analysis of the content and consequences 
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of the R-2-D agenda. This agenda and the governmental agen-
cies driving it are ultimately pursuing a rather straightforward 
objective. The basic formulation is: migration leads to develop-
ment, which leads to the end of migration; that remittance-led 
development can (and should) lead to a postmigration future. 
This book has detailed the significant governmental work 
required in the attempt to make this formulation a reality and 
has documented the uneven effects of the policies put into prac-
tice to achieve this objective. In this final section I want to move 
beyond this line of analysis to entertain alternative ways of 
thinking about migration and development, most of all by call-
ing into question the taken-for-granted assumption that devel-
opment should be pursued in the global South so that people 
can stay home, so that they can remain in the places where they 
were born and “where they belong.”
Even some of the more creative voices in recent debates over 
immigration reform in North America, themselves highly critical 
of the types of market-fundamentalist policies underlying North 
American economic integration and the R-2-D project, have 
attempted to redirect the political debate around immigration 
and the need for policy reform to focus on the need to stimulate 
economic development in Mexico’s migrant-sending regions so as 
to assure the people living there “the right to stay home” (Global 
Exchange, 2008). These voices advocate a “comprehensive effort 
to slow or reverse the outflow of Mexicans to the United States,” 
an effort that would need to focus on reducing “the crushing 
economic pressures that have won Mexico the unenvied posi-
tion of being the world’s undisputed leader in out-migration” 
(Lewis, 2008: 6, 7). There is certainly much value in these calls 
for improving the economic conditions and opportunities avail-
able to workers and small farmers in Mexico’s migrant-sending 
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regions. But this critical perspective really offers little in the 
way of an alternative, as it shares two problematic features of the 
market-centric R-2-D agenda. First, by representing migration 
as “economic expulsion” (Lewis, 2008: 8), migrants are framed as 
agencyless victims of macrostructural forces, and the full range 
of social and cultural, as well as political-economic factors, that 
have made migration into a self-sustaining process are steadfastly 
ignored. Second, migration is taken to be perverse, a patholog-
ical social process that needs to be undermined and ultimately 
reversed.
Some of the more nuanced contributions to debates about 
migration and development have, commendably, framed the 
ultimate objective of public policies not as putting a stop to 
migration but instead as making migration an option rather 
than a necessity. While this formulation does, unfortunately, 
reproduce the understanding of migration as driven exclusively 
by economic forces, as compelled by economic necessity, this 
nuanced statement of objectives helps point toward new ways of 
thinking about the future of migration and the policies address-
ing it. Most important, it helps to emphasize the value of making 
international migration and mobility into a real option accessi-
ble to peoples around the world.
The R-2-D agenda gives no sustained attention to the 
severely limited availability of legal channels for labor migra-
tion into the global North, and this constitutes one of the 
most glaring absences from this policy agenda. An alternative 
approach to migration and development1 would need to rem-
edy this silence, insisting that the potentially positive relation-
ship between migration and development cannot be realized if 
migration is not truly an option, if the dearth of legal migra-
tion channels renders substantial portions of migrants “illegal,” 
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entails migrants’ long-term separation from family and friends, 
and often requires death-defying treks through the most 
inhospitable terrains.
Through their collective forging of enduring transnational 
social spaces, migrants can valorize and find dignity in their 
engagement in political, economic, social, and familial life in 
multiple spaces across international borders—as was clearly 
evident in the CCIME consejera María Antonieta González’s 
address to President Felipe Calderón, recounted in chapter 4 
above. Perhaps this form of “transnational living” (Guarnizo, 
2003) is not a problem that needs to be eliminated or reversed; 
perhaps the problem resides, instead, in exclusionary bound-
ary-enforcement policies designed to restrict mobility, to bound 
social life within the limits of the territorial nation-state, and to 
contain peoples within the places where they were born and are 
thought to belong. If this is the case, undermining and revers-
ing these exclusionary policies should be the objective of any 
political project designed to truly make migration an “option.” 
This would likely contribute to a much more attractive form of 
“development” for the world’s poor and excluded than the finan-
cial inclusion promised by the R-2-D agenda.
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ChaPter 1. introdUCing the  
remittanCes-to-develoPment agenda
1. This translation has been produced by the author, as have all 
other translations of original Spanish- language sources in this book.
2. This is not to say that an important academic literature has not 
been spawned alongside the growing interest in remittances as a devel-
opment tool; indeed one has. Academics have made valuable attempts 
to bring scholarly argument and evidence to the attention of policy-
makers, in an attempt to further perfect public policy on migration 
and development. (See, e.g., Martin and Zürcher, 2008.) Other, more 
critical contributions have demonstrated many of the faulty bases on 
which the edifice of remittances and development policies have been 
constructed. (See, e.g., Goldring, 2004; de Haas, 2007; Delgado- Wise 
and Márquez Covarrubias, 2007; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010.) As 
will become clear below, this project is distinct in that I am not solely 
interested in contributing to the formation or critique of remittances 
and development policies. More fundamentally, Migrating into Finan-
cial Markets examines the governmental work—the knowledge prac-
tices, political maneuvering, and subjectivity formation—that made 
notes
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possible this “new discovery” and its rapid diffusion around the world 
in the early years of the new millennium.
3. I place “development” within quotation marks here to signal the 
contested nature of this concept. It is beyond the scope of the book to 
venture too deeply into the thorny academic debates about the mean-
ing and desirability of “development” or “postdevelopment” alterna-
tives. Suffice it to say that the notion of development implicated in 
most contemporary remittances- and- development debates and pol-
icy proposals would seem fully consistent with what Sally Matthews 
has termed the “post– World War II development project”—those var-
ious and competing theoretical positions, from modernization theory 
and its neo- Marxist critics on through to neoliberalism, united by a 
universalist belief in “progress,” in the notion that “some areas of the 
world are ‘developed,’ and others not, and that those which are not can 
and should set about achieving the ‘development’ which has thus far 
eluded them” (Matthews, 2004: 375).
4. Iskander’s description of this program makes clear just how 
labor- intensive this “strategy of accompaniment” was. She notes that 
Moroccan officials literally accompanied individual migrants to the 
offices of the French postal service, helping them to fill out neces-
sary paperwork and interact with postal staff, in their effort to bring 
migrants and their monies into the formal banking system (Iskander, 
2013: 169).
5. I draw the term “policy entrepreneur” from Mintrom (2000) and 
use it here to describe the officials and bureaucratic staff within vari-
ous public and private institutions advocating the conceptual and pol-
icy changes encapsulated in the R- 2- D agenda.
6. Public officials and policy entrepreneurs have not completely 
abandoned policies based on state- migrant cooperation in favor 
of these market- based solutions. Certainly programs like Mexi-
co’s Tres por Uno program continue to function with some suc-
cess. But market- based solutions have increasingly overshadowed 
 state- migrant partnerships. This is due in part to the fact that devel-
opment policymakers in the international institutions and many 
national  governments see these market- based solutions as offering 
potentially greater payoffs—by tapping into the entire stream of 
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migrants’ remittances and not just the much smaller fraction of “col-
lective remittances” (Goldring, 2004) gathered by organized migrant 
associations. But it is also clearly a function of the broader political- 
economic context favoring market- based solutions over explicit gov-
ernment action in the economy.
7. Particularly spirited has been the debate around whether such 
developments signal the emergence of a “deterritorialized nation- 
state” (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, 1994). This concep-
tualization of the nation- state as somehow “deterritorialized” has been 
the object of significant critique. (See, e.g., Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; 
Østergaard- Nielsen, 2003; Robert C. Smith, 2003; Waldinger and Fitz-
gerald, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2009.) While these criticisms may be right to 
point to the limits of the nation- state being unhinged from its territo-
rial foundations, in some cases they seem to mischaracterize the initial 
formulation of the deterritorialized nation- state as a political project, 
a set of perceptions, imaginings, and constructions of the nation and 
its citizenry as extending beyond the territorial limits of the officially 
recognized nation- state.
8. Within the transnationalism literature, this possibility is most 
forcefully articulated by Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004: 1180– 81), 
who chide transnationalism scholars for failing to subject to significant 
inquiry the topic of the relationship between immigrant transnation-
alism and the receiving state.
9. This narrative works in large part by extending a version of 
the Malthusian “perversity thesis” (Somers and Block, 2005) into the 
realm of global- development policymaking. As Somers and Block 
(2005) show, that perversity thesis worked to undermine welfare pro-
grams by suggesting that, far from eliminating poverty, these pro-
grams actually caused it. In a similar manner, the rhetoric behind 
the turn to microfinance and associated development policies serves 
to undermine the value and importance of official development assis-
tance (ODA) or other forms of redistribution at a global scale. In this 
narrative, ODA is essentially presented as an international version of 
welfare, and it carries the pernicious effects characteristic of welfare 
in that it creates “aid dependence” and limits the initiative of govern-
ments and individuals in “developing countries” to work their own 
220 / Notes
way out of  poverty. The market- based alternative proposed by micro-
finance, often summarized as the need to provide “opportunities not 
handouts,” is a repudiation of aid as a form of charity and the sugges-
tion that real change is to be found in poor people’s exercising micro-
entrepreneurship. (See, e.g., Yunus, 2007: 115– 16.)
ChaPter 2. faCts, figUres, and the  
PolitiCs of measUrement
1. See, for example, http://www5.iadb.org/mif/ProgramsandProjects/
AccesstoFinance/Remittances/tabid/215/language/en- US/Default.aspx; 




2. As Merlingen (2006: 187) notes, such an approach to global poli-
tics (and economics) helps identify the “technical ways in which real-
ity is made thinkable” through myriad “inscription devices” such as 
reports, graphs, statistics, diagrams, and drawings.
3. In fairness, we should note that the MIF Remittances Program 
did also produce maps of the outflow of remittances from the United 
States and Spain. But once again, while these maps provided valuable 
detail in terms of the aggregate amounts remitted from particular U.S. 
states or Spanish autonomous communities, they did not provide any 
concrete detail about the specific destinations of these monies.
ChaPter 3. forging the  
remittanCes-to-develoPment nexUs
1. In this sense the R- 2- D agenda internalizes and reproduces 
a trend toward the “financialization of development” (Roy, 2010) 
whereby access to credit and financial services has become the ulti-
mate objective of development policymaking.
2. This phrase is quoted in the appeals court decision from this 
class- action lawsuit. See 267 F3d 743. http://www.nmta.us/site/page.
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php?347 (accessed June 4, 2010); http://events.iadb.org/calendar/event-
Detail.aspx?lang=es&id=1533&OID=102 (accessed June 11, 2010).
3. “Who’s Who in Remittance Transfers”: http://www.profeco.gob.
mx/envio/cuadros.asp (accessed January 13, 2015).
4. http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/Content/about.php (accessed 
June 4, 2010).
5. http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org (accessed January 13, 2015).
6. See http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en/national-and- 
regional-databases-certified-by-the-world-bank (accessed January 13, 
2015) for a visual representation of this World Bank stamp of approval.
7. We should note, however, that even with this decline in the 
average transfer cost, some services from many of the major players 
that dominate the industry—Western Union, MoneyGram, Orlandi 
Valuta, Vigo, etc.—continue to be priced above 6 percent from the 
United States to Mexico. http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en/
corridor/United- States/Mexico (accessed July 13, 2014).
8. With the MDGs world leaders drew up a list of eight concrete 
development goals, ranging from the reduction of global poverty by 
50 percent between 1990 and 2015 (Goal no. 1), the reduction of child 
mortality by two- thirds during the same time period (Goal no. 4), and 
the creation of a “global partnership” for development (Goal no. 8). 
See Sachs, 2005, for a discussion and impassioned plea on behalf of the 
MDGs.
9. Most of these authors are associated with the World Bank’s Migra-
tion and Development Team, whose work can be found at http://www.
worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances (accessed August 9, 
2011).
10. The market- centric logic of the R- 2- D agenda was expressed 
succinctly by Orozco and Wilson (2005: 380), who claimed that, with 
the magnitude of aggregate remittance flows well documented and 
widely circulated, “the profit motive will ensure that the financial 
sector and other businesses will change the way they view migrants 
and their families.” In later years there has been explicit recognition 
of the limits to this market- centric vision of the profit motive driv-
ing financial inclusion. For example, the authors of a 2007 report of 
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the Inter- American Dialogue’s Task Force on Remittances, reflect-
ing upon the limited progress that had been made on the “banking 
the unbanked” recommendations contained in an earlier report (IAD, 
2004), pointed to the limits of this assumption. In their words, “when 
that report was written, the task force believed that U.S. banks would, 
on their own, conclude that serving the immigrant community was 
good business. Some banks have responded, but the number is far too 
small” (IAD, 2007: 10).
11. This discussion and the concept of  depoliticization draw inspi-
ration from James Ferguson and his suggestion that development dis-
course works by “reposing political questions . . . as technical ‘problems’ 
responsive to the technical ‘development’ intervention” (1990: 270).
ChaPter 4. bringing remittanCes into 
the north ameriCan eConomiC- 
integration ProjeCt
1. This term of art references not just Mexican migrants living abroad 
but also their children and subsequent generations born abroad. While 
the term addresses all Mexicans living abroad, the vast majority of 
migrants and their descendants are concentrated in the United States.
2. Here I’m building from Tomas Hammar’s (1990) distinction 
between two types of migrant host-state policies: immigration poli-
cies that are designed to regulate the entrance of foreigners into the 
national territory and immigrant policies that seek to facilitate the 
integration of foreigners within the nation-state’s social institutions.
3. The term was coined by Mexican political scientist Manuel 
García y Griego (1988: 147) in the mid-1980s and has been widely used 
to describe the unstated migration policy of the Mexican government 
from 1974 to around 1988.
4. Some commentators have suggested that the events of 9/11 were 
not the determining factor that dashed the hopes for Fox’s grand 
vision. Luis Carlos Ugalde (2003: 116), for example, has argued that 
“even if the attacks had not occurred, the audacious move by the Mex-
ican government to introduce a ‘NAFTA plus’ scheme to liberalize 
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the labor market across North America would have had very lim-
ited success.” Ugalde suggests that domestic constraints of a political 
and structural nature in the United States, such as electoral interests 
and the declining vitality of the economy, would have blocked the 
path to an eventual migration agreement, even in the absence of the 
 terrorist attacks. While there were surely domestic political and eco-
nomic obstacles that any agreement would have had to overcome, the 
arguments  forwarded by Ugalde and others fail to apprehend the real 
importance of Fox’s vision of the future and of the expert analysis of 
the U.S.-Mexico Migration Panel that supported that vision. These 
discourses articulated economic conditions and political interests and 
values around a vision of deeper North American integration that jus-
tified migration reform in the short term and disappearing controls on 
human mobility over the long term. The political work done by these 
visions was to restructure the political terrain and expand the limits 
of the possible.
5. http://www.ime.gob.mx. Accessed March 20, 2011.
6. Most important for our purposes, this has included a series of 
some twenty Lazos Económicos bulletins providing links to the lat-
est research and promotional material about the financial-education 
efforts and remittances and development projects carried out by Mex-
ican agencies and their allies in the international institutions, the U.S. 
government, the private sector, and civil society.
7. Recent Jornadas have addressed women business owners, 
migrant health professionals, home-town association leaders, and indi-
viduals and organizations involved in financial education, for instance.
8. In addition to the challenge this constituted for the emigrant 
policies examined here, the next section identifies the significant effect 
of 9/11 on the emigration policies promoted by the Fox administration.
9. Recognition of the MCAS would offer migrants some minimal 
rights, including the ability to identify themselves before law-enforce-
ment officials and to gain access to financial services. But these benefits 
pale in comparison to the many other difficulties faced by undocu-
mented migrants. Even with the new MCAS, most migrants would 
remain in an undocumented legal status that offered them little to 
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no labor rights, left them vulnerable to widespread workplace abuse, 
and forced them to endure the ever-present danger of detention and 
deportation by immigration authorities.
10. This tactic has not stopped the anti-matrícula forces, those same 
people that see this as a form of “quasi citizenship,” from branding the 
card “the illegal-alien ID card.” See, for example, Center for Immigra-
tion Studies, 2003; and Dinerstein, 2003. Surprisingly, Jorge Castañeda, 
the then leader of the SRE, confessed in a memoir about this period 
that he personally thought of the redesign and promotion of the 
MCAS as part of the pursuit of “creeping legalization” (Castañeda, 
2007: 149). Délano (2009: 794n.) reiterates the government’s public line 
in response to Castañeda’s admission, arguing that “Consular IDs in 
no way affect the legal status of Mexicans in the United States.”
11. For example, Mexican consul Hugo Juárez from the San José 
consulate in northern California directly lobbied county supervisors 
in Santa Clara and Santa Cruz counties during March 2002. Discus-
sions of these contacts and the resolutions recognizing the MCAS that 
were successfully passed in both jurisdictions can be found at: http://
www.blancaalvarado.org/pastproj/consular.html#II (accessed May 7, 
2009) and http://sccounty01.co.santa-cruz.ca.us/bds/Govstream/ASP/
Display/PdfFinder.asp?Type=Agenda&MeetingDate=20020618&File 
name=051.pdf (accessed March 20, 2011).
12. This finding will come as little surprise to those familiar 
with Calavita’s (1992) study of the Bracero Program, which tediously 
unpacked the black box of “the state” to identify not just the polit-
ical-economic contradictions that would eventually undermine that 
policy but also the living and breathing human beings inhabiting the 
state whose actions at its levers are driven by personal and (agency- 
specific) professional interests.
13. See the boilerplate legal agreement drawn up by officials in the 
SRE: “Acuerdo para Involucrar a las Instituciones Bancarias Estadoun-
idenses en la Promoción de las Matrículas Consulares en Estados 
Unidos,” available at http://www.ime.gob.mx/ime2/images/educacion_
financiera/acuerdo_bancos_consulados.pdf (accessed July 29, 2014).
14. http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection. Accessed March 20, 2011.
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ChaPter 5. from Promise to PraCtiCe
1. The demise of the New Alliance Task Force (NATF), a collabo-
ration between the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
Mexican consulates across the country (Frias, 2004), is a good exam-
ple of this. When I approached officials within the FDIC’s community- 
affairs department to discuss the work of the NATF, work that had been 
widely praised (see Orozco, 2004; Hernández-Coss, 2005; Paulson et al., 
2006), they were reluctant to speak with me on the record, as they feared 
that our discussions might touch on topics related to immigration policy. 
They even sought to distance themselves from the NATF collaboration, 
as illustrated in the following excerpt from an e-mail message I received 
from the agency’s national coordinator for community affairs: “We are 
glad to talk about our initiative, but are not authorized to discuss immi-
gration policy, or procedures. It is precisely for this reason that we were 
not able to engage in a formal partnership representing an inter-govern-
mental collaboration” (Electronic communication, May 14, 2009).
2. In the United States, this system goes by the name FedACH. In 
Mexico, it known as Cecoban, SA de CV.
3. Available at http://www.directoamexico.com/preguntas.html and 
http://www.directoamexico.com/caract.html. Accessed February 25, 2011.
4. See http://www.frbservices.org/files/help/pdf/DirectoMexico-
FAQ.pdf. Accessed January 23, 2015.
5. Available at http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/Country- 
Corridors/United-States/Mexico/. Accessed November 5, 2013.
6. As of April 2010, with the implementation of a new pago en ven-
tanilla service, recipients in Mexico are no longer required to receive 
their monies in an account (www.directoamexico.com/quees.html). 
This new service offers cash payment through the branches of the 
national Telecomm-Telégrafos system. I discuss this recent innovation, 
and the reasons for it, in more detail below.
7. A Web page detailing government efforts at promoting the ser-
vice suggests that a number of other cities were visited in similar road 
shows throughout 2005 and 2006. See http://www.directoamexico.
com/promo.html. Accessed March 15, 2011.
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8. “Memoria de la 36a Jornada Informativa del Instituto de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior, Banco de México y The Federal Reserve 
Financial Services,” available at www.ime.gob.mx/ime2/jornadas/36_
jornada.pdf. Accessed: April 2, 2008.
9. Audio of this presentation is available at http://www.conference 
cart.com/nacha/payments2008/sessions/player.html?sid=080503101. 
Accessed: March 3, 2011.
10. Remarks at the session “From the Back Lobby to the Front 
Office: Practical Tips in Building a Successful Remittance Program,” 
at Payments 2008 Conference, May 19, 2008.
11. For an example of a white-branded poster publicizing the service, 
see http://www.frbservices.org/files/serviceofferings/pdf/Directo 
Mexico_Poster_Spanish.pdf.
12. Remarks at the session “From the Back Lobby to the Front 
Office” (above, n. 10).
13. See http://www.ime.gob.mx/ime2/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=263&Itemid=55. Accessed March 5, 2011.
14. Available at http://consulmex.sre.gob.mx/calexico/index.php? 
view=article&catid=4:articulos&id=52:corredores-financieros-mexico- 
estados-unidos&tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=. 
Accessed March 5, 2011.
15. As of November 2008, this relatively small number of monthly 
transactions made St. Paul Federal “the market leader” among  financial 
institutions offering the Directo a México service within the Ninth 
Federal Reserve District (Grover and Nguyen, 2008). I will  discuss 
these sobering numbers in more depth below in the section enti-
tled “Significant Governmental Work and Limited Results:  Pursuing 
Explanations.”
16. http://www.directoamexico.com/corredores.html. Accessed 
November 5, 2013.
17. Available at http://www.ccul.org/02media/newsprint.cfm? 
dailynews__ID=3717. Accessed March 13, 2011.
18. Available at www.saberespoder.com/inicio.html. Accessed 
March 10, 2011.
19. “Servicios Bancarios” video. Available at http://www.saberes 
poder.com/red_video_sep6.html. Accessed March 10, 2011.
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20. Available at http://www.directoamexico.com/tutorial/index.
php. Accessed March 15, 2011.
21. Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultar 
DirectorioInternetAction.do?accion=consultarCuadro&idCuadro= 
CF311&sector=21&locale=es. Accessed November 4, 2013.
22. Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultar 
DirectorioInternetAction.do?accion=consultarCuadro&idCuadro= 
CE81&sector=1&locale=es. Accessed November 4, 2013.
23. It is probably too early to tell whether this new option for cash 
distribution in Mexico will make Directo a México more attractive to 
migrants. However, over three years after the pago en ventanilla option 
was introduced, it has not yet made a significant difference in the num-
ber of Directo a México transactions reported by Banxico. From April 
2010 to September 2013, the most recent statistics available at the time 
of this writing, the monthly transfer volume has grown only modestly, 
from 30,731 in April 2010 to a high of 35,013 transactions in August 2013. 
Even if the “government items” sent through Directo a México held 
steady at around 29,500 transfers and all of the growth in transfers was 
in “commercial items,” these would still represent less than 0.1 percent 
of the 6.42 million transfers sent in August 2013.
24. Admittedly, this one conversation cannot be deemed conclu-
sive evidence of such a habitus of resistance. Additional indications 
for its existence can be found in the existing research literature (e.g., 
Marchand, 2007; Fitzgerald, 2009, 2013) as well as my own field work. 
During a visit to the waiting room of the Mexican consulate in Sac-
ramento, for instance, I observed consular staff and representatives 
from the California Department of Labor provide an impromptu 
seminar to waiting migrants about wage and hour regulations and 
other aspects of labor law that might be of real interest to Mexican 
migrants, regardless of their legal status. And yet the migrants assem-
bled in the waiting room responded with marked indifference. While 
it is hard to say definitively what was going through the minds of 
these migrants, skepticism and distrust no doubt played some part as 
they continued watching television and conversing with friends and 
family rather than engaging with the government officials’ informa-
tional seminar. Other scholars have also noted migrants’ distrust of 
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the government officials promoting various migration and develop-
ment policies. In research on the Tres pro Uno program in the state 
of Tlaxcala, Marchand (2008) also noted that migrants expressed seri-
ous distrust in government officials, whom they perceived to be cor-
rupt and paternalistic. Given this, the migrants she interviewed were 
reluctant to participate in co-financing projects with government 
officials (Marchand, 2008: 236–37). In his discussion of political “dis-
similation,” Fitzgerald (2013: 128) notes Mexican migrants’ high levels 
of “disaffection with Mexican politics”; as an indication of just how 
widespread this is, he points to a Pew Hispanic Trust survey from 
2006 in which only 13 percent of migrant respondents reported view-
ing Mexican political institutions favorably. According to Iskander 
(2013), migrant distrust of government officials also plagued Moroccan 
migration and development-policy endeavors.
25. It is conceivable that the Executive Action announced by Pres-
ident Barack Obama in November 2014, which may offer temporary 
protection from deportation to millions of undocumented immi-
grants, will help remedy this distrust in U.S.-government agen-
cies and officials. But since this offers only a temporary reprieve, it 
must appear unlikely that such an action will have much impact on 
migrants’ perceptions.
ConClUsions
1. Such an alternative surely needs to rescue the notion of 
“ development” from the jaws of the “post– World War II development 
project” with its single, universal pathway and objective of capital-
ist modernization. At a minimum, this would mean identifying and 
fomenting grassroots- driven projects of development, understood as 
“positive change” (Matthews, 2004: 376) defined and desired by peo-
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